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David Brooks Harris 
 
 
In this dissertation I examine the Child Tax Credit (CTC), who gets it and who doesn’t, 
paying particular attention to children under the age of three, its legislative and political 
history, and how it could be improved.  At $56.4 billion per year, the Child Tax Credit 
(CTC) is nearly the largest U.S. federal expenditure on children and families, second only 
to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), at $59.5 billion (JCT, 2011).  Created in 1997, 
it has been expanded seven times in just the last decade. Yet in spite of America’s federal 
commitment of dollars and legislative commitment of reform, little has been written 
about the CTC. 
 
I examine the literature first to see if cash and cash assistance matter, finding on balance 
that there is strong evidence that it does, particularly for young children; second to show 
that the U.S. underinvests in this domain in young children relative both to what is 
needed and to what other advanced industrialized countries do; and third to lay out the 
case that changes to the refundable CTC offer one opportunity to address this 
underinvestment.  I examine the legislative history of the CTC, as I believe both the 
policy analysis and history need to be understood to inform the policy responses.   
 
Next, I examine whether the portion of the new safety net that was fashioned as tax 
policy is working as child policy – specifically, whether it is reaching our youngest 
children, with initial evidence that it may not be in the case of the CTC (Burman and 
Wheaton, 2007) yet may be in the case of the EITC (Dowd and Horowitz, 2011).  Using 
the 2011 Current Population March Supplement, I examine empirical evidence of the age 
distribution of federal tax credits for children, finding that 29% of children under the age 
of three are in families with too little earnings to get the full CTC, as opposed to 20% of 
older children.  Nearly 13% of children under the age of three are in families with no 
earnings and as such get no CTC or EITC, as opposed to 8% of older children.  While the 
EITC may disproportionately benefit young children, poor young children are more likely 
to be left out eligibility of the EITC than their older counterparts.  Since infants may or 
may not be eligible for any CTC or EITC, depending on their birth month, I suggest that 
as some have found a marriage penalty in parts of the tax code, that there may also be a 
“baby penalty.”  I use micro-simulation to examine the costs and benefits of alternative 
CTC policies.  Here I find that while full refundability may be the optimum CTC policy, 
that there are other possibilities, including those that increase the phase-in of eligibility, 
that are less costly, and also substantially lower child poverty among young children, 
including doubling the CTC for young children, increasing the phase in, and using a look 
back provision to allow families to use their previous year’s earnings to calculate their 
refundable CTC and EITC.  Yet, only moving to full refundability would do anything for 
the 12.67% of young children in families with no earnings.   
 
Finally, I propose policy responses that are rooted both in the science of increased cash 
investments in young children, and in the politics of working legislatively to get there, 
suggesting that policy makers consider the question of age equity when examining the 
distributional effects of tax policies.  Implications for research and policy are discussed.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction and Overview 
 
In this dissertation I examine the Child Tax Credit (CTC), who gets it and who doesn’t, paying 
particular attention to children under the age of three, its legislative and political history, and 
how it could be improved.  In this chapter, I discuss my rationale for examining the CTC, 
provide a brief legislative and policy background, and having done so, present an outline of the 
chapters. 
 
1.  Rationale:    
 
At $56.4 billion per year, the Child Tax Credit (CTC) is nearly the largest U.S. federal 
expenditure on children and families, second only to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), at 
$59.5 billion (JCT, 2011).  Created in 1997, it has been expanded seven times in just the last 
decade.   Since 2008, nearly $50 billion in new outlays of refundable child tax credits have been 
passed by Congress in four separate bills – ranging from approximately $3.5 billion in 2008 to 
nearly $10 billion in annual costs in 2010.  The annual cost of the CTC – both the refundable and 
non-refundable portions – is now $56 billion.  President Obama’s budget would move these 
expansions into baseline law. 
 
Yet in spite of America’s federal commitment of dollars and legislative commitment of reform, 
little has been written about the CTC.   
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The United States now has a safety net largely conditioned on earnings as opposed to need.  In 
fact, some 91% of all spending in 2010 on federal entitlement benefits went to either people who 
are not expected to work because they are 65 or older or disabled, or to families with at least one 
worker (Greenstein, 2012).  Excluding those 65 and older and the non-elderly disabled, two-
thirds of the remaining entitlement benefits went to working households with at least one worker 
who worked more than 1,000 hours during the year. 
 
Such a net does not align well with an economy with insufficient jobs.  With the passage of 
welfare reform in 1996, with TANF shrinking, and with increasing investments in refundable tax 
credits, the CTC and EITC have together become a large component of the safety net.  
Refundable credits lift more children out of poverty – 7.2 million people including 4 million 
children - than any other program or category of program at any level of government (Marr and 
Highsmith, 2011).   
 
At the same time, while leading child development experts have consistently and unambiguously 
stressed the importance of the first few years of life, only recently have policies focused on the 
first few years of life become a focus of public policy (Kamerman and Moss, 2011).  For young 
children, a work-conditioned safety net could be particularly problematic, as their parents are 
more likely to be out of work and earlier on in their earnings trajectory than the parents of older 
children.  With increasing evidence that cash assistance is particularly important in the early 
years (Duncan and Magnuson, 2011), I examine the legislative and political history of the child 
tax credit, as I believe both the policy analysis and the political history need to be understood to 
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inform the policy responses.  Next, I examine whether the portion of the new safety net that was 
fashioned as tax policy is working as child policy – specifically, whether it is reaching our 
youngest children, with initial evidence that it may not be in the case of the CTC (Burman and 
Wheaton, 2007) yet may be in the case of the EITC (Dowd and Horowitz, 2011).  I find evidence 
that young children may be the most likely to be left out of our largest child policies – that is, 
that a “baby penalty” may exist.  Finally, I propose policy responses that are rooted BOTH in the 
science of increased cash investments in young children, and in the politics of working 
legislatively to get there. 
 
Policy solutions exist - even politically viable ones. 
 
2.  Legislative Background:   
 
In September of 2002, I decided to write my dissertation on a fully refundable child tax credit.  I 
wanted to do research that would have some chance of actually positively effecting our society.  
With GOP hegemony in Washington, and tax cuts as far as the eye could see at the time, it 
seemed that one potential area of opportunity for low-income families, ironically, would be the 
tax code.  While tax cuts are most often regressive in nature, there is always the possibility of 
progressive tax cuts, even progressive tax relief. 
 
As I finished my course work and began to consider a dissertation on the child tax 
credit, President Bush was beginning to release his plans for his third tax cut - a package which 
would total $350 billion, including outlays, by the time it reached his desk on May 28th, 2003.  
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As details of the President’s ‘03 tax cut proposal leaked out, it became clear that he would look 
to accelerate the child tax credit expansion that occurred in his first tax cut of ‘01.  With the 
possibility (albeit long) of affecting this debate, I took a sabbatical of sorts, to advocate on behalf 
of making the CTC more refundable.  While it would have been useful to have the results of my 
dissertation at the time, there was no way to get the work done in time to have it be helpful in 
that session. 
 
Continuing my work with the Children's Research and Education Institute, and the advocacy 
group Kids Project, I turned my efforts towards trying to get expanded CTC refundability added 
to the legislation.  It was intended to be a six-month effort, involving primarily contact with Hill 
staff and elected officials, pro bono consultants, and people in the media.  Among other efforts, I 
had multiple conversations with people at both the Brookings-Urban Tax Policy Center and the 
Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, encouraging them to run and release specific micro-
simulations on the child tax credit in order to have demographic information that was not yet 
available both to draw attention to the issue through the news media and to use in describing the 
issue to policy makers.1 
Ultimately, a CTC refundability expansion worth just 1% of the bill was cut out in the House-
Senate conference.  David Firestone of the New York Times ended up writing a front page, top 
fold story, entitled "Tax Law Omits Child Credit In Low-Income Brackets."  It is a longer story, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  In one of these discussions, I asked Len Burman at the Tax Policy Center if they might have the 
ability to estimate if young children were less likely to get the CTC than older children.  This 
exchange, along with subsequent discussions, led to his paper with Laura Wheaton in 2007 
finding that it did.	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some of which I will detail in chapter 3, but being a slow news day, among other things, it led 
the news that night and became a story for about 45 days, with over 10 New York Times articles, 
and more importantly, coverage around the country.  Ultimately, a year later, in October of 2004, 
refundability of the CTC was accelerated for children, even though the GOP had the Presidency 
and majorities in both chambers. 
With new House Democratic Leadership coming in, there was an increased interest in child 
policy, including the child tax credit.  The Democratic House Minority kept on the issue.  When 
they took over in the 2006 election, incoming Speaker Pelosi dedicated the 110th Congress to 
Children and Families.  What followed was four years of legislative expansions of the CTC, 
including 4 expansions and extensions of refundability that were signed into law, the most recent 
in December of 2010.   
As I write this, there is a lull in tax legislation as the resumption of the tax fight on the extension 
of the Bush tax cuts will begin in earnest in the summer or fall of this year, as we move fully into 
the Presidential and Congressional elections. 
Over the course of the last years, the Politics of the CTC have changed.  An idea that was 
politically born in Newt Gingrich’s 1994 “Contract with America,” and used as a Trojan Horse 
in the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, has become a progressive tax cut that in part spans across 
ideologies, building on Ronald Reagan’s expansion of the EITC.  In each of the last 4 major 
budget deals, beginning with the January 2008 stimulus, and most recently in the December 2010 
tax cut extension, refundability of the Child Tax Credit was expanded. With the CTC set to 
shrink from $1,000 to $500 and lose part of its refundability on January 1st, 2013 (along with a 
series of other tax cuts), there is every reason to believe that this issue will remain public as the 
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debate over debts and deficits, investments and winning the future continues.   
3.  Policy Background:   
 
There has been a plethora of work examining the role of child allowances in other countries 
(Bradshaw, 2011).  The United States invests less in cash family benefits, as a percent of GDP 
then all but one of the 33 OECD countries, with Korea taking up the rear (OECD, 2011). In 
addition, there is a fair amount of work examining the effects of a cash benefit on families and 
children.  In the U.S., the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation and several think tanks 
have modeled some of the effects of changes in CTC law in order to anticipate the direct cost in 
decreased federal revenue.  At an annual cost of $56 billion - $32 billion of which is refundable, 
it is, after all, only a few billion dollars short of being the single largest federal child benefit in 
the country. 
The legislative and political history of the Child Tax Credit is fascinating (at least to me) and 
worth documenting.  People often group it with the EITC, yet the politics of the two credits are 
quite different. 
 
More important, perhaps, is laying out the case that while we have evidence that early childhood 
is the optimum time to invest in human capitol - in the domains of time, money, and services 
(particularly early childhood education), that we underinvest not just in time and services, but 
also in money.  Full refundability of the CTC may be the best solution, along with increasing the 
credit for the families of young children.  Yet, considering the political difficulty of decoupling 
tax credits from work, there are alternative policies to address this underinvestment including 
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look-back provisions, (as we did after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita), and counting unemployment 
insurance (U.I.) as earnings for the purposes of calculating one's CTC and EITC.  These 
alternatives keep the politically important tie to work, while moving towards more economic 
stability for families. 
 
As Kamerman and Kahn's first wrote in 1995, the optimum time for investment in child policy is 
early childhood.  They examine the three policy domains of time, money, and services.  In recent 
years there has been increasing evidence that early childhood, particularly the time before a child 
turns three, is the prime time for investment for each of these three domains (with particularly 
focus on early child education, family leave, and tax credits).  There is a great deal of evidence 
that we underinvest in the first two areas in early childhood (see for instance, Kamerman and 
Kahn, 1995; Waldfogel, 2006; Garfinkel, Rainwater, and Smeeding, 2010). The dissertation will 
then focus in on the third area of cash assistance to families, with a particular focus on one of the 
largest federal child policies, the child tax credit (CTC).   
 
4.  Chapter Outline:   
 
Chapter 1 is my introduction, laying out the scope of the dissertation. 
 
In chapter 2, I examine the literature (1) to see if cash matters – finding that there is strong 
evidence that it does, particularly for low-income young children; (2) to show that the U.S. 
underinvests in this domain in young children relative to what is needed; (3) to show that the 
U.S. underinvests in this domain relative to other advanced industrialized countries; and, having 
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done so, (4) to lay out the case that changes to the refundable CTC offer one opportunity to 
address this underinvestment.   
 
Chapter 3 is a legislative history of the CTC, as I believe both the policy analysis and the 
legislative history need to be understood to inform the policy responses.   
 
It begins with the political origins of the Child Tax Credit in the Republican’s 1994 campaign 
manifesto, the Contract with America, and concludes with the December, 2010 tax cut 
extensions. 
 
My advocacy role, working much of the last decade on the CTC, gives me a perspective from 
which to write the legislative history, in hopes that the politics of the CTC can help shed light on 
what policy responses may be possible to address the lack of cash for the families of low-income 
young children.  At the same time, my proximity to the issue is likely to lead to unique biases.  
Having worked for nearly a decade on the politics of the child tax credit, my interpretation of the 
history is biased by my proximity to the topic.  I will seek to minimize these biases by using 
public sources for confirmation of information whenever possible, but there is no way to get rid 
of them all together.  
 
I argue that as a tax credit, the politics of the CTC differ from those of SNAP (formally known as 
food stamps), unemployment insurance (U.I.), and other cash benefits.  Among other differences, 
this argument is consistent with the work in the area of tax expenditure analysis that is premised 
on the fact that tax expenditures can be easier to implement and harder to end than regular 
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spending programs (Kleinbard, 2010).  Tax expenditures may receive less scrutiny than direct 
spending programs, as they are part of a “hidden welfare state” (Howard, 1999).  Moreover, non-
entitlement spending generally needs to be both authorized and appropriated, necessitating two 
laws being passed, and then subsequently extended in future years, whereas tax law necessitates 
only one bill being passed, and can be passed as permanent law, obviating the need for any 
additional legislation.  Furthermore, tax credits are considered “tax cuts” where as SNAP and 
U.I. are considered spending. 
 
I lay out a case that as a middle class tax credit, the CTC differs greatly from the EITC in large 
part because the CTC goes to the vast middle class.  Last March, the House Ways and Means 
Committee held a hearing on “improper tax payments that occur within the administration of 
refundable tax credits.”  The focus was on the error rate of the EITC – and the CTC was not even 
raised in the hearing.  
 
Chapter 4 uses micro-simulation to provide new empirical evidence of the age distributions of 
the CTC eligibility.  While there are ethical reasons to move to a universal child allowance - 
recognizing the rights of children, here the focus is on the economics of doing so.  We spent an 
estimated $56.4 billion in 2011 on the CTC and another $59.5 on the EITC – together the largest 
U.S. federal expenditure on children and families – but is the money appropriately targeted by 
age?  That is, is it reaching low-income families with infants and toddlers?   
 
Using Current Population Survey March Supplement data, I run a micro-simulation seeking 
empirical evidence of the age distribution of the federal tax credits for children.  I use the CPS 
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data since it is a nationally representative sample allowing me to look to compare children of 
different ages in the same year.   
 
First, I look to see if young children are disproportionately left out of the CTC, as Burman and 
Wheaton found (2007).  I examine if it is also the case for the EITC both because with the CTC 
it is the largest federal child policy, and because unlike the CTC, there is evidence that the EITC 
disproportionately helps young children (Dowd and Horowitz, 2011).  Next, I look at basic 
demographics of the CTC to see how eligibility may vary by race and family structure for both 
married and single-parent, female-headed households.  Last, I model a range of CTC policy 
alternatives, including ideas mentioned by both policy makers and in the academic literature, 
examining their costs, their effects on eligibility for young children, and how much they may lift 
children out of poverty. 
 
Finally, in chapter 5, I propose policy responses that are rooted BOTH in the science of 
increased cash investments in young children, and in the politics of working within a work-based 
U.S. safety net. 
 
I seek to thread together the policy analysis and the political analysis to lay out opportunities for 
policy change that are consistent with increasing human capital investment in the early years. 
 
I discuss the possibility of full refundability of the CTC, with a rationale moving beyond tax 
policy (Burman and Wheaton, 2007, among others), and economic efficiency (Batchelder, 
Goldberg, and Orszag, 2006), to one based on child policy.  The differences in perspectives 
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between the fields of tax policy and child policy go beyond a simple categorization of implicit 
and explicit policy.  I will also discuss the possibility of increasing the CTC for the families of 
young children as Duncan and Magnuson (2011) have suggested, and as Senator Chuck Schumer 
has proposed (although in a non-refundable iteration). 
 
The efficiencies of universal policies (Garfinkel, 1982; Bradshaw, 2011) may in the end be what 
could lead to full refundability of the CTC, as the costs of means testing family tax credits rise 
and the cost distance between current law and full refundability shrink.  Alternatively, the need 
for revenue, and the potential of the creation of a VAT, with a need to offset its regressive nature 
could present an opportunity. 
 
In the meantime, alternatives exist that, by keeping the tie to work, could be more politically 
possible, while helping the families of young children, and narrowing the gap in cost between 
current law and full refundability.  They could also lead to the undesirable outcome of more 
clearly bifurcating the deserving from the undeserving poor, as the left continues to embrace 
compromises incorporating conservative solutions to policy problems (Klein, 2011). 
 
I then look at other cash options that may be more politically achievable in the near to mid-term 
future in the U.S.  First, I will examine the idea of a nationwide look back provision (as we did 
regionally after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and others) – focusing on how it could work and its 
potential costs, recognizing how administrability issues could hamper it, and examining its 
similarities to loss provisions on the corporate side of the income tax code. 
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Next I look at the possibility of counting unemployment insurance as earnings for purpose of 
calculating CTC and EITC – again focusing on how it would work, costs, and IRS 
administrability.  For both the look back provision and the U.I. policy, I consider the added 
benefit of the effect on state EITCs, which are pegged to the federal EITC.  I argue that both the 
look back provision and the adaptation of U.I. may be more more politically salient than full 
refundability among those who champion cash tax benefits to low-income families, as they still 
maintain the all important (in America) tie to work, as opposed to attaching cash to other 
behaviors. 
 
Finally, I argue that while efforts to mobilize parents could be fruitful (Skocpol and Dickert, 
2001), that opportunities for directly mobilizing key policy makers remain. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Literature Review:  The Effects of Income on Child Well Being and  
the Case that Changes to the Child Tax Credit Could Help 
 
On May 1st, 1991, the National Commission on Children unanimously approved a proposal for a 
national policy for America’s children.  Entitled “Beyond Rhetoric: A New American Agenda 
for Children and Families,” the report called for a comprehensive set of child policies in the 
United States to address the fact that the most prosperous nation on earth was failing so many 
children – including a fully refundable $1,000 Child Tax Credit – in 1991 dollars.  While there 
have been many policy changes in the last 20 years for children and families, America continues 
to fall short in this area, relative to what research tells us about child policy and relative to what 
peer nations invest in child and family policy. 
 
In 1995, Dr. Sheila Kamerman and Dr. Al Kahn in Starting Right: How America Neglects Its 
Youngest Children and What We Can Do About It, laid out a framework for understanding child 
policy as divided into three domains – time, money, and services.  Thanks in large part to their 
research much was already known about how much the U.S. underinvests in child policy relative 
to its peer nations.  In particular, they called attention to America’s neglect of young children –
those under the age of three - and what can be done (See also, for instance, Kamerman, 1994). 
 
In the intervening years, both child development and policy research have strengthened the case 
that the earliest years are the optimum time for investment across all three domains of time, 
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money and services, and moreover, that the United States underinvests across all three domains 
(See for instance Waldfogel, 2006; Garfinkel, Smeeding, and Rainwater, 2010; Adema, 2011). 
 
This dissertation is focused on the Child Tax Credit, and as such, the literature review will focus 
on that third domain of child policy - money.  In this chapter I will examine the literature first to 
see if cash matters – finding that while there is some disagreement, on balance there is strong 
evidence that it does matter – particularly for low-income young children; second to show that 
the U.S. underinvests in this domain in young children relative to what is needed; and third to 
show that the U.S. underinvests in this domain relative to other advanced industrialized 
countries; and, having done so, lay out the case that changes to the refundable CTC offer one 
opportunity to address this underinvestment. 
 
1.  Does Cash Matter? 
 
There is a vast literature on the role of income.  I will attempt to sum up the major points, with 
details to follow.  They include: 
 
i.  Non-experimental studies find that cash likely matters more to the families of poorer children.  
Income may matter even more for children in deep poverty.  These studies indicate positive 
associations with outcomes for children, generally more in the cognitive areas, than in behavior 
and health.  Effects may differ by age of child and appear to be more important to young 
children.  Duration of poverty also can have negative effects.  Cash matters to families both 
because it may provide material support to children and because it may reduce the stress of the 
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parents.  Still, not all literature says additional cash helps young children. 
 
ii.  Natural experiments demonstrate positive associations with outcomes for children. 
 
iii.  Experimental studies with random assignment suggest positive effects for young children 
going into school, but may confound employment with income and since they are limited by 
samples of children ages 2 to 15 do not pick up on the possible benefits of providing cash to the 
families of infants and toddlers. 
 
i.  Non-experimental studies: 
 
Cash may matter more to the families of poorer children.  
 
Duncan and Brooks-Gunn in summing up the work of twelve groups of researchers with 10 
different longitudinal developmental data sets, found that income mattered more for low-income 
children than for higher income children when looking at ability and attainment (1997).  
 
Using the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development Study of Early Childhood 
Care (NICHD-SECC), Dearing, McCartney, and Taylor looking at within family changes in 
income-to-needs ratios, also found that changes in income-to-needs ratios proved of little 
importance to children in non-poor families, but was of great importance for children in poor 
families (2001).   Specifically, when children from poor families experienced increases in 
income-to-needs that were of at least one standard deviation above the mean for poor families, 
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they displayed outcomes similar to their non-poor peers in child cognition, language, and 
behavioral outcomes.   
 
They estimate that the effects of cash transfers to the families of young children equal to the cost 
of an Early Head Start slot ($13,108 at the time of their paper) may yield a similar result in 
cognitive and behavioral outcomes as participating in Early Head Start.  The NICHD-SECC data 
by containing measures of 15-month cognitive ability, allow the authors to strengthen their case 
for causality.   
 
Examining a multigenerational dataset on living conditions in France, Maurin found that parental 
income seems to have a large effect on early schooling transitions (2002).  A 10% increase in 
parental income was associated with a 6.5% decrease in the probability of being held back in 
elementary school.  The author used parents’ education and grandparents’ socioeconomic status 
to correct for biases in errors of measuring parents’ permanent income and to test for existence of 
hereditary determinants in education and income.  
 
Income matters even more for children in deep poverty.   
 
This finding is important, as very poor children are more disadvantaged than children closer but 
still below the federal poverty line (Smith, Brooks-Gunn, and Klebenov, 1997).  Using a 
differences in differences design in the National Longitudinal Study of Youth, Dahl and Lockner 
use changes in the federal EITC and find that $1,000 increases math scores by 2.1% of a 
standard deviation and reading scores by 3.6% of an SD (2005).  They find that the results are 
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strongest for the poorest.  Moreover, they find the effects to be long lasting.   
  
Cash is important for children’s cognitive development.   
 
There is evidence that family income is a stronger predictor of ability and achievement outcomes 
for children than measures of parental education and family structure (Duncan and Brooks-Gunn, 
1997).  Importantly, Duncan and Brooks-Gunn find that parents’ education is linked to children’s 
outcomes but has an independent effect from income on children’s cognitive outcomes – that is, 
that income effects are statistically significant and meaningful (1997).  Still others argue that 
parental education may be more important (see, for instance, Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne 
Groves, 2005).  Either way, it seems clear that cash is important for children’s cognitive 
development. 
 
Effects differ by age of child and appear to be more important to young children. 
 
Income effects appear to be strongest during preschool and early school years (Duncan, Brooks-
Gunn and Klebanov, 1994; Smith, Brooks-Gunn, and Klebanov, 1997). 
 
Duncan and Brooks-Gunn’s work across 10 different longitudinal developmental data sets finds 
that family economic conditions in early childhood appeared to be more important for shaping 
ability and achievement than economic conditions in adolescence and that associations between 
income and achievement were larger for children in low-income families than for children in 
more affluent families (1997).   
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Using a sibling analysis to reduce selection bias, Duncan, Brooks-Gunn, Yeung, and Smith find 
that family income at early childhood – particularly deep and persistent poverty – had significant 
long term effects on children’s educational attainment (1998). 
 
Dearing, McCartney, and Taylor find that with increases in income for poor children there are 
improvements in outcomes for children as early as age 3 (2001). 
 
One reason increased cash resources may be particularly important to young children is a 
replacement of potential labor force earnings.  Maternal employment in the first year of a child’s 
life, and in particular, full-time employment, is associated with lower cognitive scores for 
preschool children at ages 3, 4, and 5 (Waldfogel, 2006).  Effects persist at least to age 7 or 8, 
and while these are not causal studies, the preponderance of the evidence shows the same trends.   
 
Cash matters to families both because it may provide material support to children and because it 
may reduce the stress of the parents. 
 
The quality of the home environment, often operationalized as the either the learning 
opportunities provided by parents or parent-child conflict associated with economic stress 
(Conger, Conger, and Elder, 1997), explains as much as ½ of the association between family 
income-to-needs and child outcomes (Duncan and Brooks-Gunn, 2000).   
 
Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and its 1997 Child Development Supplement, 
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Yeung, Linver, and Brooks-Gunn examined how income matters to the development of young 
children (2002).  They found that behavior scores were associated with maternal emotional 
distress and parenting practices, while achievement scores were related to a family’s ability to 
provide a stimulating home environment.   
 
Duration of poverty also has negative effects.    
 
The longer children are in poverty, the worse off they are.  Children persistently poor score 
worse on a variety of cognitive and language outcomes than never poor children.  Children who 
are poor on occasion fall between the two other groups (Smith, Brooks-Gunn, and Klebenov, 
1997).   
 
While the preponderance of non-experimental studies show a positive correlation between 
income and cognitive outcomes for children, these studies are plagued by the potential for 
unmeasured factors or omitted variable bias.  Natural experiments and actual experiments can 
provide stronger evidence of causality.   
 
Cash or Material Hardship? 
Using the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study Kindergarten class of 1998-1999, Gershoff, Aber, 
Raver, and Lennon test a theoretical model to tease apart the differential effects of income and 
material hardship on child outcomes finding that they do not move hand in hand 
(2007).  Material hardship - operationalized as food insecurity, residential instability, and lack of 
medical insurance – rates do not decline for families until they reach 200% of the federal poverty 
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line (Gershoff, 2003).  
Different goals would suggest different policy interventions.  Family income appears to reduce 
parental stress almost entirely by reducing material hardship.  If academic achievement is the 
goal, then income support will help children.  If a reduction in behavioral problems is the goal, 
then it may be more effective to target downstream material hardship. 
Not all literature says additional cash helps young children: 
 
The primary criticism of much of the above research is confined to the research based on non-
experimental data.  Simply put, it is a question of selection bias.  That is, are there unmeasured 
factors that simultaneously explain both parents’ income and their children’s outcomes?   
 
Mayer provided a series of tests to measure omitted-variable bias, finding large reductions in the 
estimated effect of parental income (1997). She finds that much of the estimated effect in the 
literature is, therefore, non-existent.  She finds that transfer income has a smaller impact than 
overall income on children’s test scores, teenage childbearing, dropping out of school, and single 
motherhood, but similarly small positive effects in years of schooling, wages, and earnings.    
 
However, Mayer did not test income effects on young children in low-income families (Duncan 
and Magnuson, 2003).  While she does cast doubt on the effect of parental income on some 
behavioral problems such as teen childbearing, her evaluations of “true” effect of permanent 
income on total number of years of education, on earnings, or on basic cognitive tests are large 
and no lower than the evaluation using ordinary linear regression (Maurin, 2002).   
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Blau presents estimates of the effect of parental income on children’s cognitive social, and 
emotional development, finding small effects with what he describes as modestly larger effects 
of permanent income, using mother daughter data from the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (1999).  Using fixed and random effects models to control for correlation between income 
and unobserved characteristics in the child outcome equation, he finds the largest income effects 
on the Behavior Problem Index, and the smallest effects on verbal memory.  Specifically, he 
finds that a $2,040 value of a credit would lead to an increase of 3% of a standard deviation or 
less in outcomes.   
 
As Maurin points out, Blau does not regress children’s test scores on the logarithm of parental 
income, but rather, on the level of parental income, and as such assumes that a marginal dollar 
has the same effect on affluent and poor families (2002).  Moreover, 3% of a standard deviation 
may not be such a small effect.  Most importantly for this dissertation, Blau does not see if the 
effects vary by age of child, potentially averaging out the differences.   
 
Attempting to get rid of the problem of endogeneity, Shea focuses on income variation in 
families due to outside factors – union, industry and job loss, that arguably represent luck, 
finding that changes in income due to luck have negligible impact on children’s human capital 
development (2000).  Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, a longitudinal data set that 
allows him to link parents to adult children, Shea finds, however, that parents’ income does 
matter for families whose father has less than a High School education, but not in families with 
low-income per se.   
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More recently, using data from the Fragile Families and Well-Being Study, a sample of children 
starting at birth from twenty U.S. cities, Berger, Paxson and Waldfogel find that even under the 
most generous associations, large income transfer programs would have relatively small effects 
on children’s cognitive and behavioral outcomes (2009).  They find that raising a family’s 
income by $3600 in the first year and $2400 in the next 4 years (as proposed by Duncan and 
Magnuson, 2003) would have little effect.  Even raising families’ income to the poverty 
threshold – which would take an average annual grant of approximately $9,000 - would have 
little effect.  They find that the home environment, “properly measured,” fully explains the 
difference in outcomes between children of low-income families and those of affluent families. 
 
ii.  Natural experiments: 
 
Almond, Hoynes, and Schanzenbach (2011) examine the impact of food stamps on birth 
outcomes, using variation in month that the food stamp program began operating in each U.S. 
county.  Using a differences in differences analysis, they find that pregnancies exposed to the 
Food Stamp Program three months before birth resulted in increased birth weight.  Their study, 
by using an exogenous increase in income suggests that the relationship between income and 
birth weight is causal.    
 
Examining a change in the Child Tax Credit in Canada, Milligan and Stabile found positive 
effects on test scores, and measures of child and maternal mental health and well-being (2008).  
Importantly, they observed different effects depending on the gender of the child.  There were 
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strong positive effects in educational outcomes and physical health for boys, whereas for girls, 
there were stronger positive effects on mental health. 
 
Employing another natural experiment, using temporal variation in state EITC changes, Strully, 
Rehkopf and Xuan, also find associations between prenatal poverty and lower birth weights, 
finding that state EITCs increase birth weights and reduce maternal smoking (2010).   
 
More recently, research on higher EITC payments suggests increases improve maternal health, 
an important effect on its own, but also likely to improve the lot of children.  Also employing a 
differences in differences design, the study uses the exogenous event of changes in the federal 
EITC, finding in data from the Behavioral Risk Factors Surveillance Survey that the number of 
days with poor mental health and fraction reporting excellent or good health both improved 
(Evans and Garthwaite, 2010).   
 
Using a representative population of 1420 rural children ages 9 to 13 at intake, Costello, 
Compton, Keeler, and Angold find that large increases in cash transfers from a casino to a Native 
American population resulted in a great reduction in psychiatric symptoms of poor children – to 
the point where after the transfers, previously poor children had the same scores as never poor 
children (2003). 
 
The study involved annual psychiatric assessments taking place before a casino came in and 
started giving out large and increasing dividends – up to $6,000 per person at the end of the 
study – to Native American families.  Employing a differences in differences design, the authors 
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find the huge effect described above.  That said, it is important to note, that the casino employees 
gave preference in hiring to Native Americans.  As such, while the transfers clearly had an effect, 
the authors are unable to control for the potential effect of possible employment. 
 
The results of these natural experiments are different than those of  
Duncan and Brooks-Gunn who find that cash income may have little effect on health and 
behavior (1997).   
 
iii.  Experimental studies: 
 
Experimental studies – those with random assignment - provide the gold standard of evaluating 
causality in policy.   
 
In the 1990s, four studies, all with random assignment, all on single parent, low-income families 
(and thus perhaps not generalizable to other poor families), took place to examine the effects of 
welfare reform.  These studies included Connecticut’s Jobs First, the Los Angeles Jobs First 
GAIN, the New Brunswick and British Columbia Sites of the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project, 
and the Atlanta, Georgia, Grand Rapids, Michigan, and Riverside, California sites of the 
National Evaluation of Welfare to Work Strategies (Morris, Duncan, and Rodrigues, 2004).   
 
These programs were designed to increase employment in some cases with earnings 
supplements, and in some cases to improve social behaviors (Morris, Huston, Duncan, Crosby, 
and Bos 2001). 
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In general, the research that looks at the various data from welfare and employment random 
assignment experiments in the 1990s find that programs that increase both employment and 
income had beneficial effects on preschool and school age children, but that programs that just 
increased employment had few effects for these children (Morris, Huston, Duncan, Crosby, and 
Bos, 2001; Morris and Duncan, 2002; Morris, Duncan, and Rodrigues, 2004) and potentially 
negative effects for adolescents (Gennetian, Duncan, Knox, Vargas, Clarke-Kauffman, and 
London, 2002). 
 
Moreover, children were between the ages of 2 and 15 at the time of random assignment, so the 
addition of cash in the earliest years (before 2) cannot be measured.  That said, Duncan and 
Rodrigues found that $800 to $2200 in benefits for a young child leads to an achievement effect 
size of 5 to 12% of a standard deviation.  
 
Morris and Gennetian, using instrumental variables analysis and data from randomly assigned 
families in the Minnesota pilot welfare reform program, suggest that increases in income 
improve the development of low-income children with regards to both school engagement and 
positive social behavior (2003).  Their findings are only marginally significant, yet consistent 
with much of the observational research discussed before.  They find that an increase of $1,000 
in income results in a ¼ to 1/3 SD increase in a scale measuring school engagement and positive 
behavior – larger effects than others have found.  However, they caution that the increase in 
income they observe is accompanied by increases in employment, suggesting that children could 
perhaps “sense” their increase in income.  They are unable to tease out whether this is an 
	  26	  
employment effect or an income effect, or what combination it could be. 
 
Experimental studies support the non-experimental studies demonstrating that cash assistance 
may be particularly important for young children. 
 
For each $1,000 programs added to yearly incomes of low-income families, young children 
gained an average of 5% to 6% of a standard deviation in school achievement – equivalent to 
about ½ the average racial gap in test scores of black and white kindergartners (Morris, 
Gennitian, and Duncan, 2005; Duncan, Morris, and Rodrigues, 2011). 
 
2.  The United States underinvests in cash assistance to young children relative to what is 
needed: 
 
It is clear then, that the preponderance of the evidence suggests that money, particularly in the 
early years, can provide a moderating effect on poverty, and moreover, that consistent as 
opposed to intermittent income can also play a role.  Evidence from both natural experiments and 
randomized trials suggest that “income plays a causal role in boosting younger children’s 
achievement” in preschool and elementary school (Duncan and Magnuson, 2011).   
 
Families with children have only limited economic protection at a level significantly lower than 
the country’s low federal poverty level, let alone the international standard of 50% or even 40% 
of median family income (Kamerman and Kahn, 1997). 
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This evidence that the optimum time of cash investment in human capital is in the early years, is 
juxtaposed with three stark facts.  First, that infants and toddlers are more likely than any other 
age group to be poor.  Second, The U.S. spends a lot in cash assistance relative to other federal 
child and family polices.  Third, in spite of this investment, young children are particularly likely 
to be left out of social policies general, making their families even more dependent on cash 
assistance. 
 
Theoretically, then America’s children should receive larger child allowances – and to the extent 
the amount differs by age, the youngest children should receive higher benefits then other 
children.  Yet, it seems likely that young children would receive proportionally less than older 
children, as the parents of young children are less likely to be in the labor force and are earlier on 
in their earnings trajectories.  Initial evidence suggests this is true with respect to the CTC 
(Burman and Wheaton, 2007).   
 
(i) In the United States, infants and toddlers are more likely than any other age group to be poor 
 
Infants and toddlers are more likely to be poor than any other age group in the United States (see, 
for instance, Redd, Karver, Murphey, Moore, and Knewstub, 2011).   
 
This fact exists for primarily two reasons.  First, people generally earn more later in life, and as 
such, the parents of young children are earlier on in their earnings trajectory – that is, on average 
they are likely to make more as their children get older.  Secondly, the parents of young children 
are less likely to be employed, as the childcare needs of young children are not universally 
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covered as they are for much of the year for school age children.   
 
Adding to this differential poverty by age, is the fact the U.S. wealth gap between young and old 
is as wide as it has even been since it was first measured by the Census Bureau in 1984 (Yen, 
2011). 
 
Moreover, young children, dependent on adults, are particularly susceptible to risk (Shonkoff 
and Phillips, 2000).  
 
This dissertation attempts to examine whether or not tax policies potentially exacerbate the 
relative poverty of infants and toddlers to older children.  (While tax expenditures do not count 
in the formal definition of poverty in the U.S., they are counted in the new supplemental poverty 
measure, and, more importantly, are directly relevant to the wellbeing of low-income young 
children). 
 
(ii) The U.S. spends a lot in cash assistance, relative to other federal U.S. child and family 
policies 
 
From the standpoint of federal child policy, the vast majority of spending is through cash 
assistance, either in the form of tax expenditures or direct spending.  The most recent year for 
federal expenditure data on children, 2010, included increases in many areas from the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA).  While the increases in refundable tax credits have 
been moved in part into baseline law, along with other efforts such as Race to the Top and Head 
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Start/Early Head Start, many of the other increases – in Medicaid, SNAP, and many other areas - 
have expired with the end of the two year stimulus. 
 
Federal tax expenditures on children total approximately $144.4 billion, including refundable tax 
credits, the dependent exemption, and other tax expenditures.  Federal health expenditures on 
children totaled $87.2 billion under ARRA.  Education benefits totaled $78.2 billion.  Nutrition 
dollars – much of which are delivered in the form of a near cash benefit, totaled $56.7 billion.  
Income security came in at $52.4 billion.  Early education came in at $12.1 billion, social 
services at just over $10 billion, and housing training, and other benefits at less than that number 
(Isaacs, Hahn, Rennane, Steuerle, and Vericker, 2011). 
 
With tax expenditures, much of childhood nutrition, and income security benefits taking the form 
of cash or near cash assistance, it is clear that the vast majority of federal expenditures on 
children come through the form of cash assistance – and that a majority of that cash assistance - 
$74.5 billion in 2010 – comes in the form of refundable tax credits. 
 
It is worth adding that relative to other advanced industrialized countries, the U.S. underinvests 
in young children as well (See for instance, Kamerman and Kahn, 1995; Garfinkel, Smeeding 
and Rainwater, 2010; Waldfogel, 2006; and Adema 2011).  That said, it is notable that the 
distribution of tax expenditures across children by age is assumed to be equal (Adema, 2011).  If 
this dissertation finds evidence that suggests otherwise, then the U.S. investment in young 
children relative to other advanced industrialized countries may be even weaker than assumed. 
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(iii) Young children are particularly likely to be left out of social policies generally, making their 
families even more dependent on cash assistance 
 
Across America, by the time a child reaches the age of 5, she is generally eligible for free 
childcare for much of the day and much of the year in the form of primary school.  While federal 
state and local investments in early care and education exist, they are by no means 
comprehensive, leaving families of young children particularly dependent on cash aid. 
 
As the Urban Institute’s examination of public expenditures on children in the early and 
elementary years found, total public investment in children more than doubles between the early 
childhood years and the elementary years (Macomber, Isaacs, Vericker, and Kent, 2010).  The 
authors find that this discrepancy is primarily driven by state and local spending.  In fact, the 
study claims that federal expenditures on children is consistent across age groups – this finding, 
though, is conditioned on the assumption that tax credits are evenly distributed by age of child – 
which the above analysis in this chapter disputes. 
 
It is likely then, that the U.S. underinvests in cash help to very young children.  And, the 
assistance that is provided, with great variation year to year, could be working in conflict with 
what is in the best interests of children and society.  Finding out the magnitude of that 
underinvestment, and possible ways to address it are the focus of this dissertation. 
 
3.  The United States underinvests in cash assistance to young children relative to other 
advanced industrialized countries: 
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Poverty rates in the U.S. relative to other countries are abysmal in both absolute terms and 
relative terms.  Cross national comparative research clearly indicates that social policies like 
children’s allowances help explain why child poverty rates are so much lower in most other 
advanced industrialized democracies (Aber, 2007).   
 
U.S. child poverty is not simply due to the fact that we have increasing numbers of children born 
into single parent homes.  Comparing the 33 countries of the OECD, the United States has the 
highest poverty for families without work, and the fourth highest poverty for both single earner 
families and dual earner families (Adema, 2011).   
 
At the same time the United States’ public spending on family benefits in cash, in-kind transfers, 
and tax transfers lags all but three OECD countries.  The total GDP spent in family benefits 
averages 2.23% for OECD countries, ranging from 0.5% in Korea to over 3.5% in Demark, 
France, Iceland, and the United Kingdom.  The United States spends about 1.2% of GDP on 
these policies (Adema, 2011).  Importantly, the U.S. has the highest proportion of family benefits 
being distributed through tax transfers.  With the lack of full refundability of the CTC, a huge 
proportion of the U.S.’ already limited family benefits are distributed through policies that 
cannot reach the most vulnerable children. 
 
The U.S. has no explicit family policy (Kamerman and Kahn, 1997).  Those countries that do 
have family policy are more generous to children and families (Kamerman and Kahn, 1983).  
Children are expensive.  The Child Tax Credit is viewed as tax policy as opposed to child or 
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family policy, and therefore is often viewed in light of its effect on taxes (knocking people out of 
positive income tax liability) as opposed to its effect on child development. 
 
All rich countries – with the exception of the United States – have child allowances – universal 
cash benefits paid to parents of all income classes (Garfinkel, Rainwater, and Smeeding 2010).  
These child allowances began at different times in different countries, but were already emerging 
as a trend in 1983 (Kamerman and Kahn, 1983), over a decade before the U.S. first created the 
essentially non-refundable Child Tax Credit (there was a small refundability component for 
larger families).   
 
Examining the experience of other countries – Australia, Canada, England, France, Germany, 
Israel, Sweden, and comparing them to the United States - Kamerman and Kahn demonstrate that 
there is a low correlation between unemployment rates within countries and the generosity of 
their family policies (1983).  Rather, it is willingness to tax that correlates perfectly with 
generosity of a country’s family policy.   
 
The Child Tax Credit is the United States’ version of a child allowance.  Child allowances vary 
by size, duration, family composition, and how often the transfer takes place.  Austria’s child 
allowance, for instance, is quite small, but it provides long term support for families (Kamerman 
and Kahn, 1991).  Germany gives larger child allowances to families with children under the age 
of six (Kamerman and Kahn, 1991).  France has a single-parent allowance for children under the 
age of three (Kamerman and Kahn, 1991).  Hungary has a more modest child allowance for 
single parents, but is not constrained to the families of young children (Kamerman and Kahn, 
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1991).  Sweden has made an enormous commitment to its universal child allowance, spending 
0.8% of its Gross National Product in 1989-1990 on what has been described as the “cornerstone 
of its welfare system” (Kamerman and Kahn, 1991). 
 
Advanced industrialized countries have a wide variety of reasons for their child allowances, 
including encouraging higher birthrates, recognizing “family work” and supporting traditional 
families, providing economic support for families with young children, encouraging women to 
enter or leave the labor force, supporting child development, providing a cheaper alternative to 
expensive early care, facilitating work family balance, supporting gender equity, and facilitating 
parents’ choices between staying at home and entering the paid labor force (Kamerman and 
Kahn, 1991). 
 
The U.S. CTC, as will be discussed in the next chapter, was in large part designed to support 
traditional families.  As tax policy, little thought was given to child development.  With high 
immigration allowing young workers to enter the U.S. whose taxes can in part pay for retirees’ 
needs, few have seen the need for a pro-natalist policy here.   
 
And, while the size of the benefit varies, only in the U.S. are those most in need of the allowance 
left out (Garfinkel, Rainwater, and Smeeding 2010).   
 
In most countries, the benefit is given out monthly (Garfinkel, Rainwater, and Smeeding 2010).  
In the U.S., the CTC is given out in a lump sum tax refund.  Families file in April and receive 
their CTC following that.  The family of a child born in December may receive their CTC within 
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six months.  A family of a child born in January, however, cannot file until the following year, 
leading to a lag time of up to 18 months.  This lag is particularly problematic for the families of 
infants, those, who discussed above, would most benefit from the transfer. 
 
It seems clear then, that that the U.S. underinvests in family benefits for young children relative 
to other rich nations.  
 
4.  The case that changes to the refundable CTC offer one opportunity to address this 
underinvestment: 
 
It seems clear then, that (1) young children are more likely to be poor than anyone else in 
America, (2) investments in their human capital are likely to be the most productive, and (3) 
America underinvests in these children.  Clearly there are different ways to address this 
underinvestment.  In the remainder of this chapter, I seek to make the case that the tax code, and 
in particular, the Child Tax Credit provides a ripe opportunity to do so, by making the following 
points: 
 
i. Tax expenditures can be viewed similarly to direct spending 
ii. The bulk of federal cash assistance to families of children is delivered through 
refundable tax credits, specifically, the CTC and the EITC 
iii. Tax refunds and “direct” spending differ in who they benefit 
iv. Initial findings suggest young children are the most likely to be left out of 
eligibility of the child tax credit 
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v. Large swings in earnings for the families of young children are particularly 
deleterious, and can happen due to macro events (recessions or floods) or 
something more personal to the family 
vi. Tax credits based on earnings can amplify these swings  
vii. Recessions have a negative impact on children, and may pose a particular burden 
on the families of young children, exacerbating the potential to leave young 
children out of earnings-based benefits 
viii. Refundable tax credits can be stimulative, simultaneously helping the macro 
economy and the individual recipients.   
 
(i)  Tax expenditures can be viewed similarly to direct spending 
 
The United States spends over $1 trillion a year in tax expenditures subsidizing a vast array of 
activities from drilling for oil, to buying a home or health insurance, to offsetting the costs of 
raising a child.  A long line of work going back decades has supported the argument that tax 
expenditures are merely spending through the tax code (Surrey and McDaniel, 1985; Marron, 
2011).  There are perhaps only six prominent people who feel otherwise – 5 on the Supreme 
Court who ruled this past Spring in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn et al. 
that a tax expenditure is not the same as direct spending in their decision to uphold a state 
nonrefundable tax credit going to private religious schools, and Grover Norquist of Americans 
for Tax Reform who still considers tax expenditures not spending.  The Court Majority made 
their claim on legal as opposed to a policy basis.  Norquist’s position is influenced by his desire 
to “shrink government down to the size where it can be drowned in a bath tub.”  Calling tax 
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expenditures tax cuts allows him to push elected officials to replace tax expenditures with other 
tax cuts as opposed to other spending.   
 
From the standpoint of the recipient, getting $1,000 check in the mail as a refund on your taxes 
or sending $1000 less to the government for having a dependent under the age of 17 is no 
different than getting a $1,000 check in the mail as a cash benefit for have a dependent under the 
age of 17.   
 
From the standpoint of the government, it is may differ in administrative cost, budgeting, and the 
legislative process, but it is still $1000 less money than the Federal government otherwise would 
have. 
 
Administrative cost:   
 
The IRS estimates that less than 1% of the cost of the EITC goes to administration of the tax 
benefit (Greenstein and CBPP staff, 2012).  It is cheaper to administer than Medicaid, SNAP, 
housing vouchers, SSI, and school meals, each of which cost less than 10% to administer in 
Federal and State costs. 
 
Even accounting for the costs of tax preparers – estimated to be no more than another 3%, the 
EITC is a highly efficient policy.  After all, writing checks and putting them in the mail doesn’t 
necessitate a lot of overhead.   
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Error Rates: 
 
There is a significant EITC error rate.  Last year, $17 billion in outlays went to families who 
provided erroneous returns.  The error rate is due to a variety of factors, including complexity in 
calculating the EITC, lack of third party data, timing of data (after refunds go out), tax law 
changes, and difficulty in detecting fraud (Olsen, 2011).   
 
While there is no comparable estimate of the CTC error rate, last year $4.2 billion in ACTC 
(refundable CTC) went to families filing with only an Individual Taxpayer Identification 
Number (ITIN).  While some of these families could have been properly filing taxes on 
investments earned while they were in the United States, the majority are likely families whose 
earnings come from people not working in the country legally.  The CTC was created in 1997, 
the year after welfare reform made eligibility for Food Stamps, the EITC, and the newly created 
TANF conditioned on citizenship.  Since at the time, the CTC was full all purposes not 
refundable, Congress never bothered to exclude non-citizens.  As refundability of the CTC grew, 
more and more families filing with an ITIN collected an ACTC, leading to $4.2 billion in outlays 
last year. 
 
While there are no specific estimates of the cost of administration of the CTC, presumably they 
are in line with the costs of EITC administration.  Some argue that were the U.S. to move to full 
refundability for the CTC, that the IRS would be “ill-equipped” to handle this new population of 
filers (Holt and Maag, 2009).  The fact that the administrative costs of the EITC are so low – and 
involve many filers who were it not for the EITC wouldn’t be filing, suggests otherwise.  
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Moreover, were the U.S. to move to a fully refundable CTC, the costs would be even lower, as 
tax liability would not need to be measured for eligibility – a family would only have to provide 




For budgeting purposes, nonrefundable tax expenditures count as a reduction in tax receipts for 
the government, while refundable tax expenditures like other spending count as an outlay.  
Therefore, in budget tables, refundable credits and nonrefundable credits occupy separate lines – 
so the non-refundable portion of the CTC and the refundable portion of the CTC are separate line 
items. 
 
Importantly, the fact that refundable credits counts as outlays effects the ability of the Senate to 
expand refundables under the budget reconciliation process.   
 
Budget reconciliation is subject to limited debate in the Senate, meaning that no cloture vote is 
needed to move to a final vote on the measure.  This allows a simple majority of 50 + 1 senators 
to advance legislation instead of needing 60 votes to cut off debate.  The Bush tax cuts of 2001 
and 2003 moved under reconciliation.  If the budget contains both tax and spending 
reconciliation instructions, then only 5% of the tax instruction can be used for outlays.  As such, 
if budget reconciliation instructions call for $350 billion in tax cuts, for all practical purposes, 
only 5% of that, or $17.5 billion, can be allocated to refundables without triggering a 60-vote 
point of order. 
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The ability to move refundable credits in the Senate under reconciliation – just 51 votes – is 
therefore constrained simply by the fact that unlike other tax expenditures, they are classified as 
outlays.  This Senate rule curiousity raises the question of whether Congress could move to 




Tax expenditures move through Congress via a slightly different process than some direct 
spending.  Annual non-entitlement spending technically necessitates two laws being signed into 
law, both authorizing legislation an appropriating legislation.  (Congress violates this rule year 
after, authorizing on appropriations bill, yet the vast majority of policies are authorized on 
separate legislation).  For instance, in order for Head Start to be created, first it needs to be 
authorized by Congress and signed by the President, and then a separate law needs to appropriate 
funds to pay for Head Start.  Each year, a new law needs to be passed to appropriate funds for 
such a program.  A specific dollar amount is appropriated (which rarely covers all potentially 
eligible), as opposed to tax expenditures and entitlements which may define an eligibility level 
and allow funds sufficient to cover such a population.  Every few years, the program may need to 
be reauthorized. 
 
As such, getting domestic discretionary money involves multiple laws being passed, and 
necessitates attention year after year, with efforts to increase appropriations to move towards 
covering more eligibles. 
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Tax expenditures act more like entitlements.  Once the law is written they are often permanent – 
necessitating an act of Congress to repeal.  Eligibility as defined by the law is what determines 
the treasury’s commitment, as opposed to Congress asking for a specific dollar amount to be 
allocated.   
 
Of course, not all tax law is permanent.  Some years ago, Congress implemented new budget 
rules, calling for ten-year budget windows, in order to more fully account for out year effects of 
policies to have a better understanding of their costs.  The tax legislation in recent history has 
taken advantage of these ten-year windows to obfuscate the real costs of policies.  Policies are 
phased in or sunsetted, so that the average cost over 10 years is significantly less than it would be 
if the policy were fully in place for all 10 years.  Other tax policies are just implemented for one 
year, putting Congress in the position to either extend them or risk the ire of voters for allowing a 
tax increase. 
 
“Hidden welfare state:” 
 
By far, the greatest rationale for the increase in tax expenditures is that it is a way for both parties 
in Congress to increase spending while getting credit for cutting taxes and in so doing obscure 
the true costs of their actions.  In the last decade, countless Republican and Democratic 
candidates have proposed more and more targeted tax expenditures.   
 
Christopher Howard has called it the “Hidden Welfare State” (1999).  With the recent attention 
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on annual deficits and the long term U.S. debt, tax expenditures have received much greater 
attention from elites.   
 
Former chief of staff to the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation Edward Kleinbard has 
called tax expenditures “ the sacred tax cows,” claiming that tax breaks are not the main tool to 
create new spending programs (Montgomery, 2011). 
 
It is worth noting that if the CTC and EITC were considered one tax expenditure, they would 
have been the single largest individual income tax expenditure in 2010, at $111.3 billion, beating 
out even the exclusion of employer provided healthcare ($105.7 billion) and the mortgage 
interest deduction ($90.8 billion) (figures from Sherlock, 2011). 
 
(ii) The bulk of federal cash assistance to families of children is delivered through refundable tax 
credits, specifically, the CTC and the EITC 
 
This year, all tax credits that are at least partially refundable will total an estimated $131.7 
billion, inclusive of the nonrefundable portion of the credits.  The refundable portion alone will 
total $77.1 billion – over $75 billion of which is the refundable CTC and EITC.  The others are 
the small health care coverage tax credit, and the American opportunity tax credit totaling less 
than $2 billion in refundability (JCT, September, 2011).  By sending all of these dollars through 
child-conditioned credits (there is a small, non-child EITC), more dollars get to low-income 
children than would otherwise through other tax alternatives, for instance if we had a negative 
income tax which would be spread out over the larger population including filers without 
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children (Brazer, 1968; Garfinkel, 1968). 
For comparison’s sake, $16.6 billion will go to TANF – the level set in the 1996 welfare reform 
legislation, a level that was never indexed, and has therefore diminished in purchasing power by 
approximately 28% over the last 15 years (Finch and Schott, 2011).  The number of families 
receiving AFDC or TANF benefits continues to shrink.  For every 100 families with children in 
poverty the number receiving AFDC or TANF dropped from 82 families in 1979 to 68 families 
in 1996 (the year welfare reform passed) to 27 in 2010 (Trisi and Pavetti, 2012). 
 
A total of $56 billion was available for SNAP in 2009 – a high point, with its expansion in the 
recovery ACT (Rosenbaum, 2011).  While the 2011 CTC and EITC estimates are also based on 
increases from ARRA, the increases in the refundable credits are budgeted to continue into the 
future, while SNAP has been targeted for decreases).   
 
There are, of course, policies specifically targeting the United States’ youngest children – WIC 
and Early Head Start among them.  Nevertheless, with over one-quarter of young child in 
poverty, clearly more needs to be done. 
 
(iii) Tax refunds and “direct” spending differ in who they benefit 
 
Having established that tax expenditures are spending through the tax code, it is worth noting 
that the choice to run a program through the tax code can effect the targeting of the policy.  
Simply put, eligibility is generally based in part on some form of tax liability as opposed to say, 
need of the recipient, or the potential benefit to society.   
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The cornucopia of nonrefundable tax credits that litter the code leave out many potentially 
worthy recipients for this reason – leading to an inefficient designation of eligibility (Batchlder, 
Goldberg, and Orzsag, 2006). 
 
Therefore, and particularly in the case of children, it is at least worth examining who these 
expenditures go to, how much do they get, and whether this tax expenditure viewed as a program 
is sufficiently reaching those who should get it. 
 
Doing so involves applying a child policy lens to a tax policy question.   
 
(iv) Initial findings suggest young children are the most likely to be left out of eligibility of the 
child tax credit 
 
Since most federal cash assistance to children comes through refundable tax credits, eligibility 
and size of benefit are conditioned on tax liability as opposed to some other criterion.  On the 
phase in range of the credits, the more you earn, the higher the credit.  Young children are more 
likely to be poor than children of all other ages – their parents are most likely to have lower 
income or no income whatsoever.  Yet, since the CTC and EITC eligibility and size are 
conditioned on earnings, they may receive the smallest benefits – right when they need it the 
most.  In fact, initial evidence suggests that this may be the case for the CTC (Burman and 
Wheaton, 2007).   
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Examining CPS data using the Brookings-Urban Tax Policy Center Transfer Income Model, 
Burman and Wheaton find that 17.6% of children were in families too poor to get any CTC, 
compared to 15.4% of children ages 6 to 9, and 13.6% of children ages 10 to 16 (2007).  They 
found that overall, 34.8% of children under the age of two were in families too poor to get the 
full credit, versus 27.6% of older children.  At the time of their analysis, the eligibility threshold 
of the CTC was $11,750, whereas now it is $3,000. 
 
A recent paper on the EITC by Dowd and Horowitz (2011) finds that over the course of a 
lifetime, young children are more likely to get an EITC than older children.  That is, EITC use is 
highest when children are youngest.  Interestingly, as the policy chapter will highlight, it is 
possible for the EITC to go more to younger children than older children, while still leaving out 
more young children, as young children are more likely to be in families with no earnings, and 
thus ineligible for any EITC. 
 
Dowd and Horowitz also found out that most EITC recipients claim the credit for short periods.  
While 20% claim the EITC for over five years, 61% only claim it for one or two years.  
 
The study used IRS federal tax return data the study tracks participants of the EITC from 1989 – 
2006, and as such, the authors point out that they were unable to include families whose tax 
filing status has changed – potentially leaving out families who move to single parent status.   
 
The EITC is different than CTC.  As children age and parents earn more, some will earn enough 
to be ineligible for EITC.  This does not happen except at very top for the CTC. 
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The analysis in the policy chapter will attempt to provide a snapshot of whether or not current 
CPS data lends credence to Burman and Wheaton’s findings for the CTC – and whether or not 
the EITC size by age of child tracks the CTC.  Since the CTC and EITC phase in over 
approximately the same earnings range, they would likely do so in the phase-in range.   
 
So, while the CTC and EITC together lift more children out of poverty than any other program or 
category of programs at any level of government (Marr and Highsmith, 2011), they may be 
helping the most disadvantaged infants and toddlers the least. 
 
(v) Large swings in earnings for the families of young children are particularly deleterious, and 
can happen due to macro events (recessions or floods) or something more personal to the family 
 
Research suggests that changes in family income from year to year – income volatility - may be 
particularly damaging to children (See, for instance, Duncan and Brooks-Gunn, 1997; Dahl, 
DeLeire, and Schwabish, 2011).   Using the NICHD-SECC, Dearing, McCartney, and Taylor 
find that changes in family income-to-needs matters more for young children with less (2001).  
These findings are consistent with experiments on monkeys showing that monkeys with little 
food, while worse off than those with a consistent supply of sufficient food, are better off than 
those who received a varied and unpredictable supply of food, and therefore were unable to 
predict or rapidly adapt to biweekly changes in food availability (Rosenblum and Paully, 1984).  
At the same time, there is evidence that there is great variation year to year in the amount that 
families receive in tax credits (Barrow and McGranahan, 2000; Scott, 2010), which combined 
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are the single largest federal cash policies for children.  Moreover, while some families do fall 
into eligibility when their earnings go down, for the poorest families, the CTC and EITC are pro-
cyclical – that is, from both a micro- and macro-economic standpoint, as the earnings of the low-
income families go down, they credits are reduced - right when they need it the most.   
 
(vi) Tax credits based on earnings can amplify these swings  
 
Since tax credits are based on previous years earnings, for families in the phase in range, a large 
drop in earnings will correspond to a drop in size of their CTC and EITC.  Businesses and 
wealthy individuals can average out losses and gains over years, allowing them to better plan for 
the future  - but low-income families have no ability to do such planning through the tax code.  
The code simply does not allow them to average out their credits over years.  If swings in 
earnings can be deleterious to low-income young children, the CTC and EITC have the potential 
to amplify this effect.  Attempts to average out the size of these benefits could lead to a tax 
policy that is more consistent with what we know about child development.  One such effort was 
the look back provision, created after Hurricanes Katrina, Irene, and Wilma.  Congress, 
recognizing that the loss of earnings due to a hurricane would lead to the loss of tax credits 
allowed residents in the effected regions of these storms to opt to use their previous year’s 
earnings to calculate their refundable CTC and EITC, dampening the negative effect of the 
storms on earnings.   
 
(vii) Recessions have a negative impact on children, and may pose a particular burden on the 
families of young children, exacerbating the potential to leave young children out of earnings-
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based benefits 
 
Several months ago, I asked John Irons at the Economic Policy Institute whether unemployment 
in the current recession was equally distributed among the families of children of different ages.  
My concern was that the parents of younger children were more likely to be last in at their jobs 
and could be more likely, therefore, to be the first laid off – or the last hired.  EPI had taken a 
look at the effect of the recession on children, and therefore had a model that allowed them to 
look at this quite easily.  While it is neither peer reviewed nor published – it was posted on an 
EPI blog - Dr. Irons run of the numbers validated my concern – that is that young children are 
more likely than the children of any other age to have an unemployed parent.  Clearly more 
research would be needed to confirm these results, and to tease out what is causing such an 
outcome.  That said, if true, it suggests that in a recession young children are even more likely 
than they already would be in normal economic times to get either a smaller CTC and EITC or 
no credits whatsoever.   
 
Some evidence even suggests that recessions are associated with reduced fetal growth, which has 
the possibility of leading to long term negative health consequences for children who were in 
utero during economic contractions (Margerison-Zilko, Catalano, Hubbard, and Ahern, 2011).  
Furthermore, there is an increased incidence of “nonaccidental head trauma” in infants 
associated with this recession (Huang, O’Riordan, Fitzenrider, McDavid, Cohen, and Robinson, 
2011; Berger, Fromkin, Stutz, Makoroff, Schirbano, Feldman, Tu, and Fabio, 2011). 
 
Such health outcomes may be related to the fact that the proportion of children with a parent who 
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is unemployed or underemployed doubled from 2007 to 2010 (Mishel and Shierholz, 2011).  
 
There has been much research on the long-term negative effects of recessions on the children of 
the unemployed (Orszag, 2009).  Much of the research has focused on the emotional effect of 
unemployment on children.  Clearly the economic impact on children is serious – and 
exacerbated by the corresponding shrinking of tax credits.   
 
(It is worth noting that in all of these cases, there are some families who fall into eligibility – 
their earnings drop, making them for the first time eligible for the EITC or for a larger EITC.  
For families who drop into this range, the EITC can serve as a stabilizing force, as opposed to 
exacerbating the loss of income). 
 
(viii) Refundable tax credits can be stimulative, simultaneously helping the macro economy and 
the individual recipients.   
 
Over the last four years, refundable tax credit expansions have been attached to several bills 
whose stated purpose was to stimulate the economy – including the January 2008 stimulus, the 
January 2009 stimulus, and the December 2010 tax cut/unemployment insurance extension bill.  
Since refundable tax credits go to families who are living paycheck to paycheck, the dollars 
received are likely to be spent as opposed to saved, making their way back into the economy at 
large.  CBO has deemed that refundable credits are more stimulative than all other tax stimulus 
options (Elmendorf, 2011).  At the same time, they suggest a multiplier effect in the range of 0.2 
to 1.0, suggesting that bang for the buck is not nearly as good as direct spending.  Others, such as 
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Dr. Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics have estimated a larger multiplier effect of 1.22 (2009).  It 
is important to note, that unlike direct spending, tax credits are received in the summer following 
the tax year for which they are implemented.  So, while unemployment insurance goes to 
recipients as often as every week – and presumably is spent soon thereafter, going right back into 
the economy, tax credits are received as a lump sum.  A family files their taxes by April 15 of the 
following year and get their check sometime thereafter as a lump some.  The small advanced 
EITC that allowed workers to get their EITC with their paycheck was recently ended.  This lag in 
receipt led the Tax Policy Center in its grading of tax components of what would become ARRA 
to give the refundable CTC expansion a B+, stating that it was the most highly targeted of all of 
the tax provisions of ARRA, and had the benefit come immediately, and been as generous as the 
original House version, it would have received an A- instead (Altshuler, Burman, Gleckman, 
Halperin, Harris, Maag, Rueben, Toder, and Williams, 2009). 
 
In sum, it seems clear that the largest cash benefit for children, indeed the largest cash benefit for 
children, simply because of the fact that it is run through the tax code, may be leaving out the 
youngest children who need it the most, and subjecting these same families to an amplified 
earnings effect – both of which are strongly associated with negative effects on young children 
and their human capital development.   
 
There is a difference between explicit and implicit policy (Kamerman and Kahn, 1997).  As 
explicit policy, the Child Tax Credit may be sound tax policy, lowering the tax burden of 
families with children – but as child and family policy it may need to be redesigned to better 
align with the child development knowledge. 
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In the policy analysis, I will examine this first possibility – that young children, those who would 
most benefit from cash assistance, may be the most likely to be left out of our country’s largest 
child policy.  Before doing so, it is worth knowing the legislative history of the Child Tax Credit, 
as paired with the policy analysis, it can help to shed light on a path forward for future policy 
changes to fix this misallocation of resources. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The Legislative History of the Child Tax Credit 
 
The legislative and political history of the Child Tax Credit is fascinating and worth 
documenting.  People often confuse it with the Earned Income Tax Credit, yet the politics of the 
two credits are quite different.  The CTC goes to the broad middle of the population including 
some families in the bottom of the earnings distribution, benefitting over 3/4s of all children, 
whereas the EITC goes only to families in the bottom two quintiles of the earnings distribution, 
benefiting less than ¼ of all children (table 1).  As such, the CTC is a quasi-universal program 
and enjoys the wide support associated with such inclusion, while the EITC is seen as a credit for 
low-income, working families.  Yet at the same time, expansions of the CTC – since they have 
focused on the eligibility of families, are more progressive than expansions of the EITC, since 
they are focused on increasing the CTC for larger families or married couples.  That is, CTC 
expansions add dollars to families at the bottom of the earnings distribution, while expansions of 
the EITC add dollars to families in the bottom two-fifths of the distribution. 
 
In this chapter, I discuss the context from which I pieced together this legislative history, briefly 
discuss some of the relevant political science literature, and having done so, detail the major 
legislative events relating to the CTC in chronological order, ending with the December, 2010 
tax cut extensions. 
 
1.  Context: 
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I have gathered many of the primary resources needed for a legislative history of the CTC.   
These include media accounts, minutes from Congressional hearings and floor speeches, and 
advocacy papers and analyses.  Where I find mention of the CTC in the memoirs of high-ranking 
officials in the Clinton and (George W.) Bush White Houses, I incorporate it.2  I participated in 
scores of meetings and phone calls on the CTC - the vast majority of which included my partner 
and father, Bill Harris - with staff and elected officials from the House, Senate, and the Obama 
Presidential Transition Team and administration.  That said, this chapter relies on information 
that can be found in public sources, though it would presumably be quite difficult to piece 
together without first having a sense of what happened.   
 
It is important to examine the optimal policy from the standpoint of child development.  My 
hope is that marrying the legislative history with the policy analysis may lead to policy 
recommendations that may be more likely to be enacted in the short run, and therefore be helpful 
to very young children and their families.    
 
2.  A Brief Discussion of the Political Science Literature: 
 
Policy change of course happens for a variety of reasons.  At times, change can come in response 
to a large public event (Derthick, 1975; Pierson, 2005), as it has with the CTC, which began after 
the revolutionary 1994 election and the GOP takeover of Congress.  Often policy change comes 
incrementally over a long period of time, as opposed to following one event (Hayes, 1982), as it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  As of this writing, there are yet to be accounts from high-ranking officials in the Obama 
administration that provide direct information of the CTC legislative history.	  
	   53	  
also has with the CTC, which has evolved in the many years since it was first created in 1997.  
Kingdon argues that “windows of opportunity” exist to enact legislation (1995).  And certainly, 
the tale of the CTC that follows indicates that some of the changes in the CTC were due to 
people scrambling through these windows.  Some analysts focus on the history or promise of 
social movements (Skocpol and Dickert, 2001) and others focus on the role of child advocates 
(De Vita and Mosher-Williams, 2001).  Still others, including in particular, works by lawmakers, 
focus on the importance of both individual lawmakers and institutional mechanisms for change, 
including the work of staff, and the roles of committees and hearings (see for instance, Obey, 
2007; Waxman, 2009).  It is no surprise, perhaps, that lawmakers view change as they saw it 
made through the lenses of elected officials and their staffs who made it happen.   
 
While no doubt all of these factors contributed at least in part to the creation and expansions of 
the child tax credit, this chapter is largely limited to a legislative point of view, primarily 
Congress’s and secondarily the Executive’s, focusing on those institutional mechanisms that 
allowed for changes that might not otherwise have been accomplished.  The CTC is after all, a 
tax expenditure, part of what Howard has labeled the “hidden welfare state” (1999), that are both 
easier to enact and harder to end than other legislation (Kleinbard, 2010).  While the creation of 
the CTC received a lot of publicity starting with the 1994 elections, subsequent changes have 
happened largely under the radar, i.e. outside of public scrutiny.  This paper should add insight 
into why it happened.  I will leave it to other scholars to debate the merits of examining the 
policy through one of these other lenses. 
 
Moreover, there are limitations to what can be gleamed from an examination of legislative 
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history, ranging from the conscious or unconscious selective omission of information that does 
not conform to my potential biases, to the question of whether or not the history can shed light 
on the potential for policy change in the future (Hayes, 1982). 
 
For the balance of this chapter, I walk through the legislative history of the CTC in chronological 
order.  First I present a timeline of the major legislative events relating to the CTC, and then 
detail each of the events below. 
 
3.  The Legislative History of the Child Tax Credit: 
 
Legislative Time Line of the Child Tax Credit 
 
9/27/1994   GOP House Minority introduces the “Contract with America;” calls for a $500 
partially refundable per child tax credit. 
 
3/19/1996   President Clinton introduces FY97 Budget Proposal calling for a $500 non-
refundable per child tax credit. 
 
8/5/1997   President Clinton signs “Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-34)” into law, 
creating a $500 CTC made partially refundable for families with more than two 
children. 
 
6/7/2001  President Bush sings “Economic Growth and Tax Reform Reconciliation Act of 
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2001” into law, doubling the CTC to $1,000 (phased in over several years) and 
making it refundable for families with any number of children and earnings above 
$10,000 (an indexed threshold that would rise every year). 
 
3/12/2003 Rep. DeLauro introduces an amendment to make the CTC fully refundability for 
CTC in House Budget Committee, fails on party line vote, with all Democrats in 
favor. 
 
5/8/2003 Finance Committee tax markup:  Acceleration of refundability of CTC added to 
Chairman's mark 
 
5/23/2003 Conference agreement:  Acceleration of refundability dropped from House and 
Senate compromise bill 
 
5/28/2003 President Bush signs "Jobs and Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 
2003" into law 
 
5/29/2003 New York Times front page story, "Tax Law Omits $400 Child Credit for 
Millions" 
 
10/4/2004 Jobs bill: Refundability of CTC accelerated 
Combat pay penalty fixed permanently for CTC and temporarily for EITC 
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9/2005 Legislation in response to Hurricane Katrina:  Congress creates "look back" 
provision allowing affected families to use their previous year's earnings to 
calculate their refundable CTC and EITC 
 
1/3/2007 Speaker Pelosi announces she will dedicate the 110th Congress to children and 
families.  Appoints Representatives DeLauro and Miller to head the effort. 
 
5/22/2007 Speaker Pelosi hosts "National Summit on Children and Families" 
 
10/26/2007 Chairman Rangel releases "Mother of All Tax Bills," which would expand 
eligibility of the CTC by lowering the threshold to a de-indexed $8500. 
 
12/2007 Chairman Rangel adds CTC threshold of $8500 to annual tax extenders bill. 
 
12/2007 Senate strips out CTC provision and passes tax extenders. 
 
1/2008 President Bush and Speaker Pelosi agree to a tax stimulus that includes a one time 
refundable per Child Tax Credit of $300 for up to two children for families with 
earnings of at least $3,000 
 
9/2008 Chairman Rangel again adds CTC threshold of $8500 to annual tax extenders bill 
 
9/29/2008 House rejects TARP bill, markets plunge in response 
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10/1/2008 Senate attaches tax extenders to TARP and passes it  
 
10/3/2008 House passes TARP with extenders attached, lowering the CTC eligibility 
threshold for one year to $8500. 
 
1/22/2009 House Ways and Means Committee passes recovery package lowering CTC 
eligibility threshold to $0 
 
1/27/2009 Senate Finance Committee passes recovery package lowering CTC eligibility 
threshold to $8,000 
 
2/11/2009 In negotiations, House and Senate agree to new eligibility level of $3,000. 
 
2/17/2009 President Obama signs into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 
lowering the CTC eligibility threshold to a de-indexed $3,000 for two years 
 
1/28/2010 PAYGO passes as part of debt limit extension, allowing future extensions of 
refundability of current policy CTC to be extended without having to offset the 
costs 
 
12/17/2010 Extension of 2001/2003 Bush Tax Cuts, CTC refundability from 2001 cuts and 
ARRA extended through 2012. 
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1994:  The Contract with America 
 
Six weeks before the 1994 Congressional midterm election, House Republicans stood on the 
steps of the Capital and released their “Contract with America,” detailing what they would do if 
they were to take control of Congress.  Under the leadership of Minority Leader Newt Gingrich, 
the House GOP committed to bringing to the floor a set of rule changes and nine bills within the 
first 100 days of the 104th Congress.  One of those bills was entitled the “American Dream 
Restoration Act,” which promised “A $500-per-chid tax credit, begin repeal of the marriage 
penalty, and creation of American Dream Savings Accounts to provide middle-class tax relief” 
(Norquist, 1995). 
 
It appears to be the case that one of the central reasons that the CTC was included in the Contract 
with America was to “strengthen the family” (Gingrich, 1995).  The idea of a CTC was popular 
with conservative “pro-family” groups, and in particular Christian Conservatives, like the Family 
Research Council (FRC).3  FRC saw the CTC as one way to support families who chose to 
homeschool their children.  Christian Conservatives could provide the energy for the policy, as 
they were known to turn out votes reliably, and the CTC could help rouse electoral support.  Yet 
a wider coalition existed to support the idea of a CTC.  For libertarians, there was the benefit of 
government allowing families to make their own choices on how they spent their money. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  While FRC considers itself “pro-family,” in support of what some call the traditional family, 
others believe the opposite to be true.  FRC has since been designated as a hate group for its anti-
gay stance by the Southern Poverty Law Center.  	  
	   59	  
Contract with America co-author Grover Norquist saw the CTC as one way to divert revenue 
from Washington, by diverting money bound for the treasury and leaving it directly in the 
pockets of families.  He argued that cutting taxes so that every family received a $500 tax credit 
for every child would begin to “reduce the damage Clinton’s tax policies do to families.”  The 
CTC could offset payroll taxes4 and more generally, send less revenue to the government that 
could be put to use in spending programs.  The CTC in the contract in America was slated to be 
partially refundable to the extent that an employee’s payroll tax, including the employer share, 
exceeded its EITC (Greenstein and Shapiro, 2001).   
 
In his 1995 book on the GOP takeover of Congress, Norquist wrote of the problem of not 
indexing tax credits, arguing that the dependent exemption lost ½ of its value because “the 
federal government wanted more money and rather than raising taxes directly and honestly, the 
politicians simply let inflation eat away at the value of every child’s deduction” (1995).  It was 
estimates from the conservative Heritage Foundation that Norquist used to show the impact of 
the creation of a $500 per child tax credit for children under the age of 18, by state and in terms 
of dollars and children helped.   
 
The CTC then, was a way for the GOP using conservative think tank and interest group honed 
policy, to run on a family friendly platform, cut taxes, shrink government, while appealing to 
pro-family conservatives and libertarians at the same time.  It was a political winner. 
 
The fact that conservatives, who had never embraced a stronger role for government in child and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Clinton, of course, was not responsible for payroll taxes.  	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family policy, were claiming the “pro-family” label did not go unnoticed (see for instance, 
Kamerman and Kahn, 1997).   
 
President Clinton embraced the Child Tax Credit, including a CTC starting at $300 per child 
gradually increasing to $500 in his FY 1997 Budget released at the beginning of 1996 (Joint 
Committee on Taxation, 1996).  Unlike the original CTC in the Contract with America, it was 
proposed as a non-refundable credit.  Welfare reform had yet to pass, and heading into the 
reelection, perhaps the White House considered it was not worth the risk to add refundability to a 
budget that was primarily a political document and would not become law.  The Clinton 
Administration had already successfully advocated for a significant expansion of the refundable 
EITC.  The moderate pro-business Democratic Leadership Council called for a $750 per child 
tax credit (DLC, 1997A) and suggested that it too be made refundable (DLC, 1997B). 
 
While the GOP Contract with America CTC had been refundable and the Clinton Budget had 
been non-refundable, here the parties flipped back.  In negotiations over the 1997 Balanced 
Budget Agreement, the White House insisted on some refundability for the CTC.  Gingrich 
referred to it as “welfare,” so the Clinton administration brought in Daniel Mercado of the 
Savannah, Georgia Police Department, to rebut the Speaker’s claim.  The Speaker subsequently 
agreed to accept a small amount of refundability, yet the entire budget deal almost fell apart 
when Gingrich left a meeting when the White House asked for more refundability.  It was finally 
pieced back together in a subsequent call between chief of staff Erskine Bowles and the Speaker 
(Sperling, 2005).  
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As part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-34), a $500 Child Tax Credit was passed 
into law and signed by President Clinton.  In the midst of the House and Senate compromising 
on the costs of the overall tax package, the age was reduced from all children under 19 to 
children under 17, and the value of the CTC was reduced from $500 to $400 for the first year, 
increasing back to $500 in the out years.  For families with more than two children, it was made 
partially refundable, to complement the EITC (Shvedov, 2010).  At the time, families got a 
higher EITC if they had a second child, but nothing more for additional children.  The 1997 CTC 
was made refundable up to the difference in a families’ payroll tax liability and their EITC.  
Nothing more would happen with the CTC during the Clinton administration. 
 
2001: Economic Growth and Tax Reform Reconciliation Act of 2001 
 
President Bush was narrowly elected in November of 2000.  Having received fewer votes than 
Al Gore, it was hard to make the case that the “compassionate conservative” had a conservative 
mandate when he entered office on January 20th of 2001.  
 
While many look back at the legacy of the two terms of President Bush and think first of the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it was also the domestic events that took place in the months 
before September 11th, specifically the 2001 tax cut, that set the parameters of the discussion on 
the size of government that continue today. 
 
In June of 2001, President Bush pushed through one of the largest tax cuts in U.S. history at a 
10-year cost of $1.3 trillion.  In fact, that cost, estimated by the official Congressional arbiter of 
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tax estimates – the Joint Tax Committee, underestimated the real cost of the cuts. 
 
Some years back Congress adopted ten year budgeting, in order to better account for costs of 
programs.  Often, a program’s costs and benefits – even just those counted on the Congressional 
“books” – do not occur in the same year.  Ten year budgeting was implemented to get more 
accurate estimates of the effects of a policy on the treasury. 
 
The 2001 tax cuts took advantage of the ten-year budget window.  In order to minimize the 
overall 10-year cost of the tax cuts while maximizing the ultimate effect of the cuts, the tax cuts 
were phased in.  In the first year, only some cuts would take place, growing in each year.  While 
some were to be fully implemented in the middle of the decade, others would not be until the 10th 
year.  The cost of the Bush tax cuts in 2010 therefore was estimated to be approximately twice 
the average annual cost of the cuts.  Moreover, by reducing the tax liabilities of many middle-
income families, the Bush tax cuts pushed many of these families onto the Alternative Minimum 
Tax (AMT).  Congress knew at the time that it would need to pass laws to keep the AMT, 
designed in the 1980s to make sure that wealthy families paid at least some tax, from hitting 
middle class families.  Each year, the costs of “patching” the AMT continue to rise, and now are 
on the order of magnitude of $75 billion per year. 
 
The phase in of the tax cuts over the decade also allowed the distributional effects of the cuts to 
be blurred.  Cuts for most of the population could phase in over a few years, whereas the most 
regressive tax cuts – like repeal of the estate tax, only gradually increased, and did not get fully 
implemented until the 10th year. 
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Still, some tax cuts for middle class families were needed in order to show some semblance of 
distributional equity and in order to get the bill through the Senate Finance Committee, where 
Senate tax legislation is first introduced, and off the floor.   
 
In this context, the child tax credit was doubled to $1000 per child in the bill, and made partially 
refundable for potentially all children in a family - not just for families with more than two 
children.  In 2001, there were only two women on the Senate Finance Committee, both 
moderates – Democrat Blanche Lincoln from Arkansas and Republican Olympia Snowe from 
Maine.  Both are given credit for making the CTC refundable for all children in a family.  Surely 
others were involved in this effort.  Ron Haskins, in his review of this chapter, pointed out that 
Republican Representative Nancy Johnson of the House Ways and Means Committee called or 
met with Senator Snowe and gave her the idea for how to have refundability and still maintain 
work incentives. 
 
The parameters of refundability came about partly for policy reasons, and partly to contain its 
costs.  Families would get 15% of each dollar of earnings above a threshold, since 15% was 
approximately a family’s payroll tax burden.  Harkening back to the Contract with America, 
then, the CTC was seen as offsetting the payroll tax.  Some found this argument curious, as the 
EITC already served this purpose.  Nevertheless, that is how Congress arrived at the 15% rate.   
 
In order to limit the costs and make sure that only people working close to full time were 
eligible, the Senate passed an eligibility threshold of $10,000.  Of course earnings are only a 
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proxy for work, so families with very little work could still have earnings sufficient for a full 
CTC, whereas families earning the minimum wage were only eligible for a credit of a few 
hundred dollars.   
 
In conference, in order to contain the costs of the CTC, and the overall costs of the tax cut to 
$1.3 trillion, the CTC was phased in, starting in year one at $600, then moving up to $1000, and 
the eligibility threshold index of $10,000 was indexed.  Every year, until subsequent legislation 
in 2008, the eligibility threshold increased.   
 
Most often, indexation in the tax code serves to preserve the purchasing power of the original 
benefit level.  Here, the case was different.  In future years, with stagnant wages for low-income 
families, and a minimum wage that did not increase for years, indexation had the perverse effect 
of leading to shrinking CTCs for some families, and pushing other families out of eligibility all 
together.   
 
Nevertheless, it was the 2001 Bush tax cut, the tax cut that eliminated the estate tax for the 
wealthiest families (albeit temporarily) that led to the beginning of refundability of the CTC for 
families with any number of children. 
 
The other relevant piece of information about the 2001 tax cut is that it was passed through the 
Senate under reconciliation.  In order to end debate in the Senate, sixty votes are needed rather 
than a simple majority of 51.  The original Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act 
of 1974 created special rules for budget reconciliation bills, including their passage by a simple 
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majority.  If the Senate chose, budget bills could contain “reconciliation instructions” in order to 
achieve some net change in the budget.  Debate on reconciliation instructions is limited to thirty 
hours, and therefore does not need sixty votes to pass.  As such, the Republican Congress passed 
a budget in 2001 with reconciliation instructions for the Senate Finance Committee to cut 
revenue by $1.3 trillion.   
 
Reconciliation allows the Senate majority to move some legislation that it could not otherwise 
move without sixty votes, including most recently, the Affordable Care Act, colloquially known 
as Obama’s Heath Care Reform.  Yet, reconciliation only applies to a ten-year window, meaning 
that anything passed under reconciliation expires at the end of the decade.  Therefore, the Bush 
tax cuts were set to expire on December 31st, 2010.  As will be detailed below, they were 
extended for two years at the end of 2010, and are set to expire at the end of this year.  The 
consequences of this legislative rule will become clear as the chapter progresses. 
 
2003:  Jobs and Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003 
 
The first post-9/11 election in 2002 swept in a net 8 House seats for the GOP and more 
importantly, gave them a net two seats in the Senate allowing them to regain the majority, 
(having briefly lost in in 2001 when Republican Jim Jeffords became an independent, caucused 
with the Democrats, leading to 51 Democratic votes in the Senate). 
 
With majorities in the House and Senate and the election wins behind them, the GOP pushed 
through a budget with reconciliation instructions for tax cuts again.   
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This time, President Bush was pushing to cut dividend taxes, taxed at the time at ordinary 
income rates of up to 39.6%.   
 
In March, as the budget began to move through the House Budget Committee, Congresswoman 
Rosa DeLauro of New Haven offered an amendment in committee to the budget that would 
make the CTC fully refundable.  Under the amendment as offered, all families, regardless of 
whether they had any earnings or not, would receive a full $1,000 child tax credit for each child.  
As expected, it lost on a party line vote.  It received no attention, but should be recognized as the 
first time Congress voted on a fully refundable Child Tax Credit. 
 
Before the tax cut fight was fully joined, the Bush administration was rumored to be looking for 
a tax cut of approximately $350 billion over a decade.  When they announced a plan for a cut of 
$674 billion, the astute reporters Jonathan Weisman and Mike Allen noted on the front page of 
the Washington Post that the Administration may have doubled their ask so as to be able to 
negotiate back to their original goal of $350 billion.   
 
Unlike the Senate, the rules of the House give the majority party total control over the process of 
moving legislation, that is, if they can keep their party voting with them.  While the Republicans 
had reconciliation, with a 50-50 Republican to Democrat balance in the Senate, the partisan 
breakdown of committee members meant that the GOP would need every Republican vote on the 
Senate Finance Committee in order to move a bill to the floor.  With any tie votes in the Senate, 
including that for majority leader, the Vice-President casts the tie-breaking vote. 
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Moderate Olympia Snowe was a hold out.  She was reluctant to cut dividend taxes.  While more 
and more Americans received dividends, the vast majority of the dividend tax cut would go to 
the those with earnings over 250,000.  Moreover, Senator Snowe was aware of the fact that once 
the bill moved out of committee she would lose her leverage, as conservative Democrats could 
provide the 50th vote to get the bill off of the floor of the Senate. 
 
While a main purpose of the 2003 tax cut was to lower dividend tax rates, and thereby, 
theoretically increase investments and grow the economy, the other main part of the bill would 
accelerate all of the 2001 personal tax cuts, including the non-refundable portion of the CTC.  
Those cuts that in 2001 were phased in to slowly would be accelerated.   
 
Left out of acceleration, curiously, were just three items – the estate tax, the 2001 EITC 
expansion, and the refundable portion of the CTC. 
 
Teaming up with Senator Lincoln, Senator Snowe submitted an amendment in committee to 
accelerate the refundable portion of the CTC at a cost of $3.5 billion over two years.  Consulting 
with Chairman Grassley, Senators Snowe and Lincoln withdrew their amendment as the 
Chairman offered to include it in his manager’s amendment.   
 
Having agreed to accelerate the increase in the refundable CTC, Chairman Grassley now had the 
votes to move the bill to the floor. 
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The House had passed a somewhat different measure.  While the House left out acceleration of 
the refundable CTC, the biggest difference between the two chambers was that Chairman Bill 
Thomas of the tax writing Ways and Means Committee was insisting on lowering capital gains 
in lock step with dividends. 
 
In conference, Thomas prevailed in spite of the objections of the administration, in lowering both 
the capital gains rates and dividend rates to 15%.   
 
With a more conservative bill coming out of conference, Senator Snowe was no longer willing to 
support the bill.  The conferees, meeting off of the Senate floor with Senate President Dick 
Cheney needed a fiftieth vote.  Senator Lincoln would not provide that vote, and in the end, 
while the bill passed, the provision accelerating refundability of the CTC was dropped in 
conference.  The provision, at a cost of $3.5 billion would have been just 1% of the overall bill.   
 
The administration had never left refundability out of their 2003 proposed bill and now cut it out 
of the conference agreement.  The economic team in the Bush administration believed that 
rebates sent to lower-income families would either be saved or used to pay down credit card 
debt, and thus would not stimulate the economy (Rove, 2010).  In his memoir on his time in 
office, President Bush does not mention these families being left out.  He does, however point 
out that after the bill passed the Senate that Vice-President Cheney joked that he did not get to 
vote often, but that when he did, he was always on the winning side (Bush, 2010). 
 
Tax bills have many components.  It is common for reporters to seize on those items where there 
	   69	  
is disagreement between the negotiating parties.  The coverage of tax bills often focuses on the 
politics of the bill, and maybe one or two components of the bill.  Here the story was about the 
dividend cut, the capital gains cut, and getting to 50 votes. 
 
Most of the major papers, in discussing the agreement, said that the bill would accelerate the 
2001 Bush tax cuts, sending a CTC to all but the wealthiest families.  Since the refundable 
portion of the CTC was not being accelerated, the families of 11.9 million children were left out 
of the bill (Lee and Greenstein, 2003).  Still more low-income children were not eligible for a 
CTC at all since they were in families with earnings under the eligibility threshold of $10,500.  
In all, the media reports were off by a total of about 20 million children (Harris, 2003).   
 
Since no public attention had been paid to the lack of acceleration of refundability of the CTC, 
which would have benefited the families of 11.9 million children receiving a refundable CTC 
with earnings over $10,500, reporters were unaware that it had been left out, much less cut out of 
the all-GOP negotiations in Vice-President Cheney’s Senate office.   
 
One paper reporting that the CTC would go to all but the wealthiest was the New York Times.  
The NYT was in the midst of hiring its first ombudsperson in response to the fallout from a 
series of fabricated stories from a staff reporter, Jayson Blair.  On the morning of May 24th, 
2003, the day after the final bill passed the Senate, the NYT – along with the other major papers) 
again reported that the tax cut would accelerate the CTC for all but the wealthiest families.   
 
The NYT received a call that morning saying that they were off by about 20 million children and 
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requesting to speak to an ombudsperson.  Within minutes, the NYT called back, said they take 
mistakes very seriously, and asked for details.   
 
The following Tuesday, May 28th, President Bush, surrounded by the many men who helped him 
pass the bill, signed the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003 into law. 
 
On the morning of Wednesday, May 29th, the New York Times put a photograph of the signing 
on the front page, top fold, under which ran the headline, “Tax Law Omits $400 Child Credit for 
Millions.”  It happened to be a slow news day.  The President’s Spokesperson Ari Fleischer was 
peppered with questions about the CTC, at one point referring to it as public assistance.  It would 
be the only time that the Bush administration would refer to the refundable credit in terms 
relating it to welfare.  The story ran on all three of the major network news programs that night, 
leading on two of the stations.  While it was relevant to public discussion of the CTC, it did not 
rise to the level of importance to be included in Fleischer’s memoir (Fleischer, 2005). 
 
Several months earlier the Democratic Polling Firm of Greenberg, Quinlin, and Rosner (GQR) 
paired up with the Republican Firm, Public Opinion Strategies (POS).  They had run a poll 
looking at messaging around the CTC.  Stan and Anna Greenberg designed the survey to test 
potential arguments of opponents to simulate how they would affect likely voters.  Bill 
McInturff, the founding partner of POS, at the time had more Congressional clients than any 
other Republican pollster and was widely respected.  He said that while their data didn’t compel 
his clients to be for the refundable CTC, that they couldn’t fight against it politically and win in 
the arena of public opinion.  They found that the most likely anti-CTC message of calling the 
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refundable CTC welfare wouldn’t even work among Republicans.  It was a message that 
couldn’t work at the time, even against a fully refundable CTC.   
 
The story took off.  Over the next six weeks, David Firestone of the NYT would file over a 
dozen articles on the issue.  Congressional Democrats called for legislation to address the issue. 
 
Just five days after Firestone’s first story, USA Today ran a story saying that approximately one 
million children from military and veterans’ families had been left out of the bill.  The story was 
based on a report by Arloc Sherman, at the time at the Children’s Defense Fund, which itself 
followed the issue being raised on Friday night’s NewsHour by Mark Shields, and subsequently 
by Tim Russert on Sunday’s Meet the Press.  It could now be seen as unpatriotic to be against the 
refundable CTC.   
 
Republican Senators John McCain and John Warner said the issue should be addressed.  Other 
GOP Senators joined in support.  Compromise legislation was crafted to address the bill.  It 
contained the $3.5 billion measure to accelerate the refundable CTC.  It also added to the 
eligibility of the CTC – not by bringing in more low-income families, but by moving the phase 
out level from $110,000 to $150,000.  That is, the Senate bill, an effort to fix the fact that low-
income children were left out of the tax bill, added better off children to eligibility.   
 
On June 10th, the New York Times ran a story by David Firestone entitled, “Bush Presses House 
Republicans on Credits for Poor,” in response to Ari Fleisher’s saying that Bush would tell GOP 
lawmakers if asked about the bill to “pass it.”  President Bush had run on a platform of being a 
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“compassionate conservative.”  He may have been open to the idea of helping the working poor.  
That said, the President had left the refundable CTC out of his original proposal, in spite it 
adding up to a rounding error and there was no evidence that his newfound public support of the 
bill had anything to do with an actual effort to get it passed.   
 
The GOP House majority was loath to add to refundability.  Some conservatives see refundable 
tax cuts as using the tax code as welfare - a perversion of the code.  As such, the majority came 
up with the one solution that would allow them to save face without actually having an 
acceleration of refundability signed into law.  Knowing Democrats in the Senate would vote 
against it, they brought to the floor and passed a bill accelerating refundability, while making the 
entire CTC permanent, at a cost of approximately ½ a trillion dollars.  The bill was too expensive 
for the Democrats in the Senate, who had railed against the cost of the Bush tax cuts to the 
treasury.  With reconciliation passed and the bill needing 60 votes it went nowhere legislatively 
in 2003. 
 
However, the politics of the refundable CTC were changed.  While the Wall Street Journal 
editorial page has referred to families with incomes too low to get the accelerated CTC as “lucky 
duckies,” it was now considered difficult for the GOP to be publically against the CTC.  Over the 
course of the weeks leading up the August recess, the Democratic House leadership, under the 
encouragement of Congresswoman DeLauro, suggested members to go down to the floor of the 
House day after day to rail on the GOP for not accelerating tax cuts for working people.  The 
Democrats were now on record in favor of a tax credit for working families, including 
waitresses, home health aides, and troops.  Having been on the wrong side of the issue with the 
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public, GOP elected officials and their spokespeople no longer called the CTC “public 
assistance.”   
 
2004:  The Jobs Bill 
 
Under the Constitution, tax legislation must be introduced first in the House of Representatives.  
Since the rules and customs of the Senate lead to bills being fashioned more often than not in 
committees rather than by leadership and with many compromises to get to a majority or 60 
votes, final versions of tax bills are often written by the Senate.  Historically, this had not been 
the case.  In the past, the House would pass a bill and send it to the Senate.  The Senate would 
then pass its own bill and meet in Conference to resolve their differences. 
 
At times the House passes legislation to advance a message, knowing that the Senate will kill the 
bill.  Other times, the House is hesitant to pass legislation, preferring for the Senate to move first, 
so that they don’t have to be on record voting for an unpopular bill that isn’t going to become 
law anyways. 
 
In these situations, the Senate can take up a tax bill that has passed the House, but never gone 
anywhere, and use the bill as a shell, taking out all of the language and putting in their own bill, 
thus complying with the words of the Constitution, if not the intent. 
 
In 2004, just such a situation existed.  Large multi-national companies had been parking profits 
overseas under a provision in the tax code known as deferral.  U.S. companies with overseas 
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profits must pay taxes equal to the difference between the taxes they pay in the country where 
their profits are earned and what they would owe in the United States.  However, those taxes do 
not need to be paid until companies “repatriate” the profits, that is bring them back to the United 
States.  Deferral leads to two behaviors by such firms.  First, they credit as much of their 
earnings as possible to foreign locals.  Second, they put off repatriating their profits for as long 
as they wish. 
 
In 2004, these companies were seeking a tax holiday – the opportunity to bring their profits back 
from overseas at a much reduced rate, under the premise that doing so would allow them to 
create jobs back home in the U.S.   
 
The Senate had a House revenue measure that they had never taken up that they could use as a 
shell bill.  It happened to be the Child Tax Credit bill that the House passed in June of 2003 to 
include the children left out of the 2003 reconciliation bill.   
 
In this shell, they put the 2004 Jobs Bill, which lowered the corporate rate for repatriated profits 
to 5%.  A year and a half after the May 2003 passage of the bill that left out acceleration of the 
refundable CTC, the Senate, in their bipartisan negotiations to pass the bill, as they needed sixty 
votes to pass the bill, included a one year acceleration of the refundable CTC. 
 
In the intervening year, as more was learned about the one million children in families of troops 
and veterans that were left out of the 2003 bill, a quirk in the tax code was discovered. 
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Some time ago, Congress, in an effort to increase the compensation for people in combat, passed 
a bill prohibiting combat pay from being taxed.  Troops working in a combat theater, at the time 
which included Afghanistan and Iraq, did not have to pay income taxes on their combat pay.  
Unknown at the time was the fact that this so called benefit had the perverse effect of keeping 
combat pay from counting as earnings towards calculating a families’ refundable CTC or EITC.  
In essence, we sent men over to war (women who went did not serve in official combat 
positions) and at the same time took away their CTC and EITC.  Obviously, for soldiers 
receiving base pay, particularly those who were the sole-earner in their family, the result of this 
policy was particularly problematic, leading to losses of thousands of dollars in tax credits per 
family. 
 
The 2004 tax bill quietly fixed the combat pay provision for the refundable CTC permanently.  
While Senator Lincoln proposed an amendment in the Conference to fix it permanently for the 
EITC as well, the conservative Senator Don Nickles blocked the measure, along with Senator 
Trent Lott, and Representatives Bill Thomas and Tom Delay.  Senator Nickles said that it would 
be better to study the issue before fixing it permanently.  (The real negotiating for the bill was 
not happening in the Conference Committee anyway, but during breaks in Chairman Thomas’ 
private office in the Capitol, known as a hideaway, out of sight of the public and the press). 
 
The EITC combat pay penalty was patched year after year, and eventually fixed permanently. 
 
While attempts were made to draw attention to the fact that the indexation of the refundability 
level of the CTC led to people losing eligibility, coverage of the issue only materialized the day 
	  76	  
after the conference committee, a day too late, in an article by Jonathan Weisman in the 
Washington Post. 
 
In all, the refundable portion of the bill, including both the one-year acceleration of the 
refundable CTC and the combat pay provisions, was estimated to cost $2.33 billion.  In the same 
bill, General Electric was said to receive a total tax benefit of approximately $2 billion. 
 
2005:  Hurricane Katrina 
 
With Bush newly elected to a second term, conservatives were pushing to reduce the estate tax 
further.  Senator Jon Kyl, a member of the Senate Finance Committee and the second most 
senior Republican in the Senate, was leading the effort in Congress.  For those on the left, there 
was concern that they would be successful.  There was a group of moderate to conservative 
Democratic senators who believed that the “death tax burden” was too high.  The concern was so 
deep, that the Life Insurance Industry had hired lobbyists to keep the estate tax from being cut 
further.  Wealthy families’ life insurance was predicated on there being an estate tax.  Insurance 
values were calculated on what the inheritors would receive.  With a 45% estate tax rate, insurers 
were only on the hook for the remainder of the estate.  If that rate were cut, insurance companies 
would owe more to wealthy families, as these families would be getting larger inheritances 
passed on which the companies were insuring against. 
 
On Monday, August 29th, 2005 Hurricane Katrina reached the continental United States, arriving 
in Southeast Louisiana.   
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Senator Kyl, along with Senator Jeff Sessions, was reported to be looking for a millionaire 
business owner killed in the storm so that they could use it in their effort to repeal or lower the 
estate tax (Milbank, 2011).  They were unsuccessful. 
 
Of course, in its wake, Katrina left people dead, more homeless, and many jobless.   
 
Hurricane Katrina can be seen as a reminder of why the CTC and EITC are not sufficient 
substitutes for a properly functioning child benefit or welfare allowance.  Both eligibility and 
size of benefit of the CTC and EITC are conditioned on earnings.  As such, when a family loses 
earnings, even if it is through no fault of its own, as when a hurricane rips through their home, 
they can also lose parts or all of their CTC and EITC.   
 
Congress, fortunately, drafted legislation to respond to the needs of the states and people affected 
by Hurricane Katrina, and subsequent Hurricanes Rita and Wilma.  The White House wanted to 
provide tax incentives for the return of businesses and for hiring local workers (Bush, 2010).  As 
such, since tax provisions would be included in the bill, it had to originate in the House. 
 
While Republicans were still in the majority, in committee conversations around what was seen 
as a national problem without ideological issues, the Majority was convinced that loss of CTC 
and EITC due to the hurricanes was a real problem both for the families directly affected and for 
the communities that would feel a commensurate loss in purchasing power.  There are provisions 
in the tax code that allow farmers, businesses, and wealthier people to smooth out their taxes 
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over years.  The IRS typically gives automatic time extensions to businesses and individuals and 
federally declared disaster zones.  
 
Recognizing this issue, the committee drafted a “Look Back” provision, allowing families in the 
affected region to opt to use their previous year’s earnings for calculating their refundable CTC 
and EITC.  Families were allowed to opt in, so as not to hurt the families who may have fallen 
into eligibility as a result of losing earnings.  While there is no evidence that the Bush 
Administration helped on this issue, the fact that it was not blocked could have something to do 
with their take on the horrors of Katrina.  Both at the time and in reflecting back later, having 
been called a racist, the President considered it the worst moment of his presidency (Bush, 2010).  
It is also conceivable that it was not blocked because of his idea of compassionate conservatism.  
In 2000, as a Presidential nominee, he called on the GOP Congress not to “balance the budget on 
the backs of the poor.”  More likely, perhaps, is the fact that it was too small to worth bothering 
over, and was part of a larger set of trade offs in the legislation. 
 
Both the Clinton Foundation and ACORN subsequently worked in the region to sign families up 
for their credits, but little is known about how much this provision helped.   
 
Passing the Look Back provision, while only on a regional level, and only for a year, was the 
first time that Congress passed a law that partially decoupled receipt of the credit from earnings.  
Families only needed to be earnings-eligible the year before in order to receive the credit. 
 
While such a response demonstrates that Congress can appropriate special funds for a particular 
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problem without creating a new program for the entire country, the fact that they have not done 
so in subsequent disaster legislation suggests that a more comprehensive response is warranted.  
In 2011, all fifty states had federally declared disasters.  After Hurricane Irene last summer, 
legislation was introduced in both the House and the Senate to create a look back provision 
modeled on the one created after Katrina for people in these disaster zones.  It was never passed. 
 
2007:  Pelosi sworn in as Speaker/Democratic Control 
 
Tracking polls showed President’s Bush approval dropping after Hurricane Katrina, and never 
recovering.  Against this backdrop, and under a campaign coordinated by Minority Leader 
Nancy Pelosi and Congressman Rahm Emanuel, the Democrats swept to power in the 2006 
midterm election, winning control of the House for the first time since the GOP won in 1994 on 
the Contract with America and a 51-49 majority in the Senate.   
 
In 2004, in the midst of his bid for the Presidency, Minority Leader Dick Gephardt had decided 
to step down from Congress.  Minority Whip Pelosi – the number two leader for the House 
Democrats ascended to the leadership of the Democratic House.  With the election of 2006, she 
would become the first woman Speaker of the House. 
 
Ms. Pelosi was unknown to the country at the time, and as such the rollout of her ascension was 
carefully choreographed.  Two days before she was sworn in, events were held in Baltimore, 
where she grew up as the daughter of the Mayor.  She was an Italian-American from Baltimore.  
The unsaid message being that she was not just a liberal from San Francisco.   
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The day before Pelosi was sworn in, there was just one event open to the media, a women’s tea, 
highlighting the fact that she would be the first woman Speaker.  And at this event, Speaker-
Elect Pelosi said that she would dedicate the 110th Congress to children and families.  She 
announced that she was asking her closest confidants, Representatives Rosa DeLauro and 
George Miller to head this effort for her.  
 
DeLauro and Miller would chair the Steering and Policy committee of the House, in charge of 
committee assignments for all members.  DeLauro was a senior member on the House 
Appropriations committee, and chaired the subcommittee on Agriculture.  Miller, who was the 
founding chair of the House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families in the 1980s, 
was now chairing the House Education and Labor Committee.  Miller’s chief of staff, whose 
history with Miller went back to the days of the Select Committee, became Pelosi’s chief of staff.   
 
Having announced that she was committing the Congress to children and families, Speaker 
Pelosi scheduled a “National Summit on Children and Families,” for May 22nd, asking 
Representative Chaka Fattah to join Representatives DeLauro and Miller in the effort.  Ms. 
Pelosi spent almost the entire day at the summit, leaving only for a meeting on the war in Iraq.  
Little press showed up.  But in the weeks leading up the summit, the Speaker held three meetings 
with policy experts on what to do about children and families5.  Most importantly, she invited the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Dissertation committee member John Lawrence Aber presented at the May 22nd summit.  
Dissertation committee chair Jane Waldfogel presented at one of the summit pre-meetings as did 
I, where among other things, I mentioned that preliminary evidence suggested that young 
children, particularly infants and toddlers, may be more likely than older children to be ineligible 
for the child tax credit.	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most senior House members and their senior staff to the meetings, signaling her commitment to 
the issue.   
 
While Pelosi’s commitment to child and family policy has been little acknowledged in public, it 
was clear to her colleagues that she wanted to get something done in the area.   
 
2007:  Rangel’s “Mother of All Bills” / Tax Extenders 
 
After 36 years in the U.S. House, the 2006 election also led to Representative Charlie Rangel 
ascending to the chairmanship of the Ways and Means Committee for the first time.  
 
In the fall of 2007, Mr. Rangel offered a major tax reform bill that would, among other things, 
repeal the AMT.  With tax increases included in the measure, the proposal was soundly criticized 
by Republicans.  Recognizing that it would not become law, the Democrats never brought it to 
the House floor for a vote.  The bill was to be revenue neutral.  It is very difficult to have the tax 
increases and tax cuts perfectly cancel each other out.  Under the encouragement of 
Representative DeLauro and at Chairman’s Rangel’s request, the drafters of the legislation, after 
receiving the Joint Tax Estimates for the net cost of the overall bill, took the extra dollars in 
revenue and applied them towards reducing the CTC earnings threshold.  The way the numbers 
came out led to a reduced CTC threshold of $8500.  The eligibility for the CTC was also de-
indexed.  While Rangel’s bill, which he called “the Mother of All Bills,” would not become law, 
it did, for the first time propose this new eligibility level for the CTC. 
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If a tax measure is first enacted as a temporary, one-year measure, its cost scored over ten years 
is greatly reduced.  Many such provisions enter the code, and every year they need to be 
extended for a year or two.  Every year or two, Congress needs to pass what is colloquially 
referred to as a “tax extenders” bill, containing provisions ranging from deductions for teachers 
who buy classroom supplies, to the Research and Design credit, to the state and local tax 
deduction.  With interests at risk for losing potentially billions in tax subsidies, tax extenders can 
take on a legislative momentum of their own.   
 
With revenue measures originating in the House, and with the commitment of the Speaker to 
children and families and the Chairman to the CTC, the Ways and Means committee attached a 
provision that would lower the threshold of eligibility of the refundable CTC to $8500 for one 
year.  Doing so for one year would get the provision enacted into law, and then embedded with 
the other extenders, with the likely outcome of getting extended each year on the coattails of the 
well-advocated-for business tax extenders.   
 
In the Ways and Means committee markup of the bill, Republicans offered an amendment to 
strip a provision for trial lawyers and use the proceeds to reduce the CTC threshold further.  
There was no way this amendment would pass – it was just a way to embarrass Democrats for 
supporting lawyers, however what President Bush’s Press Secretary had once called “public 
assistance” was now being advocated for by GOP House members on the Ways and Means 
committee, at least rhetorically. 
 
However, with Democrats in the majority, it was Senate Republicans who would provide enough 
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votes to get to a cloture-invoking 60-vote threshold.  The insisted that the Senate strip out the 
CTC provision before passing the measure and sending it back to the House.   
 
2008:  The Bush Stimulus 
 
In January 2008, with the economy faltering, it was clear that something needed to be done.  A 
recession had officially begun in December of 2007.   
 
President Bush proposed tax cuts.  The Democrats argued that increased unemployment 
insurance and expanded food stamps were the best way to get money back into the economy.  
Harry Reid, the Leader of the Senate said that if the President could work out a compromise with 
Speaker Pelosi and Minority Leader Boehner, that the Senate would go along with it.  In order to 
get Bush’s support and that of enough Senate Republicans, Pelosi would need to come to an 
agreement with Boehner. 
 
The House Republicans of course had observed the House Democrats’ attempts at expanding the 
refundable CTC in late 2007.  According to senior Democrats, Leader Boehner said that his 
caucus could not pass spending programs like U.I. or food stamps, but that they could do the 
refundable CTC because it was a tax cut.  Ultimately the agreement contained a one-time 
expansion of refundability of the CTC with Leader Boehner accepting the refundable CTC that 
Speaker Pelosi had championed. 
 
HR 5140, the bipartisan House passed stimulus bill, provided tax rebates including a refundable 
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CTC to families with earnings between $3,000 and $25,000.  According to the Tax Policy 
Center, the bill provided a refundable CTC to approximately 34.2 million children.  Families 
with children received a total of $21.8 billion in refundable rebates, including $9.8 billion 
specifically in refundable Child Tax Credits. 
 
This group included 6.3 million children who were newly eligible for the CTC, those who live in 
families with earnings between $3,000 and the previous eligibility threshold of $12,000.   
 
For the first time - unlike in the 2003 tax bill that was sold as stimulus – refundable tax credits 
were included in a stimulus bill, credits that the Bush administration had considered in 2002 as 
not stimulative (Rove, 2010).  That said, while the elected officials referred to the refunds as 
“Child Tax Credits,” the internal revenue code was not changed to reflect this oratory.  
Therefore, in contrast was the subsequent Obama stimulus legislation in 2009 (the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act), the CTC had not technically been expanded. 
 
Speaker Pelosi was excoriated by some of her usual allies for agreeing to a package that did not 
include expanded unemployment insurance and food stamps, even though the total dollars that 
went out in refundable credits were higher than those proposed for U.I. and food stamps. 
 
2008:  TARP / Tax Extenders  
 
In October of 2008, nearly a year into the recession, the economy was teetering on the brink.  
Things were so bad that the conservative President Bush was calling on Congress to pass the 
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Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP).  TARP was fundamentally different than a stimulus 
bill.  Economists were worried that credit would dry up leading to devastating consequences to 
the economy.  TARP would provide the government with money to purchase assets and equity 
from financial institutions to provide liquidity to the markets. 
 
House members were nervous to be voting for a bill that could be considered a bailout for banks 
and would cost $700 billion.  The House leadership of both parties committed with the help of 
the Bush administration to share the votes needed to pass the bill.  But when the final bill came 
to a vote, not enough votes were available, and the House voted it down.  Stock indexes 
plummeted as one measure of the public’s reaction to the House vote.   
 
In order to pass TARP, the Senate would need to augment the measure.  With the year running 
out, and tax extenders still yet to be done, the Senate added the 2008 House tax extenders bill to 
TARP, passed the overall bill, and sent it back to the House.  This time, the House passed TARP. 
 
The 2008 House tax extenders bill drafted by Chairman Rangel, now added to TARP and signed 
into law, like the 2007 House tax extenders bill, lowered the eligibility threshold of the 
refundable CTC from $12,0506 to $8,500 within the internal revenue code.  If the House had 
passed TARP the first time, it never would have been signed into law.  But, with the Senate 
scurrying to address the economy, there was no time to change the House tax extenders bill. 
 
Therefore, TARP became the first vehicle to lower the official eligibility threshold of the 
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  What	  was	  once	  an	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  of	  $10,000	  had	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  to	  $12,050	  because	  of	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refundable CTC within the internal revenue code, and the second bill passed within the year that 
expanded eligibility, this time, for a one-year cost of $3.129 billion.  The additional credit was 
worth up to $532.50 per family – the equivalent of approximately two full weeks of work at the 
minimum wage. 
 
2009:  The Obama Stimulus:  The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
 
The next month, Senator Obama was elected to the Presidency, and Democrats dramatically 
increased their majorities in the House and the Senate. 
 
The Obama transition team, recognizing that the magnitude of the economic problem was quite a 
bit bigger than they had previously thought, announced that they would be putting together a 
large stimulus package.   
 
Needing some Republican votes in the Senate, and having run on the idea of a post-partisan 
presidency, the President’s Team decided to include tax cuts as one component of their package.  
The President ran in part on the platform of creating a “Make Work Pay” tax credit, a refundable 
tax credit of up to $500 for adults making under $250,000.  The Make Work Pay Credit 
(MWPC) would become a centerpiece of the Obama stimulus. 
 
The MWPC offered $500 to an adult.  It gave $1,000 to a couple.  Yet, a mom with a child only 
got $500.  A mom with two children only would get $500.  Children, while indirectly helped by 
the MWPC, would not be eligible for this credit.  (Ultimately, in negotiations, the MWPC was 
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reduced to $400).  For children to be helped directly, some form of a child-conditioned credit 
would need to be added to the package. 
 
The President-Elect had worked to expand the EITC as a State Senator in Illinois (see for 
instance, Grumman, 1999).  He had also tried to expand eligibility of the refundable CTC as a 
Senator in 2007 and 2008, but was rebuffed by more senior members associated with the policy, 
and by an institution that was following the lead of the House, rather than leading the charge on 
the legislation. 
 
The House passed their version of ARRA before the President was sworn in.  They lowered the 
eligibility threshold of the refundable CTC to $0 for two years – the first dollar of earnings.7  The 
Senate was less generous, lowering the threshold to $8,000.  In subsequent negotiations, the CTC 
eligibility threshold was lowered to $3,000, de-indexed, and included in the recovery package.  
On February 11th, President Obama signed ARRA into law in Denver, Colorado, the city where 
he had had accepted his party’s nomination in August of 2008. 
 
The provision was estimated to cost $14.83 billion over two years.  Importantly, its expiration 
would be coterminous with the Bush tax cuts.  If the Bush tax cuts were to be extended (as they 
subsequently were in December of 2010), it would be difficult not to extend the ARRA CTC 
expansion at the same time, as the idea of extending tax cuts for the wealthy, while letting them 
expire for working families could potentially be politically perilous. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Since the expansion of CTC eligibility passed with TARP was for only one year, the ARRA 
proposed expansions would be measured against the previous baseline, reducing the threshold 
from $12,050 instead of $8,500.  The House proposed reduction, then, was to reduce the 
threshold from $12,050 to $0.  The Senate’s was from $12,050 to $8,000.	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Nearly two-thirds of the benefits (65.6%) went to families with earnings below $20,000 and 92% 
went to families with earnings below $30,000 (TPC, 2009).  More importantly, lowering the 
threshold provided a CTC of up to $1432.50 to the families of 15.9 million children, including 
5.5 million newly eligible children. 
 
Single-earners working full time, full year at the minimum wage with one child, for the first 
time, were eligible for the full $1,000 CTC, instead of the $82.50 they received before. 
 
Single-earners working full time, full year at the minimum wage with two or more children 
became eligible for a $1,515 CTC instead of the $82.50 they received before. 
 
When the minimum wage was raised in the summer of 2009, their credit would rise to $1,725. 
 
While part of the argument for including the CTC expansion in ARRA was that it was 
stimulative – the Tax Policy Center had given it the highest grade of all of the tax policies in the 
bill (Altshuler, Burman, Gleckman, Halperin, Harris, Maag, Rueben, Toder, and Williams, 2009) 
– clearly, it was a continuation of the effort of the House Democrats to add eligibility to the 
measure.  Among many other policies, ARRA, unlike the 2008 Bush Stimulus, included large 
expansions of both the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (popularly known as Food 
Stamps) and Unemployment Insurance, which leading economists again called stimulative (see 
for instance, Zandi, 2009). 
 
	   89	  
Republicans claimed that ARRA was just a wish list of every Democratic priority that had been 
dreamed up over the years, and that it was the intent of the President to move all of ARRA into 
baseline law.  With the CTC, they weren’t entirely wrong. 
 
2010:  PAYGO 
 
A depressed economy combined with increased stimulus spending was leading to dramatic 
increases in short term deficit projections.  Moreover, the GOP minority had decided to oppose 
the President on every move.  The Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell even claimed 
that his most important job was making President Obama a one term President. 
 
At the same time, it was time for Congress to pass a statutory increase in the debt limit in order 
to pay for obligations previously incurred by laws it had passed. 
 
House Blue Dog and Senate moderate Democrats were getting skittish about all of the spending.  
In order to pass the debt limit increase, President Obama agreed to attach statutory Pay-As-You-
Go language (known as PAYGO), and to subsequently commit to appointing a deficit reduction 
commission. 
 
PAYGO would force Congress to only pass bills that would not add to the deficit.  Each bill, 
therefore, would have to have “pay fors” to offset any costs.  With the Bush Tax Cuts expiring at 
the end of 2010 and with the President having committed to extending the tax cuts for those 
making less than $250,000, Congress created a series of exceptions to PAYGO.  Any other 
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spending would have to be offset by tax increases or spending cuts.  These exceptions would 
allow some policy extensions to be passed without having to pay for them, essentially creating a 
new baseline law.   The exceptions were not small.  In addition to making the Bush tax cuts 
permanent for those under $250,000, the bill said that the ARRA expansion of the CTC could be 
made permanent without violating PAYGO as well.  This was particularly important, as the out 
year costs of just this provision, the ARRA CTC expansion, have increased to over $10 billion 
per year.  The full annual cost of the refundable CTC, all of which is protected under PAYGO is 
$32.2 billion (JCT, 2011).8 
 
The effort to attach PAYGO to the debt limit increase was led by House Majority Leader Steny 
Hoyer, a confidant of Blue Dog democrats, and the number two leader in the House.  Hoyer also 
has had a long history of supporting issues related to child and family policy.  It was strongly 
advocated for by the Obama Administration as well who wanted the policy and pointed out that 
the optics of locking in tax cuts for the middle and upper classes, while leaving out low-income 
working people would be terrible. 
 
This inclusion of the ARRA CTC expansion in PAYGO was enormously important to the 
chances of the CTC refundability expansions being extended into the future.  Any time the Bush 
tax cuts would be up for renewal, the ARRA CTC expansion would be able to move with it for 
no extra PAYGO cost.  Had PAYGO not included the refundable CTC, Congress would have to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Some may that in advocating for the CTC to be a PAYGO exception, that the implicit argument 
is that these means-tested provisions are more important than the deficit.  While I believe that to 
be the case, here the argument is less broad.  Simply put, if PAYGO would except the extension 
of the Bush Tax Cuts for both the middle class and the wealthy, it could also except the 
extension of tax cuts for low-income families.  On a first order analysis, both add to the deficit.	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find $32 billion in program cuts or tax increases for every year that they wanted to extend it.  
And, detractors would have few excuses if they tried to extend the other tax cuts while leaving 
out these families.   
 
2010:  Extension of the 2001 Bush Tax Cuts 
 
With the economy not in a depression but still in the doldrums, the Republicans swept to power 
in 2010, winning back control of the House.  After the elections, the President would have less 
than two months to secure a number of items on his agenda before having to work with a GOP 
House majority.  With the Bush tax cuts expiring, the President appointed Vice-President Biden 
to negotiate with the Senate to get to a deal.  Having not passed a budget with reconciliation 
instructions, they would need 60 votes in the Senate to get anything passed, and presumably the 
House would go along. 
 
Mitch McConnell tasked his number two, Senator Kyl to negotiate with Biden.  In order to get 
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia passed, Kyl was insisting on increased money 
for nuclear plants.  He was also pushing an estate tax cut.  He would not support the Bush Tax 
Cut extension without the cuts for the wealthiest.  Moreover, Kyl would not agree to extend the 
President’s signature Make Work Pay Credit.   
 
President Obama badly needed to pass an Unemployment Insurance (U.I.) extension for both the 
people eligible for the help and the economy as a whole.  Republicans did not want to do it.  In 
order to get a deal on U.I., and move on to other items while he still had a Democratic House, the 
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President agreed to an extension of all of the tax cuts, including the ARRA CTC expansion, but 
without the Make Work Pay Credit.  Also included were a one-year payroll tax cut.  The two-
year cost of the ARRA CTC expansion was estimated to be $19.743 billion. 
 
The President was widely criticized for going back on his promise to let the tax cuts for the 
wealthiest expire.  Yet, had he done so, he would never have extended U.I.  Furthermore, he 
pushed the tax debate into the 2012 election, a time when the electorate is more likely to be 
paying attention to the stark trade offs.  The consequences of pushing this debate into the 2012 
cannot be overstated, both in terms of the politics and the policy and are discussed in the 
concluding chapter of this dissertation. 
 
America may not be entirely unique in its CTC expansions.  Here, over the last eighteen years, 
the CTC has moved from an idea in the Contract to America to a refundable CTC approaching 
full refundability.   
 
In the United Kingdom, Tony Blaire made a commitment to ending child poverty in a 
generation, and largely under the radar dramatically reduced absolute poverty, a large component 
of which involved combining their various child benefits into one Child Tax Credit that was fully 
refundable for families with and without earnings, and then increasing its value.  Like the U.S. 
CTC, the wealthiest families are left out.  Unlike the U.S., all families at the bottom of the 
earnings spectrum, including those with no earnings are included (Waldfogel, 2010).    
 
Here too, leaders, in this case Speaker Pelosi with the encouragement of Representative DeLauro 
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made a commitment to families and children.  And, largely under their leadership, and certainly 
under the radar9, the CTC has been expanded and in so doing reduced child poverty (See, for 
instance, Sherman, 2009).10  In fact, the major expansions of refundability of the CTC were 
attached to much larger bills, thus remaining outside of the view of the public – the 2008 Bush 
stimulus, TARP, ARRA, and the December 2010 tax extensions.   
 
Of course, while spending significant sums on means-tested programs, the U.S. has not made a 
commitment to the elimination of child poverty.  And, with recent austerity measures the U.K. 
has taken some steps backward.  Still, while the reductions in poverty here are not as dramatic as 
the U.K., their magnitudes are meaningful, and will be discussed in the next chapter, with 
particular importance for our nation’s youngest children in poverty – those who could most 
benefit from increases in income transfers. 
 
There is a larger point I want to make here regarding the relationship of political analysis and 
policy analysis.  From the perspective of policy analysis it is worth asking what is the optimum 
policy.  In the case of the CTC, child policy experts often say full refundability.  However it it is 
insufficient to just say let’s have full refundability and leave it at that.   
 
From the perspective of children, it is also worth asking what is the optimum policy.  And here 
the answer is the best policy is one that is implemented.  Therefore it is essential that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  The CTC ARRA expansion only shows up as a footnote in the recent Urban-Brookings Tax 
Policy Center analysis of the President’s Tax Proposals as Outlined in his Budget, in spite of the 
fact that it costs an additional $83 billion over the coming decade (Tax Policy Center, 2012).	  
10	  The amount that poverty was reduced due to the CTC eligibility expansion in ARRA is 
estimated in chapter 4.	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policymakers have options that can be turned into law.  The last decade of the CTC has 
demonstrated that when policymakers had alternative options for expanding eligibility they were 
able to implement improvements to the policy with a real impact on children.  So did the 
Affordable Care Act.  If single payer health insurance were the only option for expanding 
affordable health care, ACA never would have passed.  When policymakers had options beyond 
full refundability, and when they had large enough bills to which they could be attached, they 
expanded the CTC. 
 
Over the last decade, Congress implemented a variety of expansions of the CTC.  Each iteration 
depended on the legislative vehicle.  When tax cuts were being accelerated in 2003, 
Congressional advocates sought to accelerate the CTC.  When Hurricane Katrina struck, these 
advocates created a look back provision.  When one-year tax extenders were being drafted, 
Congress drafted a one-year expansion of eligibility of the CTC.  When stimulus checks were 
being mailed out at the beginning of 2008, Congress created CTC rebates.  When ARRA was 
drafted, Congress created another expansion of eligibility of the CTC.  When U.I. was extended 
in 2010, Congress attempted to make U.I. count as earnings for the purposes of calculating the 
refundable CTC and EITC.  And, when Hurricane Irene arrived in the summer of 2011, Congress 
tried again to create a look back provision.   
 
The look back provision and the U.I. as earnings are two different policy responses trying to 
address the same basic issue, each with a different shape.  One is relevant in time of U.I. 
legislation and reform.  The other is relevant in a time of disaster legislation.  The latter is 
preferable in theory – it would cover more children, but whatever could get signed into law is 
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preferable to children.  Of course, passing this U.I. reform could theoretically keep the other 
from passing by diminishing the need for it.  This is a trade off which policymakers and 
advocates need to weigh.   
 
Going forward, lowering the CTC threshold to $0 like the EITC may be good policy, but it can 
sound (incorrectly) to some like the CTC would be decoupled from work.  Indexing the amount 
of the credit may make sense in the context of the AMT being indexed.  A look back provision 
may make sense in the context of legislation relating to damages from storms.  U.I. counting as 
earnings may make sense in the context of U.I. reform.  Policy analysts do not need to know the 
politics of a given policy.  It is just useful to know that having alternative options helps 
policymakers who may be sympathetic to the underlying policy problem. 
 
Yet policy analysis still must provide – when possible – information on what the optimum 
policies are in theory.  If policy analysis also provided more doable options for policymakers, it 
may lead to more policy change that is implemented.  The additional $10 billion per year going 
the refundable CTC provides some evidence that the provision of alternatives can help. 
 
If Congress didn’t have a variety of options for expanding the CTC, if the only option were full 
refundability, the huge expansions over the last decade never would have happened.  Therefore it 
is imperative that policy analysts suggest second best options in addition to the ideal policies.  In 
some policy areas, these second best alternatives have already been written about.  Heath policy 








Policy Analysis:  Micro-simulation Estimates of Some Costs and Benefits of Alternative 
Expansions of the Child Tax Credit 
 
The United States spent an estimated $56.4 billion in 2011 on the CTC and another $59.5 on the 
EITC – together the largest U.S. federal expenditure on children and families – but is the money 
appropriately targeted by age?  That is, is it reaching low-income families with infants and 
toddlers?  I look to see if my findings concur with Burman and Wheaton's assertion that infants 
and toddlers are the least likely children to be eligible for the CTC (2007).  I examine if it is also 
the case for the EITC both because with the CTC it is the largest federal child policy, and 
because unlike the CTC, there is evidence that the EITC disproportionately helps young children 
(Dowd and Horowitz, 2011).  I then look at the demographics of those receiving the CTC to see 
how eligibility may vary by race and family structure for both married and single-parent, female-
headed households.  Finally, I model a range of CTC policy alternatives, including ideas 
mentioned by both policy makers and in the academic literature, examining their costs, their 
effects on eligibility for young children, and how much they may lift children out of poverty. 
 
This chapter is organized into four overall sections: a description of how the current CTC works, 
data, method, and results.  The results are then divided into three areas, a description of the 
effects of current policy, a description of alternative CTC policies, and a simulation of the effects 
of moving to these alternative CTC policies. 
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I.  How the Child Tax Credit works: 
 
Under current law, families receive a CTC of $1,000 for each child under the age of 17.  If you 
have one child, you can get $1,000.  Two children, you can get $2,000.  Five children, $5,000, 
and so on.11 
 
A child’s eligibility status for the CTC varies by the earnings of their family.  There are families 
who are not eligible, families in the phase-in range, families who are eligible for the full credit, 
families in the phase out range, and families with income too high to be eligible.  More 
specifically, there are six different groups related to a child’s eligibility status for the CTC: 
 
1. No Credit, No earnings: Children in families with no earnings, who get no CTC 
2. No Credit, Poor w/ Earnings: Children in families with some earnings below $3,000, 
who get no CTC 
3. Phase-in:  Children in families in the phase in range, with earnings above $3,000, 
who get a partial credit. 
4. Full Credit:  Children in families who receive the full CTC 
5. Phase-out:  Children in families in the phase out range, with earnings above 
$110,000, who get a partial credit. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Technically, a family can opt for a refundable CTC calculated as described above or, if they 
have more than two children, the amount by which their social security taxes exceed the EITC.  
In practice, since such a small minority of families is ever in a situation where the latter credit 
would be larger than the former, as the EITC almost always more than offsets their payroll tax 
liability, I calculate the CTC as if all families choose the initial formula.	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6. No Credit, High Income:  Children in families with earnings too high to get any CTC.  
(These families could have earnings as low as $130,000, so “high income” may be a 
misnomer, but indicates that this group is fundamentally different than those who get 
nothing because they earn too little).  
 
Families with no income tax liability - those families at the bottom of the earnings spectrum who 
work and have earnings, pay payroll taxes, but no income taxes – can be eligible for a refundable 
credit, known in the IRS tax code as the Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC).  CPS data does 
not provide tax liability information, making it impossible to tease out the relative benefits of the 
CTC and the ACTC.  However, for the purposes of describing the CTC in this dissertation, I 
refer to the CTC as the policy inclusive of both the CTC and the ACTC, as they run seamlessly 
together. 
 
Families too poor to get the full CTC can get an ACTC equal to 15% of each dollar of earnings 
above $3,000.  The maximum ACTC a family can receive is equal to the maximum CTC they 
could receive - $1,000 x the number of children under 17 in their household. 
 
Unlike their middle class neighbors, families in the phase in range of eligibility of the CTC do 
not get an increased CTC for each child.  A family with earnings of $5,000 would get a CTC 
equal to $450, whether or not they have one, two, three, or ten children, while a family with 
sufficient tax liability, and earnings of say, $75,000 would get $1,000 for each child.  This leads 
to an asymmetry in the program, specifically disadvantaging families with multiple children. 
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The CTC goes to the broad middle of the population, but phases out for families with higher 
earnings.   Specifically, families lose $50 in CTC for each $1,000 in earnings they have above 
$110,000. 
 
As such a family with one child is eligible for a partial CTC if they have earnings up to 
$129,000.  A family with two children is eligible for a partial CTC if they have earnings up to 
$149,000, and so on. 
 
Since CTC eligibility is restricted to families with children under the age of 17, from here on out, 
when I refer to the population of children, I will be referring to children under the age of 17.  At 
times, I will collapse categories 1, 2, and 3 in the analysis into the group of children in families 
too poor to receive the full CTC. 
 
II.  DATA: 
 
Using the 2011 Current Population March Supplement data, I ran a micro-simulation seeking 
empirical evidence of the age distribution of the federal tax credits for children.  I use CPS data 
since it is a nationally representative sample and allows me to compare children of different ages 
in the same year.  IRS tax data, often used to calculate effects of tax policies allows users to 
calculate estimates of take up.  However, it does not include families with no earnings.  Using 
the CPS allows me to estimate what would happen to these families.  
 
I used the 2011 CPS since it is the most current survey.  The benefits of the CTC ARRA 
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expansion did not accrue to families until 2010 (since they filed for their 2009 taxes in April of 
2010).  Using the 2011 survey allows me to model the effects of ARRA and other CTC policies 
in 2010, since it is retrospective data, referring to employment and earnings in the prior year, 





The CPS is a monthly probability sample taken by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of 
approximately 60,000 households of the civilian non-institutional population of the United 
States.  The March supplement provides additional detail necessary for estimating CTC 
eligibility.  In particular, it has data on the previous year's income from all sources.  The sample 
is made up of separate samples of each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia.  As such the 
CPS only covers a subset of those eligible for the CTC.  Since the CTC goes to non – civilians, 
specifically the families of our armed services, to some people outside of the 50 states and D.C. 
(including partial credits to Puerto Rico), and to people filing for the refundable CTC without a 
social security number (including $4.2 billion in payments in just the refundable portion of the 
CTC in 2011), the CTC estimates from the CPS will likely underestimate the overall cost of the 
program.  Studies have estimated that the CPS produces an approximately 10% - 15% 
undercount of undocumented immigrants (Passel and Cohn, 2009).  While the CPS weighting 
should offset some of this undercount, those not sampled may be more likely to be low-income, 
and therefore more likely to be situated in the income spectrum that is eligible for the refundable 
CTC.  That said, the population sampled by the CPS includes the vast majority of those eligible 
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for the CTC. 
 
At the same time, the CPS while allowing me to estimate CTC eligibility does not allow me to 
make a great estimate of take up.  Therefore, the analyses in this dissertation will be of the entire 
universe of eligible children, as opposed to the subset more likely to take it up.  Since take up of 
tax credits is high, the likely differential between these estimates and others that discounted for 
take up, is likely to be slim.  There are no estimates of CTC take up in the academic literature.  
EITC take up estimates are very high, ranging from 83% to 144% (Scholz, 1994).  A high error 
rate in filers may account for a take up rate of over 100%.  While there is some evidence that 
take up rates for non-means tested programs may vary as much as those for means-tested 
programs (Currie, 2004), compliance with the IRS code, particularly on the benefit side, should 
be high.  Furthermore, tax benefits unlike some social programs, provide an opportunity for for-
profit entities to move into low-income neighborhoods and sign people up for their credits.  
Therefore, the CTC take up rate may be as low as 83% but likely approaches full take up.  My 
cost estimate of $49 billion comes in slightly higher than OMB’s estimate of $46 billion and 
would be consistent with such take up.  However, my estimate is somewhat lower that that of 
Congress’s.   
 
According to the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) – the official scorekeeper 
for taxes in Congress, the total CTC cost in 2010 for both the refundable and non-refundable 
portions was $56 billion.  My estimate of the cost of the current CTC is $48.194 billion.  JCT 
estimated the two-year cost of the ARRA CTC expansion to be $14.83 billion, whereas this 
analysis suggests a one-year cost of $5.98 billion.  So the estimates may be off by approximately 
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20%.  As the analyses here estimate the cost of provision of the policy if there were 100% take 
up, this should lead to a larger estimate.  However, since the CPS does not include the non-
civilian population, people outside the 50 states and the D.C., and may not include many of the 
ITIN filers collecting $4.2 billion in refundable CTC in 2010, my estimates should be a bit lower 
than those of the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation.  In particular, I may undercount 
the cost of the refundable portion of the CTC.  Since approximately 15% of the cost of the 
refundable CTC went to ITIN filers, it may be worth considering that the estimates of the 
additional costs of each of the CTC policy alternatives could be approximately 15% higher than 
the estimates I provide. 
 
That being said, this analysis should provide good estimates of the relative costs of each of the 
policies, and ballpark estimates of the actual costs.   
 
The 2010 March supplement includes 204,983 individuals, including 54,800 children under the 
age of 17 - those age eligible for the CTC.  All families with children under the age of 17 are 




In order to conduct the analysis, I used the following variables from the CPS: family id, 
household id, and personal id (in order to sort all individuals into families; age, family earnings, 
family relationship of parents (married, single parent, etc), number of persons in household, 
number of families in household, race including the variable for Hispanic, marital status, 
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earnings weight (to properly weight the earnings of each household), poverty level, poverty 
status, family income, and individual weight (to properly weight individuals).   
 
In order to create a poverty variable, I took the CPS poverty ratio variable, and classified families 
with under 100% of FPL as poor, and families equal or greater than 100% of FPL as not poor. 
 
Next, I created race/ethnicity variables, by sorting the using both the race variable and the 
variable for Hispanic.  In order to obtain mutually exclusive groups, I made “Hispanic” a race 
variable, and sorted the other races for all people not classified as Hispanic.  White was defined 
as white, non-Hispanic.  Black was defined as black, non-Hispanic.  Asian was defined as Asian 
(non-Hispanic), and all other people were sorted into “other.” 
 
For family structure, I only counted married families with a spouse present as “married.”  For 
families that were separated, or the spouse was absent, I treated them as unmarried.  Doing so, if 
anything led to a diminished differential in the CTC status of married and unmarried couples, 
providing me with a conservative estimate of the potential variance.  I sorted “single families” 
into female-headed and male-headed households.  In my discussion of the results, I only present 
married families and female-headed families, as female-headed, single family homes are a 
particular concern of people interested in poverty in the United States. 
 
Next, I applied the CPS March Supplemental weight of the head of household to everyone in the 
family, since a family’s earnings are the same for everyone in a family.  I dropped the marital 
status for everyone except the head of household, as households are the unit of measurement for 
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tax liability, and therefore, I am interested in whether or not the head of household is married. 
 
Next, I sorted families by age of youngest child, so as to eventually examine the difference in 
eligibility for families with children of different ages.  Doing so allows me to compare the credits 
of families with children under the age of three, to those of families without children under the 
age of three.  In order to tie each person into a family and a household with the proper weights, I 
collapsed the child variables, age variables, race variables, weight variables, family structure 
variables, family earnings, weights, poverty status, and family income by a unique id for each 
person.  I took out of the sample families where the youngest person was over the age of 16, 
since they are ineligible for the CTC. 
 
Next, I sorted children into age groups for families with children under the age of 3, and families 
with children ages 3-16.  Sorting families in such a way, allowed me to make comparisons at the 
family level.  I used these variables to compare families with children under the age of 3 with 
families with children between the ages of 3 and 16, and who did not have children under the age 
of three.  However, I was particularly interested in knowing the actual number of children in 
each eligibility category and how many children were affected by different policies, as opposed 
to families.  Therefore, having initially sorted the data by family, I reshaped the date, in order to 
separate the children from their families, and provide child-level estimates.  At the same time, 
reshaping the data, allowed me to keep the family structure, family earnings, earnings weights, 
and other variables attached to each child.  Last, I created new age groupings of the children with 
the reshaped data, so I could compare children of different ages with each other.   
 
	  106	  
III.  METHODS: 
 
I conducted the micro-simulation using STATA.12  First, I constructed a variable for CTC 
eligibility, using the parameters of current law.  Next, I constructed a variable to calculate a 
family’s CTC by applying the current policy CTC to the CPS variable on family’s earnings.  
Families with earnings less than or equal to $3,000 received no CTC.  Families with earnings 
above $3,000 received a CTC equal to 15% of each dollar of earnings above $3,000 up to a 
maximum CTC equal to $1,000 times the number of children under the age of 17 in a household.  
For families with earnings above $110,000, their CTC was calculated by reducing their 
maximum CTC by $50 for each additional $1,000 in earnings.  These calculations resulted in the 
full CTC received by a family.  Last, in order to calculate a per-child CTC, I divided the family 
CTC by the number of children under 17 in a household to estimate a family’s per child tax 
credit.   
 
In order to simulate movement in eligibility I constructed variables for 9 alternative policies, 
using the same techniques, but plugging in the parameters for each policy that are described 
below in the section on alternative CTC policies.  Current policy provides a maximum $1,000 
per child tax credit.  Some proposed alternatives envision tripling that per CTC to $3,000.  Some 
of these policies could move families up to, for instance, $1500 per child.  In so doing, these 
families would receive more per child than the full CTC under current policy, but less than a full 
CTC of $3000 per child under the new proposal.  Therefore, in order to have an "apples to 
apples" comparison when examining the relative merits of moving to a new CTC policy, I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  For a more thorough picture of the micro-simulation, I have attached the Stata code in 
Appendix 1.	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assumed that under any policy, a child receiving at least $1,000 was getting the "full credit."   
 
In order to estimate the costs of each policy, I estimated the mean CTC for each policy with the 
weighted sample and multiplied that by the Census estimate of the total number of children 
under the age of 17 in 2010 - 69,786,172 children, including 12,019,152 under the age of 3 and 
another 57,767,020 between the ages of 3 and 16.  
 
In order to estimate the potential reductions in poverty, I looked at the population of children 
under 17 in poverty in 2010, and then added a family's estimated CTC to their earnings to see if 
it moved a family over the poverty threshold.   
 
As a fully refundable child tax credit has been proposed as a possible policy by both academics 
and policy makers (Duncan and Magnuson, 2011; Rep. DeLauro, March, 2003), I will examine 
what the effect of the policy would be on the age distribution of federal tax credits for children, 
considering as well, the effect of indexing the amount of the credit at different levels.  As the role 
of women in society has changed radically, and as more children are in single parent, women-
headed families, I will also run a distributional analysis by family type.  It would be useful to 
know how much less women headed families get in CTCs and EITCs than other families, due to 
both the presence of only a single earner and the fact that women earn, on average, 77 cents for 
every dollar a man earns. 
 
I did not model potential behavioral changes that could result from changes in the CTC for 
several reasons: (1) people are generally unaware of the fact that they get the credits; (2) even if 
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they were aware, it is unlikely to affect the estimates; and (3), most of the proposed changes I 
model are relatively modest and therefore at most may produce only a relatively modest effect on 
work.  Should one have any additional questions on the modeling, I have attached my STATA 
code in Appendix 1 in order to provide readers with a copy of my coding.  
 
 People are unaware that they get the CTC: 
 
For the other policy changes, there is a possibility that with an increased CTC, people may be 
more or less likely to work.  This incentivized behavior is unlikely to be realized however.  The 
CPS asks respondents if they got the CTC or EITC.  Almost everybody says no.  People do not 
realize that they get the CTC or EITC, since taxes can be less than transparent.  If people are not 
aware that they get the credit, it is unlikely that a marginal increase in the credit would lead to a 
change in their behavior.  That said, it is of course possible. 
 
 
 Changes in behavior would not affect the estimates: 
 
Full refundability – giving the CTC to families even if they have no earnings, could theoretically 
be a disincentive to work.  However, in estimating the costs of full refundability, the estimate 
would only change if people at the top of the earnings spectrum – those with earnings over 
$110,000 all of a sudden stopped working in order to get a $1,000 per child tax credit.  Such a 
behavior change seems unlikely on its face.  Under such a scenario, the universe of children in 
families with earnings under $110,000 would be unlikely to change, so the estimates would be 
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unlikely to change.  If middle income or lower income people cut their work, they would still get 
the $1,000 CTC either way, leading to no effect on the cost or age distribution estimates.   
 
 
IV.  FINDINGS: 
 
In the first part of this section I present findings on eligibility and benefits for both the CTC and 
EITC under current policy.  The second part describes nine alternative CTC policies and then 
presents the results of simulating those changes.   
 
A.  Effects of Current Policies 
 
In examining the CTC and EITC, I look at receipt and benefit amounts not just by age, but also 
by the six different groups related to a child’s eligibility status for the CTC as outlined above:  
 
1. No Credit, No earnings 
2. No Credit, Poor w/ Earnings 
3. Phase-in 
4. Full Credit 
5. Phase-out 
6. No Credit, High Income 
 
[See Table 1] 
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Table 1 shows the percentage of children in each category of eligibility status for both the CTC 
and the EITC and the total number of children in each category in millions.  The first section 
describes the eligibility status for all children.  The next two sections provide the same 
information first for children under the age of three and then older children.  The bottom section 
of table 1 lists the percentage of children too poor to get the full CTC.  This figure is calculated 
by summing up the first three CTC eligibility categories:  (1) those children who get no credit in 
families with no earnings, (2) those children who get no credit in families with some earnings 
(less than or equal to $3,000), and (3) those children in families who get a partial credit in the 
phase-in range of the CTC. 
 
The CTC goes to most families.  It is worth noting that over three-quarters of families receive at 
least a partial CTC, whereas less than a quarter get any EITC.  Over 8% of all children, 5.85 
million children, are in families with no earnings, and therefore receive no CTC and no EITC.  
The fact that our largest federal child policy leaves out so many children – those who need it the 
most - is of concern.   
 
Perhaps more importantly, 12.67% of children ages 0 – 2, approximately 1.5 million children, 
get neither the CTC nor the EITC - those that need it the most.  In fact these estimates for young 
children are too low.  The family of a child born in December can file their taxes by April 15th, 
and receive a CTC and an EITC for their child, if they are eligible.  They may receive their credit 
in the summer, around when their child is 6 months old.  The family of a child born in January, 
however, cannot file for a CTC or EITC for their child until the following year.  Therefore, this 
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family may not receive their first CTC and EITC until their child is 1.5 years old.  Middle class 
families can adjust their withholding in order to pay less tax within the tax year, allowing them to 
enjoy the benefit of their CTC in the year their child is eligible.  However, lower-income 
families, specifically those whose credits more than offset their federal taxes, do not have this 
option.  An employer cannot give their employee negative taxes.  In my analyses, I have 
assumed that all infants are eligible for the CTC, leading my estimates to be too low.   
 
It is clear that, consistent with Burman and Wheaton (2007), children between 0 and 2 are 
disproportionately left out.  While just over 20.5% of all children are in families too poor to get 
the full CTC, over 29% of children ages 0 – 2 are in such families.  Burman and Wheaton looked 
at the CTC in 2007, when both the policy and the economy were different, finding that 34.8% of 
children one and under were in families too poor to get the full credit vs. 31.1% of all age-
eligible children.  Since the time of their paper, the policy has changed dramatically with the 
2008 expansion of eligibility and the subsequent 2009 passage of ARRA, leading to dramatically 
improved eligibility for children.  It seems then that eligibility improved for all children with 
these policy changes, but perhaps more so for older children than the youngest.  (This trend is 
consistent with my findings as discussed later in this chapter in the section on table 3). 
 
The EITC is a similar story.  It is true that children under the age of three are more likely to 
receive at least some EITC than older children - 41% of younger children vs. 35% of older 
children.  This finding is consistent with Dowd and Horowitz’s findings (2011) discussed in 
chapter 2.  However, it is worth pointing out that 12.67% of young children are too poor to get 
any EITC, vs. 7.98% of older children.  Therefore, while the EITC may benefit more young 
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children, at the same time, like the CTC, poor young children are more likely to be left out of 
eligibility for the EITC than their older counterparts.  This is true for two reasons.  First, as the 
numbers indicate, young children are more likely to be in a family without earnings.  Second, as 
discussed earlier, infants may or may not be eligible for any EITC whatsoever, depending on 
their birth month. 
 
[See Table 2] 
 
Table 2 shows how CTC eligibility/ receipt varies by race/ethnicity and family structure for all 
children, for children under the age of 3, and for older children.  Table 2 presents the percentage 
of children in each category of eligibility by race and family structure.  The first section 
describes the eligibility status for all children.  The next two sections provide the same 
information first for children under the age of three and then older children.  Finally, the bottom 
section of table 3 lists the percentage of children too poor to get the full CTC.   
 
Eligibility status of the CTC is not equally distributed by race.  This finding is consistent with 
earlier work examining eligibility for previous CTC policies by race (Harris, 2003; Burman and 
Wheaton, 2005).  While approximately 20.5% of all children are in families too poor to get the 
full CTC, nearly 30% of Hispanic children and 38% of African-American children are in these 
families.  More striking over ½ of African-American children under 3 are in families too poor to 
get the full CTC.  Part of this result is tied to the fact that African-American children are over 3 
times more likely than white children to be in a family without earnings (18.15% of African-
American children vs. 5.27% of white children). 
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Children in single parent homes, a growing demographic are in particularly bad shape when it 
comes to CTC eligibility.  In fact, over ½ of all children in female-headed homes are in families 
too poor to receive the full CTC.  This is in part because ¼ of these families have no earnings 
whatsoever.  It may also be due in part to the presence of only one potential wage earner, and the 
fact that women make on average only 77 cents for every dollar a man makes. 
 
Over 2/3s of children under the age of three in female-headed homes are too poor to get the full 
CTC.  With the majority of births to women under the age of 30 now occurring outside of 
marriage (Wildsmith, Berger, Manlove, Barry, and McCoy-Roth, 2012), this discrepancy in tax 
credits for families by parental status may continue to increase. 
 
B.  Alternative CTC policies: 
 
Proposals to reform the CTC, while scarce in the academic literature, have been proffered by 
politicians.   Since low-income young children are disproportionately left out of eligibility of the 
CTC, it is important to analyze possible reforms in terms of expansions of eligibility, credit size, 
and costs.  Therefore, it is worth looking at both those reforms that have been proposed, and 
alternative proposals that could possibly reach these children more effectively or efficiently.   
 
This analysis will examine current law, pre-ARRA law, and eight additional CTC proposals, 
including all of those proposed in Congress that could affect young children and several 
additional alternatives, simulating movement in eligibility category, changes in CTC size, and 
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reductions in poverty for children under 3, comparing them to older children. 
 
These policy alternatives discussed, broadly speaking, can be classified into two types of reforms 
– those that increase the full credit and have little effect on families in the phase-in range, and 
those that focus on the phase-in range.  For the purposes of this dissertation, I will not analyze 
proposals to add eligibility to children older than 16 such as those floated by Senator Blanche 
Lincoln (D-Arkansas) in the late spring of 2003. 
 
1.  Current Policy: 
 
Current policy on the CTC is the baseline from which all comparisons are made in this analysis.  
It should be noted that current policy is different than current law as under current law, in 2013, 
the CTC decreases from $1,000 to $500 and essentially reverts to being non-refundable.  Current 
policy therefor is a $1,000 CTC, whereas current law is a $500 CTC.  As discussed in chapter 4, 
the likelihood of Congress and the President not intervening to keep this decrease from 
happening is slim. 
 
Current policy includes a phase-in rate of 15%, an eligibility threshold of $3,000, and a 
maximum credit of $1,000 per child. 
 
2.  Pre-ARRA: 
 
Pre-ARRA, the CTC was less generous to low-income families.  While previous analyses in this 
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dissertation examine the effects of ARRA on eligibility, it is worth comparing pre-ARRA to 
current policy and other alternatives to see how it stacks up in costs, eligibility changes, and 
increases in credits. 
 
Pre-ARRA includes a phase-in rate of 15%, an eligibility threshold of $12,550 (it was legislated 
to be $10,000 and was indexed, and would be $12,550 today), and a maximum credit of $1,000 
per child. 
 
3.  Lower the Eligibility Threshold to Zero (Pelosi/DeLauro/Rangel): 
 
In the negotiations in Congress leading up to passage of ARRA in January of 2009, the House 
initially passed a bill that lowered the eligibility threshold of the CTC to 0, allowing every dollar 
of earnings to count towards the CTC.  The Senate bill only lowered the threshold to $8,000.  As 
a compromise, the final measure ended at a threshold of $3,000.  It is worth knowing the benefits 
and costs of lowering the threshold to zero, which would allow every poor child in a household 
with earnings to be eligible for at least a partial CTC. 
 
Lowering the eligibility threshold to 0 includes the same phase-in rate of 15% and a maximum 
credit of $1,000 per child. 
 
4.  Index the Value of the Credit: 
 
The value of the CTC has never been indexed, meaning it has eroded in purchasing power every 
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year since it was increased to $1,000.  Perversely, the initial law only indexed eligibility for the 
threshold.  This meant that for those low-income families with stagnant wages, their credits 
shrunk over time.  Some lost part of their credit; some lost eligibility all together.  Indexation of 
the eligibility threshold ended with the passage of ARRA. 
 
While there has been no formal proposal to index the value of the credit, it is worth considering 
what the costs and benefits of doing so would be.  It also provides a view of what an increased 
credit more generally would look like.  In order to examine the relative benefit of indexing, the 
analysis assumes that the credit was indexed in 2001 when it was first made refundable.  Since 
indexation in the federal tax code is rounded off, and since the eligibility threshold would have 
moved from $10,000 to $12,550 over the decade, the analysis assumes that the credit would now 
be $1,255 instead of $1,000. 
 
The indexed credit policy includes a phase-in rate of 15%, an eligibility threshold of $3,000, and 
a maximum credit of $1,255 per child. 
 
5.  Triple the Value of the CTC (Senator Santorum’s Proposal): 
 
As of this writing, one of Rick Santorum’s only specific economic policies he has laid out in his 
quest to become President would triple the CTC.  While this policy would be hugely expensive, 
it is worth examining its costs and benefits, since it is at least theoretically possible that Mr. 
Santorum could become President or at least the Republican nominee some cycle in the future.  
Moreover, it is reasonable to at least consider the effects of dramatically increasing the overall 
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credit, a goal of so- called “pro-family” right wing groups such as the Family Research Council 
(considered a hate group by the Southern Poverty Law Center).  Mr. Santorum’s proposal does 
not mention the refundable component of the CTC.  Since leaving out an increase in 
refundability would essentially leave out all families in poverty from the increase in policy, and 
since Mr. Santorum has not specifically said that the refundability wouldn’t be increased, this 
analysis assumes, perhaps too generously, that the policy would triple the credit for both the 
refundable and non-refundable portions of the CTC. 
 
Tripling the CTC includes a phase-in rate of 15%, an eligibility threshold of $3,000, and a 
maximum credit of $3,000 per child. 
 
6.  Double the CTC for children under the age of 6 (Schumer): 
 
In February 2007, shortly after regaining the majority, Senator Schumer, a member of the (tax 
writing) Finance Committee introduced a bill that would double the CTC for children under the 
age of 6.  Such a policy would presumably be one way to increase resources in a targeted way to 
young people.  Curiously, his proposal did NOT double the CTC for children who receive the 
refundable CTC, thus, like Santorum, leaving out those children who could most benefit from the 
assistance.  With some work, it is possible that the Senator would fix this oversight.  Therefore, 
this analysis assumes that the CTC would be doubled for both the refundable and non-refundable 
portions of the CTC. 
 
Doubling the CTC for children under 6 includes a phase-in rate of 15%, an eligibility threshold 
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of $3,000, a maximum credit of $2,000 per child under 6, and a maximum credit of $1,000 per 
child for children between the ages of 7 and 16.  (It is worth noting that the IRS may not look 
favorably on the potential increases in error rates due the somewhat complicated calculations that 
families with children in both categories would have to make.  That said, the IRS does not write 
law, and, obviously, accommodates the policy-making choices of the legislative branch). 
 
Since families with more children lead to more families being in the phase in range instead of 
getting the full credit, and, since the families of low-income children under 3 are more likely to 
be in the phase in range than families with just older children, any increase in the phase in range 
could diminish the infant credit penalty.  Three options for doing so are presented:  providing 15 
% of earnings for each child in the phase in range, giving families in the phase in range a fraction 
of the full family credit that middle class families get, and doing the same in a more generous 
way.  They make up the next three reform policies presented in the analysis.  By focusing these 
reforms on the phase-in, resources are targeted to those most in need – at least those in working 
poor families. 
 
7. Increase the Phase In Amount By Providing 15% of Earnings above the eligibility 
threshold for EACH child in the family: 
 
Since families who get the full credit get $1,000 for each child, it seems fair that families in the 
phase in would get at least 15% of earnings for each child up the full $1,000 credit.  Under 
current law, a family earning $7,000 gets a total credit of $600 whether they have one child, two 
children, three children, or more.  A family making $70,000 gets $1,000 if they have one child, 
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$2,000 if they have 2 children, $3,000 if they have three children, and so on. 
 
Providing a 15% per child phase-in, for the purposes of analysis, would maintain an eligibility 
threshold of $3,000, and a maximum credit of $1,000 per child. 
 
8 and 9. Increase the Phase In Amount By Calculating the Phase in as a Percent of the 
Full Family CTC: 
 
It is entirely conceivable – whether or not Rick Santorum is ever elected President – that the 
CTC could be increased at some point.  Increases in the CTC do not lead to any increases in 
credits to those in the phase-in range.  Therefore, tying the lot of those families in the phase in 
range to those who get the full CTC would increase the chances that future potential increases in 
the CTC would include low-income families.  At the same time, tying the credit of families in 
the phase-in range to the credit of those families who get the full amount, allows for increases in 
credits to those families with more children in the phase in – a family with three children, instead 
of getting 15% of earnings above some threshold would get, say 15% of the full family credit 
($3,000) for each $1,000 in earnings. 
 
This analysis calculates the “tied phase-in” in two ways.  Families receive 10% of the full family 
credit for each $1,000 of earnings.  As such, with $5,000 in earnings, they would get 50% of the 
full family CTC.  A family with one child would get $500.  A family with two children would 
get $1,000.  A family with four children would get $2,000.  A family with $10,000 in earnings 
would get the full family CTC. 
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The analysis runs the numbers again in an effort to see what the relative costs and benefits would 
be of providing a more generous rate of 15% of the full credit for each $1,000 in earnings.  
Under such a policy, a family with earnings of $6,667 would get the full family CTC. 
 
10.  Full refundability: 
 
Full refundability – giving the full $1,000 to the families of all children at the bottom end of the 
earnings spectrum - may work differently.  It is the only option that gets the credit to the over 8% 
of children in families without earnings and the 12.7% of children under 3 in these families.  All 
other options leave out these 5.85 million children – including 1.5 million under the age of 3. 
 
C.  Effects of alternative CTC policies: 
 
In order to examine the effects of the various CTC policy options, this analysis considers (1) the 
changes in eligibility status of children, (2) the costs of the policies, (3) the average increase in 
benefits each policy provides, (4) the relative bang for buck of each policy, (5) the relative 
effects on reducing poverty, assuming that the CTC were treated as earnings for calculating 
poverty status, and (6) the cash benefits of each policy to a family with a single earner working 
full time, full year at the minimum wage.  Before doing so, I first examine the effects of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act on the CTC, as it is the largest change in CTC 
eligibility since the 2001 Bush tax cut, and provides a baseline policy change, from which to 
compare other alternative CTC policies. 
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Effect of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act on CTC: 
 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), a.k.a. the Obama stimulus package, 
signed into law in February 2009, contained the largest expansion of the CTC since the 2001 
Bush tax cut, lowering the eligibility threshold from $12,000 to $3,000, for a two-year cost of 
$14.83 billion (according the official Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation Estimate).  
Lowering the eligibility threshold did two things:  children who received a partial credit, but 
were too poor to receive the full credit got an increase, and children in families with earnings 
between $3,000 and $12,000 who were previously ineligible for any CTC moved into eligibility 
for at least a partial CTC. 
 
Approximately 90% of the dollars of the ARRA expansion of the refundable CTC went to 
families with earnings below $30,000 and approximately 2/3s (66%) went to families with 
earnings below $20,000 (CTJ, 2010).   
 
The average poor family who was helped by the CTC expansion in ARRA received a total 
increase of over $900 in family child tax credits.  This increase was limited by the fact that 
families who before ARRA nearly received a full CTC were limited to an increase of only the 
difference between what they got and $1,000 per child.  For instance, a family with one child 
receiving a pre-ARRA CTC of $900 could only receive a maximum increase of $100. 
 
Since pre- and post-ARRA, families with no earnings get no CTC, the only children eligible to 
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move up in eligibility were those in working families, specifically those in families with earnings 
above $3,000.  The vast majority of the 8.5% of children in working families too poor to get any 
credit before ARRA became eligible for at least a partial credit.  Approximately 5.5% received a 
partial credit, and 1% got the full $1,000 per child CTC.  Of the 12.3% of children in families 
who pre-ARRA who got a partial credit, well over ½ - 7.6% now receive the full $1,000 per 
child CTC.   
 
For the families of low-income children under 3, the expansion of ARRA led to an even greater 
increase in eligibility.  Of the 12.7% of low-income children under the age of three in working 
families who were ineligible for any credit pre-ARRA, over 3/4s moved into eligibility for at 
least a partial CTC.  Of the 13.9% in the phase-in range pre-ARRA, 8.85% moved up to the full 
CTC.   
 
It is clear then, that ARRA significantly improved the eligibility status of both young children 
and older children.  But how would the alternative policies described above stack up? 
 
1.  Changes in Eligibility Status of Children 
 
The focus on this dissertation is the cash benefits the CTC provides to low-income families – 
particularly those families with children under the age of 3, where cash assistance can be of 
particular help.  Therefore, in comparing the relative merits of various CTC policy options it is 
worth looking at what the policy does for families with children in the bottom three rungs of 
eligibility – those in families with no earnings, those in families with earnings too small to get 
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any credit, and those in families with earnings who get a partial CTC, but not a full CTC. 
 
[See table 3] 
 
Table 3 presents the percentage of children in each category of eligibility status for each of the 
10 CTC policies listed above.  The first section describes the eligibility status for all children.  
The next two sections provide the same information first for children under the age of three and 
then older children.  Finally, the bottom section of table 3 lists the percentage of children too 
poor to get the full CTC.   
 
First off it is worth noting that full refundability, by design, moves all children in these three 
categories up to a full credit.  It is the only policy that does anything for the approximately 
8.38% of all children and 12.67 % of children under the age of 3 in families with no earnings.  
You can’t design a tax credit that reaches these children unless you somehow decouple eligibility 
from work or earnings. 
 
What about the approximately 12% of all children and 16% of children under 3 in families with 
earnings?  For these children, the policies that deal directly with the phase-in have much greater 
impact on moving the children to a full credit.  It is worth noting that the 15% per child phase in, 
the least expensive of all the options, moves more children to a full credit than lowering the 
threshold to 0.  For just over $3 billion, the 15% tied phase in takes over ½ of all previously 
ineligible children in working families and over ½ of children under 3 who receive partial or no 
credit and moves them to full eligibility.    
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Indexing the credit, increasing the credit, even tripling the credit, all do nothing for children in 
the bottom three categories.  Only doubling the credit for children under 6 does something for 
children in these categories, by moving more children to the full $1,000 per child CTC.  That 
said, it should be noted, that it does not move any of the children in these categories to the new 
full $2,000 CTC that would go to middle class families under such a proposal.   
 
Clearly then, policies that just increase the CTC without focusing on the phase-in do nothing for 
families too poor to get the full CTC.  But from the standpoint of the family, what increases do 
each of these policies provide? 
 
2.  Costs of the policies: 
 
[See table 4] 
 
Table 4 presents the costs and dollar benefits to families of each of the ten policies.  The first line 
contains my estimates of the costs of each policy.  The next line contains the additional costs of 
each policy.  I include these estimates as they are the relevant numbers that Congress would have 
to consider in moving from current policy to one of the alternative policies.  In order to get these 
estimates, I simply substract my estimate of the cost of current policy CTC from the estimated 
costs of each of the alternatives.  For instance, the additional cost of moving to full refundability 
would be the cost of full refundability,  $61.53 billion, minus the cost of current policy, $48.94 
billion, for a total additional cost of $12.59 billion.   
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Next table 4 presents the mean dollar increases per family of each of the nine policy alternatives 
to the current CTC divided by families with children under 3, and families without children 
under the age of 3.  These estimates are provided to give a sense of the magnitude of the benefit 
from the perspective of the family.  Since the dissertation is focused on the potential for the CTC 
alternatives to get cash to low-income families with young children, this section also looks at the 
benefit for the families of children in poverty.  Since only full refundability gets cash to families 
with no earnings, this table also looks at the average benefit for the families of children in 
poverty who have some earnings.   
 
Last, since the marginal costs of the proposals vary significantly, table 4 presents one way to 
examine the relative merits of each proposal, showing the “bang for buck” of each policy 
alternative.  This is calculated by dividing the average benefit to families by the additional cost 
of each alternative.  The limitations of this analysis is discussed when I present the results.   
 
Importantly the costs of the four policies that directly increase the phase in (0 threshold, 15% per 
child phase-in, and the 10% and 15% tied phase in) are significantly less costly than increases to 
the entire credit.  These policies range in annually additional costs from $1.55 billion to $3.06 
billion.   
 
Indexing or increasing the CTC for all children, doubling for children under the age of 6, and 
tripling the CTC cost annually from $12.00 billion to $85.49 billion.  Each of these policies cost 
more than full refundability, the cost of giving all children at the bottom the full $1,000 per child 
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tax credit, would cost $11.77 billion.   
 
3.  Average increase in benefits of the policies: 
 
For all children, the biggest average dollar increases in the credit come from those policies that 
increase the overall credit.  Under Senator Santorum’s proposal of increasing the per-child CTC 
to $3,000, families would receive an increase of approximately $1,000 per child, and $2,000 per 
family.  Doubling the credit for children under 6, as Senator Schumer proposed, would add an 
average of $647 per child, for all children under the age of 6.   
 
However, with the evidence that cash assistance is particularly productive for low-income young 
children, it is worth focusing on what the average increases look like to children in poverty.  
Here the results flip.  Those policies that address the phase-in help the most.  Clearly, the fully 
refundable CTC gives the largest dollar increase to poor families with children under the age of 6 
– a total of $679 per child, and $1,462 for their families.  Poor older children, and poor families 
with older children each get slightly less assistance than the youngest children, but not much – 
about $200 less per family.     
 
Doubling the credit for children under the age of 6 gives the second best benefit to young 
children, an average of $262 per child for children under the age of 3.  For families with children 
under 6, the increase of approximately $533, is equivalent to the dramatically cheaper policy of 
the 15% tied phase in which results in an increase of $526 per family.  
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The three policies that directly deal with the phase-in each give per child increases ranging from 
$120 to $208.  For older children the increases are similar.  Yet, with these policies, families of 
poor young children do receive modestly more than families of older children.  With these 
policies, families of young children receive increases ranging from $356 to $526.  Families of 
older children get between $115 and $147 less. 
 
Tripling the CTC does very little for the families of poor children, adding an additional $78 in 
CTC to families with children under the age of three. 
 
Since nine of the ten policy regimes do nothing for the 8.38 % of all children and 12.67% of 
children under the age of 3 who are in families with no earnings, it is worth examining what the 
policies do for poor working families – the groups targeted by the policies.  Here, the trends are 
consistent with the analysis of the increases for all poor children – those policies that deal with 
the phase in are most beneficial to poor children and young children in particular. 
 
(Under full refundability, average increases in the CTC for working poor families are less than 
those for all poor families, since this analysis does not include the generous assistance provided 
to families with no earnings). 
 
4.  Bang For Buck: 
 
Since the policy proposals differ significantly in cost, one way to compare their benefits is to 
calculate the relative “bang per buck” of each proposal.  One way to do this is to look at the 
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average dollar increase in credit for each increased billion spent to enact the policy.  Since the 
focus of this dissertation is young children in low-income families, this analysis is restricted to 
young children in poor families. 
 
Traditionally, many economists have assumed that policies that are “targeted” to a population are 
more efficient, as they send limited resources to a specific population, limiting the overall cost of 
a program or tax expenditure (see for instance, Weisbrod, 1969).  However, much work has been 
done to show that the costs of means-testing (in administration, among other factors) are so high 
that universal programs can be more efficient (see for instance, Garfinkel, 1982).  Health care 
policy in the U.S. is one area where the benefits of a universal program – Medicare for older 
Americans, or models of a single-payer program for all Americans – are clear.   
 
More recent work by Batchelder, Goldberg, and Orszag (2006) argues that uniform refundable 
credits are more efficient approach for tax incentives whose intention is to correct for positive 
externalities if there is no evidence that externalities or elasticities related to the tax credit vary 
by income class.  That is, if a child tax credit is supposed to incentivize a family to invest more 
in a child, absent evidence that either (1) society would not benefit from having poor families 
invest more in their children or (2) that poor families’ investments in children will not be as 
affected by a $1,000 credit as those of richer families, then the CTC should be fully refundable.   
 
While it is theoretically possible that poor families may be less likely to invest a marginal $1,000 
in their children, in fact, it is likely that poor families are more likely to invest a marginal $1,000 
in their children – as they are cash poor, and their likelihood of investing it in children may be 
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more affected by $1,000 as it is worth more to poor families than to wealthier families. 
 
Either way, absent evidence to the contrary, it would be more efficient to have a fully refundable 
CTC.  As such, a “bank for buck” analysis may not be the most appropriate analysis of the 
relative merits of the policy options outlined.  Nevertheless, if seen in this cautionary light, it can 
add some perspective to the relative merits of the policy options.  After all, those policies with 
higher bang for the buck generally move towards full refundability, and therefore are potentially 
more efficient than current policy.   
 
On a per child analysis, the policies that deal with the phase in provide the biggest bang for buck.  
Even lowering the threshold, in a per child analysis, seems to be a very efficient way to increase 
dollars going to poor young children.  This is in large part due to how cheap the policy is – it is 
an efficient way to get money to young children, but doesn’t send much money their way. 
 
ARRA, designed to stimulate the economy and help poor families, was a relatively efficient way 
to target resources to the families of poor children under 3. 
 
It is worth noting that increasing the credit for all children under 6, while helpful to poor young 
children, is at first glance, an inefficient way to help them.   
 




For families, however, the increased phase-in policies provide a modestly better bang for buck 
than lowering the threshold to 0, and dramatically better than all of the other policies.   
 
5.  Relative effects on reducing poverty, assuming that the CTC were treated as earnings for 
calculating poverty status: 
 
Clearly the official Federal Poverty Line (FPL) is not the best measure of poverty over all.  
Among many of its much-discussed deficiencies is the fact that it is measured pre-tax.  
Therefore, the CTC cannot technically lift a child out of poverty, (at least directly), as it does not 
count towards the measure.  That said, for the purpose of analysis and comparing the policy 
options, one can examine the effect of the CTC on poverty, if the CTC were counted towards 
poverty eligibility.    
 
Moreover, the CTC and EITC provide generous assistance to many low-income families, who 
may be helped significantly, but not enough to move above the poverty threshold.  As such, it is 
not the best measure of a policy’s strengths.   
 
Still, in spite of these limitations, looking at the poverty threshold does give some context to 
what the policies would do.  In 2010, 21.80% of all children under 16 (those age-eligible for the 
CTC) were poor.  For children under the age of 3, the number was a staggering 25.95%.  For all 
children, the number is 20.92%. 
 
[See table 5] 
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Table 5 presents the effects of the CTC policy alternatives on reducing poverty, for all children, 
for children under 3, and for older children.  It is divided into four sections.   
 
First, it presents the percentage of children lifted above the Federal Poverty Line (FPL).  Next, it 
presents increased percentage of children lifted above the FPL by each policy alternative.   These 
estimates are calculated by subtracting the percent lifted above poverty by the current CTC from 
the percent lifted above poverty by a policy alternative.  For instance, 8.23% of all children are 
lifted above the poverty line by the current CTC.  10.94% of all children would be lifted above 
the poverty line by a fully refundable $1,000 CTC.  Therefore, the increased percentage of 
children lifted above the FPL by moving to full refundability is the difference between those two 
numbers, 2.71%. 
 
The next section of table 5 presents another way to examine the effect of the CTC policy 
alternatives on poverty, presenting what percentage of children would be in poverty if the CTC 
counted towards the measure.   
 
Since more children under the age of 3 are in poverty (25.95%) than older children (20.92%), the 
absolute reduction in percentage of numbers does not allow one to compare how much poverty is 
reduced in each age group.  Therefore, the last section of table 5 presents the percentage 
reduction of children in poverty for each policy.  These estimates give one gauge to examine 
how much of the problem is being addressed by the CTC, where the problem is defined as 
children being below 100% FPL.   
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First off it is worth noting that the current CTC cuts poverty by 37.75% for all children under the 
age of 16, and by 28.40% for children under the age of 3.  Second, it is worth noting that all of 
the proposals cut poverty by amounts nearing ½ of all children – and over that in two cases – full 
refundability and Senator Schumer’s proposal.  For children under 3, the proposals cut poverty 
by nearly 1/3, and over that in the same two cases. 
  
With the single exception of Senator Schumer’s proposal, every CTC policy iteration cuts 
poverty more for older children than for those under 3.  His policy would cut poverty by 5 
percentage points for all children under the age of 3, dramatically more than full refundability, 
which would only cut poverty by 1.81 percentage points among this population.  It is worth 
noting that on a bang for buck basis, though, this proposal is less efficient than any of the three 
phase-in increase proposals.  Moreover, as discussed earlier, the phase-in proposals do more for 
children in poverty, they just lift less above the poverty threshold.  It is also worth adding that the 
reason more children would be lifted over the poverty threshold by this policy than by full 
refundability, is that this policy would double the CTC to $2,000 for young children, while full 
refundability as modeled, would just get a full $1,000 CTC to all children.  A fully refundable 
CTC of $2,000 would of course do more for poor children than a $2,000 partially refundable 
CTC. 
 
6.  Relative benefits of each policy to a family with a single earner, working full time, full year at 
the minimum wage: 
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One way to examine the benefit of each policy to families is to look at how much of a credit 
would go to a two parent family with both parents working full time, full year at the minimum 
wage, and to a single parent family working full time, full year at the minimum wage.  While 
many people may disagree with the prospect of giving the credit to families with no earnings, it 
is hard to argue against the idea of people working full time, full year getting a full credit.  
 
These “example” families are presented, as one way to explain the effects of the policies on 
working families.  Since families with two children and a single-earner working full-time full-
year at the minimum wage do not earn the full CTC for both children, this table is one way to 
demonstrate what would happen. 
 
The Federal minimum wage is currently $7.25 per hour.  I calculate full-time full year work to be 
40 hours a week for 50 weeks.  Therefore a single earner working full-time full-year would make 
$14,500 per year.  And dual earners would make twice that - $29,000 per year.13 
 
[See table 6] 
 
Table 6 presents the dollar benefits of each policy alternative to families working full-time, full-
year at the minimum wage.  The first section of the table presents the benefits to families with a 
single earner working full-time, full year at the minimum wage for families with one, two, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Some may argue that full-time full-year work would include 52 weeks instead of 50 weeks.  
Estimating the CTC for families who work the extra two weeks, would result in an additional 
$87 in CTC for single earner families, and an additional $174 in CTC for dual earner families.  
While those increased estimates are meaningful, they do not affect the overall trends discussed in 
this section.	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three children.  For instance, a single earner family with minimum wage earnings under current 
policy would get a $1,000 family CTC if they had one child, a $1,725 family CTC if they had 
two children, and a $1,725 total family CTC if they had three children.  The second section of 
the table presents the benefits to families with two earners, working full-time, full year at the 




First off it is worth noting that ARRA significantly increased the CTC for single parent 
“minimum wage” families, adding over $700 to families with one child, and $1,432.50 to 
families with two children.  Second, it is worth noting that all of the policies that deal with the 
phase in – with the exception of lowering the threshold to 0 - move these families to the full 
credit for each child.  A single earner family with two children, for the first time, would get the 
full $2,000 family CTC.  A family with three children would get the full $3,000.  
 
Lowering the threshold to 0 would give a $275 boost to single earner families with two children 
and a bit more to families with 3 children, but nothing to families with one child.  
 
While doubling the policy for children under age 6 would give a big boost to such a family with 
one child, it does nothing for single parent minimum wage families with more than one child.   
 
Those policies that simply increase the credit help single parent families with one child, but do 
nothing for families with more than one child.   
	   135	  
 
Married Families:  
 
Since, under current law, married families making the minimum wage already get the full CTC 
for each child if they have one, two, or three children, the policies that increase the credit are the 
ones that help these families.   
 
As such, there is a differential effect of the policies on these hypothetical families.  For single-
parent families, those policies that address the phase in do the most help, since under current law 
they do not get a full CTC.  For married families, those policies that increase the overall credit 
help the most, since under current law they already get a full CTC.   
 
A Baby Penalty? 
 
In summary, the findings demonstrate that young poor children are disproportionately left out of 
both the CTC and the EITC – our two largest federal child policies.  This finding is compounded 
by the fact that the families of babies born after the first of the year may not receive their tax 
credits for a year and a half.  All other tax expenditures are either non-refundable leaving out 
low-income young children, or do not go to low-income young children at all. 
 
Many have pointed out that there exist “marriage penalties” in the tax code, places where 
families pay more in taxes simply because of the fact that the grown-ups are married.  The 
findings above suggest that the tax code may also contain a “baby penalty.”  While the CTC and 
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EITC are extremely important in alleviating the poverty of families with young children, the fact 
is that they disproportionately leave young children out of eligibility and can be improved. 
 
By design full refundability may be the optimum CTC policy for helping out low-income young 
children, as it is the only policy that gets anything to the 12.67% of children under the age of 
three who are in families without earnings.  That said, decoupling eligibility of the CTC from 
work remains a tall order in the current political environment.   
 
Those policies that increase the phase-in do more for low-income young children, and get more 
money to them in a more efficient way than all of the other proposals.  In particular, proposals to 
simply increase the size of the credit do close to nothing for poor children.   
 
Doubling the credit for children under the age of 6, does the most to move young children – all 
children - over the poverty threshold.  Policies that just increase the per- child CTC to $1,000 can 
only move a family’s earnings up a maximum of $1,000 per children.  Doubling the credit to 
$2,000 allows more families to move over the threshold. 
 
Of the three proposals that deal specifically with the phase–in, the latter two (tied phase-ins) may 
be the best options available.  In the future, there is the possibility of increasing the overall CTC, 
even if it does little to help low-income families.  If beforehand, the amount of the credit in the 
phase-in range was linked to the amount of the full family CTC, such a policy change would 
benefit people in the phase in range as well.  This change in the CTC would tie the lot of those in 
the phase in to those who get the full credit, a more powerful constituency, obviating the need in 
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There are limitations of not doing the broader analysis of federal cash assistance.  I am seeking to 
find out if the U.S. underinvests in young children in the domain of cash, as we do in the 
domains of services and time.  While tax credits are the largest source of federal cash for 
children, by leaving out other major sources of cash for families, including, in particular, SNAP 
and WIC, I do not capture the net effect of federal policies.  That said, looking at the CTC and 
EITC can give one measure of what we do. 
 
Likewise, there are limits to using a micro-simulation model, including in my case, the 
assumption that the credit would go to all who are earnings-eligible. 
 
It is worth noting, that changes in the tax code could produce behavioral effects that are not 
picked up in these analyses.  All child allowances are pro-natal for all families - not just for those 
without earnings.  Theoretically providing additional cash assistance to families for more 
children not based on work, could lead to some families without earnings having more children, 
which could lead to having increases in the number of children in poverty.  Decoupling cash 
assistance from work could serve to remove incentives to work or to marry – however, the 
absence of an incentive, in this case a weak incentive, is not the same as a disincentive to work 
or to marry.  To the extent that credits remain based on earnings, as they do in all of the previous 
iterations, the credit remains, at least theoretically, pro-marriage and pro-work for families with 
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earnings below $110,000.  The more you earn, the higher the credit until you reach the full 
$1,000.  Marrying or working more (or at least earning more), provides equal or greater credits 
for families with earnings below $110,000.   
 
  





In this last chapter, I summarize the findings of the literature review, the legislative history of the 
child tax credit, and the policy analysis, present implications for both research and policy, briefly 
discuss where the CTC may be headed at this time, and finally, harkening back to earlier 
discussions of the possibilities of a child allowance in the United States, suggest that future 
opportunities for improving the CTC may in large part be dependent on the leadership of our 
elected officials. 
 
1.  Summary of findings: 
 
In chapter 2, I examined the literature, demonstrating that cash matters and that where evidence 
was available in experiments, that cash assistance matters.  Most of these studies examined 
whether children in families with higher incomes do better than children in families with lower 
incomes.  Of course, those who receive cash assistance may be negatively selected so that there 
may be a negative association between for instance TANF receipt and child outcomes.  However, 
on balance, the evidence from both natural and controlled experiments was consistent with the 
non-experimental studies that cash assistance.  The preponderance of the evidence suggested that 
cash was particularly important for young children.   
 
Chapter 2 also examined the literature to demonstrate that while cash may be particularly 
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important to young children, America underinvests in this domain relative both to what to what 
young children need and to what other advanced industrialized countries spend.   
 
Finally in chapter 2, I presented a case that changes to the refundable CTC offer one opportunity 
to address this investment.  Here I showed that tax expenditures can be viewed similarly to direct 
spending, that the bulk of federal cash assistance to families with children comes through the tax 
code mostly in the form of the CTC and EITC, that tax refunds and “direct” spending differ in 
who they benefit, that young children therefore may be the most likely to be left out of eligibility 
of the CTC, that large swings in earnings to the families of young children are deleterious and 
can happen due to events outside their control, that family tax credits can amplify these swings, 
that recessions have a negative impact on children potentially exacerbating the potential to leave 
young children out of earnings-based benefits, and finally that refundable tax credits can be 
stimulative, simultaneously helping the macro economy and the individual recipients. 
 
In chapter 3, I presented a legislative history of the CTC, highlighting that the U.S. child 
allowance was politically launched in the Republican House’s 1994 political document, the 
“Contract with America,” subsequently made refundable for even the first and second child in a 
family under President Bush, and increased over the last decade with particular support from the 
Democratic House Leadership.  Here, the legislative history highlighted the fact that America’s 
version of a child allowance has largely grown under the radar, that is, outside of the attention of 
the public.  Moreover, the expansions of the refundable CTC over the last decade have 
demonstrated that policy analysis should provide recommendations for both optimum policies 
and alternative policies that may be more likely to become law.  There is a tendency for policy 
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analysts to just call for full refundability and leave it at that.  While full refundability would be 
great, it is an insufficient response to the concerns of deep poverty.  Alternatives exist that can be 
implemented in the interim – and therefore help kids in practice, not just theory.  From the 
perspective of children, the optimum policy is one that can be signed into law.  As such, it is 
imperative that policy analyses also provide alternative policy options for policymakers to 
consider.  Having a variety of policy options allows a policymaker to weigh the policy merits 
against the politics. 
 
In chapter 4, I examined 2011 March CPS data and find that 29% of children under the age of 
three are in families with too little earnings to get the full CTC, as opposed to 20% of older 
children.  Nearly 13% of children under the age of three are in families with no earnings and as 
such get no CTC or EITC, as opposed to 8% of older children.  And, while the EITC may 
disproportionately benefit young children, poor young children are more likely to be left out 
eligibility of the EITC than their older counterparts.  Since infants may or may not be eligible for 
any CTC or EITC, depending on their birth month, I suggest that as some have found a marriage 
penalty in parts of the tax code, that there may also be a “baby penalty.”   
 
Next I used micro-simulation to examine the costs and benefits of alternative CTC policies.  
Here I found that while full refundability may be the optimum CTC policy, that there are other 
possibilities, including those that increase the phase-in of eligibility, that are less costly, and also 
substantially lower child poverty among young children.  Doubling the CTC for young children 
would lift even more children out of poverty than moving to full refundability, reflecting the fact 
that by moving to a $2,000 CTC, more families could cross the federal poverty line.  Yet, only 
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moving to full refundability would do anything for the 12.67% of young children in families with 
no earnings.  
 
There are limitations of not doing the broader analysis of federal cash assistance.  I am interested 
in the age distribution, as I want to see if the U.S. underinvests in young children in the domain 
of cash, as we do in the domains of services and time.  Looking at tax credits, the largest federal 
source of cash for young children, while not the whole picture, will give a sense of what we do.  
Yet by focusing exclusively on tax credits, I leave out other major sources of cash for families 
including SNAP, TANF, UI, SSI, Child Support, as well as state and local cash policies.  As 
such, my net distributional analysis, by age will not capture either the full federal effort, or, 
perhaps more importantly, the full effort from the perspective of a family.  Estimating this net 
effect would be an important future analysis. 
 
There are also limits inherent in using a micro-simulation model, including the presumption that 
those who are earnings-eligible for tax credits actually receive them. 
 
The CTC and EITC are success stories, extremely important to low-income families with young 
children, yet these opportunities for improvement exist.  With poor children under the age of 
three disproportionately left out of the most costly child policies, and their need for cash 
assistance so clear, something must be done to reform the CTC.  There are implications both for 
research and policy. 
 
2.  Implications for Research: 
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Implications for research abound, including opportunities for examining (i) natural experiments, 
(ii) areas related more broadly to the possibility of a baby penalty, (iii) other child tax research 
issues, and (iv) questions of interdisciplinary research.   
 
i.  Natural Experiments: 
 
A series of natural experiments exist, that were proper data available, could lead to better 




The combat pay CTC and EITC penalty ended in 2005.  The possibility of a differences in 
differences analysis exists.  Before 2005, some families with a member in combat lost over 
$4000 in tax credits.  After 2005, they got them back.  While families with a parent in combat are 
by no means to be considered representative of the country, and while families may endure 
increasing stress the longer the nation is at war which could bias the estimates, the analysis 
nevertheless could add to the literature examining the links between transfers and child 
wellbeing.   
 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act: 
 
With a economic and political push to get the 2009 recovery package dollars out the door as 
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quickly as possible, much of the direct help to families, in the form of increased unemployment 
insurance and SNAP, was available in 2009.  Since 2009 taxes were not counted until April 15, 
2010, and since credits weren’t received until the summer of 2010, there may be an opportunity 
to study the large expansion of the refundable CTC, and the smaller expansion of the EITC by 
using a difference in difference study.  This opportunity may also exist when examining other 
CTC expansions over the last decade, including in particular those in 2001 and at the end of 2008 
when the eligibility threshold dropped to $8500.   
 
Month of Birth: 
 
Perhaps more importantly, one could examine the difference in child outcomes for children born 
in December versus those born in January.  Do the December babies who receive their CTC and 
EITC when they are 11 months younger than the January babies do any better?  Might it be 
possible to use the November and February babies, to see how the differences compare month to 
month?  One benefit of examining this area, is that experimental studies on the effects of cash 
transfers to families have only measured effects as young as the age of two.  An additional 
benefit, if data were available, is that it would be an analysis of a scaled policy, as opposed to an 
experiment that may or may not be scalable. Furthermore, the cash benefits are large enough that 
some differences may be observed. 
 
Absent advanced payments in tax credits, the month of birth issue with tax credit eligibility is 
potentially a recurring natural experiment that could measure the impact of the “baby penalty” or 
more particular, the effect of cash transfers to babies.  One could look retrospectively at the 
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results from other data sets that contain measures of interest, perhaps even allowing for the 
estimate of effects in the out years, this is, when a child turns 17 or 18.  One could also move 
forward with opportunities to measure other areas of interest, or add month of birth to ongoing 
studies so as to make this analysis possible.  The existence of Child Tax Credits in other 
countries suggests that there may be cross-national opportunities for research as well, that may in 
the U.K. for instance, also allow for examining the effect of a fully refundable CTC on infants – 
that is one not conditioned on work. 
 
ii.  Other implications for research related to the possibility of a baby penalty: 
 
If a baby penalty exists in the tax code because child tax benefits are conditioned on earnings, 
might there be other implications in looking at a baby penalty, beyond the study of tax credits? 
 
What is the effect on young children of having a safety net largely conditioned on work?  
Does a baby penalty exist with other work-conditioned benefits? 
 
With two-thirds of federal entitlement benefits that don’t go to the elderly and the disabled going 
to working households, it is worth examining whether a baby penalty exists in other work-
conditioned benefits in addition to tax credits.  That is, are babies specifically, and young 
children more generally, more likely to be left out of the majority of federal entitlement benefits 
since their parents on average are more likely to have lower earnings than the parents of older 
children, or no earnings whatsoever.  With welfare reform the law of the land and with jobs now 
scarce, are young children even more vulnerable than previously perceived?   
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Some argue that most of the safety net should be conditioned on work, or more specifically 
earnings.  Can a work-conditioned safety net work for infants and toddlers?  If not, is there a 
larger indictment of work-conditioned benefits - that is that they leave out those who need it the 
most.  Of course, the U.S. pairs work-conditioned benefits with some non-work-conditioned 
benefits such as SNAP and WIC.  Do they sufficiently offset the effects of the baby penalty? 
 
Variation in wealth by age of child: 
 
It may also be worth examining whether wealth differs by age of children.  If young children are 
the most likely to be poor in this country, if they are the most likely to be too poor to get the full 
CTC and EITC, are they also the same group who has the least wealth?  Since wealth increases 
with age, we likely already know the answer qualitatively, but measuring the magnitude and its 
implications could yield useful findings, since wealth could be particularly important in the first 
year of life, when a parent is more likely to be at least partially out of the paid labor force. 
 
Does cash matter more in the first year of life or the year before? 
 
With evidence that cash appears to be particularly important in the first years of life, and with the 
importance of the prenatal period to a child’s health and wellbeing, it may be important to 
examine whether cash is particularly important in the year before a child is born.  Such an effect 
may be very difficult to measure, and its implications for policy would likely lie outside of the 
tax code.  Still, it could be theoretically modeled and may potentially provide greater knowledge 
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on how to increase the chances for young children born into poverty. 
 
Do cash and other early childhood policies matter more in the early years because young 
children are more vulnerable or because parents are younger?  Are both issues at work? 
 
Parents of younger children are younger parents, less experienced at parenting than when they 
have older children.  Part of the reason families with young children have lower earnings is due 
to the fact that parents of younger children earn less than they do later in life.  Clearly one factor 
is that young children are in a period of great developmental growth.  Might the age of a parent 
also contribute to this effect, since a younger parent or teen parent may have less developed 
parenting skills than older parents?   
  
 Young kids and unemployment? 
 
While John Irons has taken an initial look to see if young children are more likely than older 
children to have a parent who lost in a job in the Great Recession – and found out that they were 
(2011), there is work to be done to confirm this finding, and more work to be done to see if 
young children are disproportionately effected be either recessions or layoffs of a caregiver.  It is 
theoretically possible that the parents of younger children are more likely to keep their job than 
those of older children, since younger parents receive less in earnings, and thus may be less 
costly to keep employed when a firm needs to cut costs.  At the same time, it is theoretically 
possible that these same parents are more expendable, since they may have less work experience 
or seniority built up than that of the parents of older children.  If young children are more likely 
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to have a parent lost a job, there could be effects on the child both through a family’s loss of 
income and associated benefits, and through the potential mental health effect on a caregiver.   
 
(iii) Other child tax research opportunities: 
 
There are a variety of opportunities for examining the implications of child tax policy beyond the 
questions of natural experiments and possible baby penalties.  I will mention just one. 
 
Use IRS ITIN numbers to estimate the number of children in low-income families whose 
parents are undocumented 
 
With $4.2 billion in refundable CTC going to families filing with an Individual Taxpayer 
Identification Number, it may be possible to estimate the number of low-income children in 
families with an undocumented parent.  Since $4.2 billion went out in 2010, there are a minimum 
of 4.2 million children in families who received a CTC after filing with an ITIN.  This number 
must be much higher, as families eligible for a refundable CTC receive a credit of up to $1,000.  
If receipt of credit were evenly distributed by child, there would be 8.4 million children in 
families filing with an ITIN. 
 
Some families do not file for their refundable CTC.  It is likely that families with an 
undocumented worker may be even less likely to file.  Others may make too little to be eligible 
for the CTC and still others might make too much to be eligible for the refundable CTC.  It is 
likely that a small percentage of ITIN filers could be filing on investment income, and therefore 
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not necessarily be working without permission from the U.S. government.  People from abroad 
making investments in the U.S., filing taxes on their earnings, and being eligible for a refundable 
CTC is likely to be very small.  
 
These estimates potentially could give a better understanding of the number of children in low-
income working families whose parents are undocumented. 
 
(iv)  Opportunities for interdisciplinary research: 
 
In addition to the specific implications for research outlined above, there are other research 
considerations, including the potential of (1) combining tax policy analysis with child policy 
analysis and (2) marrying policy analysis with political analysis. 
 
Combining tax policy and child policy: 
 
Too often, the child tax credit has been seen through the lens of tax policy.  The tax policy 
researchers in general are not focused on child development.  Moving forward, it would be 
important for family policy experts to work together with tax policy experts on efforts to create a 
tax policy that is more beneficial to families, and productive for the nation as a whole. 
 
The differences in perspectives between the fields of tax policy and child policy go beyond the 
categorization of implicit and explicit policy.  Seen through the lens of child policy, the CTC’s 
lack of full refundability leads to a variety of distortions in receipt of the credit.  This dissertation 
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is focused on young children, and, to a much lesser extent highlighted children of color and 
single-parent, female-headed homes.  Others are differentially impacted by the eligibility rules as 
well.  The families of some troops are left out (Welch, 2003).  Still other work has shown that the 
CTC has a disproportionate positive impact on rural families (Durst and Farrigan, 2011). 
 
Yet with the needs of young children so clear, and with tax credits being such a central 
component of the U.S. social welfare system, something must be done. 
 
 Marrying policy analysis and political analysis: 
 
The 1991 National Commission on Children report called for a fully refundable $1,000 CTC, yet 
in 2012 America still does not have such a policy.  The implication is that the reason we do not 
yet have a fully refundable CTC may be due more to politics than a lack of policy analysis.  
Clearly, there is literature that combines these two lenses (see for instance, Kamerman and Moss, 
2011).  Moving forward, where there are gaps between what policy analysis would prescribe and 
what policy exists, perhaps the possibility of looking at a marrying policy analysis with a 
political analysis or legislative history of the issue could lead to other opportunities for policy 
options, that simple policy analysis devoid of the political lens may ignore.  
 
Cross national comparative research: 
 
A more comprehensive and updated comparative analysis of countries’ child allowances would 
be well worth doing, with opportunities to examine variations in child allowance delivery, size, 
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eligibility, and funding mechanisms.  A political analysis, examining the politics of child 
allowances in different countries along the lines of Moss and Kamerman’s book on the Politics 
of Parental Leave Policies, would be worth documenting and may provide some clues for 
opportunities in other policy regimes, including abroad and within U.S. states. 
 
3.  Implications for Policy: 
 
Implications for policy include (i) the case for full refundability, (ii) a discussion of second best 
alternatives, (iii) other policy opportunities directly related to the CTC, and (iv) other policy 
opportunities indirectly related to the CTC.14 
 
i.  The case for full refundability: 
 
Clearly, full refundability would be the optimum response, as it would bring all children at the 
bottom of the earnings spectrum up to eligibility.  This policy paid significant dividends in the 
U.K.  Moreover, the simplification of administrability that comes with moving to full 
refundability could allow for distribution of the CTC through electronic benefit transfers, 
allowing the families of babies and older children, to receive a monthly “allowance” in the year 
they are eligible, as opposed to in the following year.  Families would get the money while their 
children are young and when they most needed it.  Such an option used to exist for the EITC, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  With the needs of young children so clear, policy implications also exist that may not effect 
size or receipt of the CTC, including strengthening both Early Head Start (EHS) and Women, 
Infants, and Children (WIC), and moving to a paid family leave policy that would allow low-
income families in a broader range of firm sizes to take advantage of leave.  However, this 
section, consistent with the dissertation, focuses on areas that affect the CTC.	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“advanced EITC.”  Riddled with a high error rate and a low take up rate, the advanced EITC was 
recently ended by Congress.  Since it was dependent on a family’s earnings, it was calculated as 
an estimate, leading to some cases where families owed the IRS money back after receiving 
overpayments.  With clear eligibility rules, a fully refundable CTC should be significantly easier 
to administer making such advanced payments possible. 
 
 Full refundability paired with an increased and indexed benefit: 
 
In the late 1960s, social security was increased several years in a row, and then indexed for 
inflation.  Elderly poverty went from approximately 30% down to nearly 10%.  Ideally, moving 
to full refundability of the CTC would be coupled with an increase in the credit, and certainly 
indexation of the benefit so that it does not continue to erode over time.  This recommendation is 
consistent with others seeking to use the tax code to alleviate child poverty (Waldfogel, 2009; 
NYC Center for Economic Opportunity, 2012). 
 
Vehicle for redistribution to offset future regressive taxes: 
 
Moving forward, as the country considers to bat around the idea of moving to a Value Added 
Tax for more revenue or a Carbon Tax for both revenue and to slow down the rate of climate 
change, mechanisms for getting dollars to low-income families become more important.  Each of 
these policies is regressive and would necessitate rebates to at least America’s poorest families.  
Moreover, families can’t wait a year for their rebates.  Piggybacking rebates onto a fully 
refundable CTC could be one way to address this issue for families.  Alternatively, the need for 
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revenue, and the potential of the creation of a Value Added Tax (VAT), with a need to offset its 
regressive nature, could present an opportunity of moving to a fully refundable CTC. 
 
Universal family credits: 
 
Both policy academics and policy makers have suggested combining the CTC, EITC, and other 
child tax policies into a single policy, or into two separate policies – a child credit, and a work 
incentive credit (See for instance, Burman, Maag, and Rohaly, 2005; Emanuel and Reed, 2006).  
Such a plan would be consistent with previous calls to “make work pay” (Ellwood, 1988).  With 
a $17 billion EITC error rate, and the fact that full refundability at a cost of approximately $12 
billion would both simplify the code and presumably reduce the error rate, there certainly seems 
the opportunity for a grand bargain to marry simplification with full refundability.  And, with the 
possibility of tax reform on the horizon, as the annual cost of the Bush tax cuts increases, it must 
be seen as a possibility.   
 
The efficiencies of universal policies (Garfinkel, 1982; Bradshaw, 2011) may in the end be what 
could lead to full refundability of the CTC, as the costs of means testing family tax credits rise – 
as exemplified by error rates -  and the cost distance between current law and full refundability 
shrink.  However, some in the Democratic Party remain skittish about providing additional cash 
to families who are not employed. 
 
ii.  Second best alternatives to full refundability: 
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While full refundability clearly would be the optimal child tax credit, alternatives exist that 




As a second best measure to full refundability, policies dealing with the phase-in range could be 
employed.  As modeled in chapter 4, those that tie the amount of the family CTC to the full 
family CTC would have the biggest benefits for young children, at a relatively modest cost. 
 
Increasing credit for young children: 
 
Increasing the credit for young children, as proposed by Duncan and Magnuson (2011) and 
Senator Schumer would do wonders as well.  As proposed it would lift more children over the 
poverty line than a $1,000 fully refundable CTC, cutting all child poverty, including for young 
children in half.  Of course, a fully refundable $2,000 CTC would do more for poor children than 
a $2,000 partially refundable CTC for young children.   
 
Partially decoupling eligibility from work: 
 
In the meantime, alternatives to full refundability exist that, by keeping the tie to work, could be 
more politically possible, while helping the families of young children, and narrowing the gap in 
cost between current law and full refundability.  They could also lead to the undesirable outcome 
of more clearly bifurcating the deserving from the undeserving poor, as the left continues to 
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embrace compromises incorporating conservative solutions to policy problems (Klein, 2011).   
 
This third category of option, decoupling eligibility from work, lies between full refundability 
and changes in eligibility.  There are at least two possible options for expanding the CTC by 
decoupling eligibility from work:  creating a nationwide look back provision and counting 
unemployment insurance as earnings for calculating the refundable CTC and EITC.  While there 
is no evidence of the direct impact of these policy changes on young children, clearly these 
policies would increase resources for low-income families, some of whom have young children. 
 
Nationwide look back provision: 
 
Creating a nationwide look back provision, as was done regionally after Hurricanes Katrina, 
Rita, and Wilma, would smooth families’ tax benefits over two years, and allow families not to 
lose their benefit when they needed it the most.  Such a policy could benefit a variety of families 
in different situations, including those that take time off in the first year of a child’s life (that is, 
the subset that can afford to take time off from paid work), would not lose their corresponding 
CTC and EITC. 
 
Count unemployment insurance as earnings for calculating the refundable CTC 
and EITC: 
 
A less ambitious option would allow Unemployment Insurance to count as earnings for the 
purposes of calculating both the refundable CTC and the EITC.  The “U.I. as earnings” option 
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would only apply to the subset of families who have a member collecting U.I., but would provide 
an important lift to those eligible.  Counting U.I. as Earnings would also have the benefit of 
pumping more dollars into the economy when the economy is in recession, as unemployed 
families with children are more likely to spend their credits as they receive them. 
 
For both the look back provision and the U.I. policy, there is an added benefit.  Approximately ½ 
of all states have a state EITC, pegged to the rate of the federal EITC.  Were the lookback 
provision or the U.I. as earnings provision enacted, it is likely that some states would have to 
extend a proportional benefit to their taxpayers through their state EITC. 
 
Since families already file taxes on Unemployment Insurance, and since the I.R.S. already has a 
record of the previous year’s earnings of families, the administrative costs of these proposals are 
likely to be small, and significantly cheaper than other proposals to find new ways to get money 
to low-income families like conditional cash transfers.  Furthermore, by maintaining the all-
important (in the United States) tie to work, they may be as politically salient.  
 
iii.  Other policy opportunities directly related to the CTC: 
 
In addition to the specific implications for policies outlined above, there are two other policy 
considerations, first the concept of adding “age equity” to discussions of tax reform, and second, 
the importance of locking in policy changes soon. 
 
Adding the concept of “age equity” to discussions of tax reform: 
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Scholars often talk about horizontal equity and vertical equity in discussing the tax code and the 
possibility of tax reform.  Horizontal equity refers to people earning approximately the same 
income paying approximately the same tax.  With earnings on investment taxed at the much 
lower rate of 15% than earnings on labor, clearly the code is not horizontally equitable.  Vertical 
equity refers to progressivity in the code – that is the code is vertically equitable if people who 
earn more pay higher tax rates than those who earn less.  With billionaire Warren Buffet pointing 
out that he pays less in taxes than his secretaries, clearly the current code is not vertically 
equitable. 
 
Advocates for “fiscal discipline” often discuss the idea that by borrowing now, the federal 
government is robbing future generations of children.  The emphasis in this argument is often 
that we are taking from children.  But this issue can more precisely be labeled one of 
generational equity.  One generation borrowing from a future generation.  And, if we cut 
programs that benefit young children in order to satisfy this concern, it is quite distinct from age 
equity.   
  
With the possibility of tax reform on the horizon then, perhaps the concept of “age equity” could 
enter the discourse, along side horizontal and vertical equity, so that one concern in a possible 
revamping of the code would be the distributional effect of credits by age, with corresponding 
distributional charts as one way to examine the merits of a proposal.15  Under such a frame, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  The idea of  “age equity” as a concern for tax policy can be considered as related to earlier 
proposals to create Child Impact Statements as much legislation triggers Environmental Impact 
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will be clear that the families of children receive a large number of meaningful tax expenditures, 
while at the same time the families of young children get less. 
 
Locking in increases soon: 
 
With the United States projected to be made up of increasing proportions of African-American 
and Latino children, and with these populations disproportionately left out of the CTC, there is 
an urgency and changing baseline CTC policy sooner as opposed to later.16  Future expansions, 
even assuming no inflation, are likely to cost more and more.  For this reason too, while indexing 
the amount of the CTC does little to help poor young children now, it is worth achieving, if only 
to lock in the purchasing power of the CTC into baseline now, before the credit erodes any 
further. 
 
Refundable tax credits continue to be more politically protected than spending programs.  The 
current House budget proposal explicitly cuts SNAP, while doing nothing explicitly to the CTC 
and EITC.  While the intent is to cut the tax credits as well, the House majority chose not to 
highlight the fact, wary of being on record again against tax cuts for working families.  
Moreover, the domestic discretionary component of the Federal budget is now shrinking in real 
dollars, as conservative lawmakers have successfully made the case to freeze funding in this 
area, leaving fewer opportunities in this area in the short-run for costly expansions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Statements.  However, issuing age distributional tables of tax policies may be easier to achieve 
than the larger concept of a C.I.S. 	  
16	  There may also be an opportunity for demographers to estimate future child poverty based on 
projected changes in the racial proportions of children.  While poverty is not static, Latino and 
African-American children are much more likely to be poor than other children.  	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iv.  Other policy opportunities indirectly related to the CTC: 
 
In addition to the specific implications for policies outlined above, there are other policy options 
that would indirectly increase the CTC for low-income families.   
 
Increase the minimum wage: 
 
An increase in the minimum wage would directly increase the earnings of families working at or 
near the minimum wage and as such potentially increase the CTC and EITC for families in the 
phase in range of either policy.   
 
 Pay equity: 
 
With women currently making 77 cents of each dollar that a man in an equivalent job makes, pay 
equity legislation could increase the take home pay of low-income, working women and in so 
doing, have a proportional impact on increases in CTC and EITC for families in the phase-in 
range of the credits.  Of course, families in the phase-out range of the EITC, could potentially see 
a reduction in tax credits corresponding to their increases in earnings.  That said, these families 
in the phase-out range of the EITC would not see a reduction in combined earnings and tax 




 Job policies: 
 
Other economic policies, both micro and macro, that increase the number of jobs available to the 
parents of low-income children, or the wages of these parents, could also lead to increases in the 
CTC and EITC for low-income families.  With two-thirds of federal entitlement dollars going to 
families with an earner working at least 1,000 per year (excluding assistance to the elderly and 
the disabled), such an increase may have a larger effect than on the benefit size and eligibility of 
the CTC. 
 
4.  What may be next for the CTC:  The 2012 Primary and General Elections 
 
It may be impossible to predict what issues will be important in an election.  The war in Iraq was 
a central issue in the 2008 Democratic Primary campaign, yet it was the economy that had 
moved center stage by the general election. 
 
Whatever issues arise, it is clear that a major choice for the country lies ahead.  On December 
31st, 2012, all of the Bush tax cuts and the Obama ARRA cuts will expire.  Central to the debt 
ceiling deal negotiated last summer is a provision forcing Congress to pass a law or laws to cut 
spending or increase taxes by $1.2 trillion by the end of this year.  If not, across the board cuts of 
(with some limitations) of an equivalent amount, called sequestration, will begin immediately on 
January 1st, 2013. 
 
The December 2010 tax extension deal included a one-year payroll tax deduction.  In December 
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of 2011, with the temporary payroll tax cuts expiring, the President and the Democrats pushed 
the Republicans to extend the cuts.  With Tea Party opposition, the GOP majority hesitated and 
found themselves on the defensive, arguing against tax cuts for working people. 
 
The Republican House Majority continues to offer bills that would restrict refundable CTC 
eligibility to filers with a Social Security Number.  With $4.2 billion in refundable CTCs going 
to families filing on Individual Taxpayer Identification Numbers, many in the GOP see an 
opportunity to save money while highlighting an “undeserving” population, the children of 
undocumented workers.  Pushback by the Democratic House Leadership (with the help of Ways 
and Means ranking member Sandy Levin and House Caucus Vice-Chair and Ways and Means 
Committee member Xavier Becerra) with some additional support from Republican Senator 
Marco Rubio of Florida has stalled this effort. 
 
Some in the GOP continue to seek ways to limit the high error rate in administration of the 
EITC.  Yet, they are reluctant to say anything negative about the CTC.  After all, the CTC is a 
broad middle class tax cuts.  Ironically, expansions in eligibility are seen in this light- as 
extensions of a middle class tax cut, but disproportionately benefit the poorest.  A dollar added to 
refundability of the CTC by lowering the eligibility threshold is more progressive than a dollar 
added to the EITC, as the CTC eligibility expansion dollars go to families who do not make 
enough to get a full credit and are at the bottom of the income spectrum, whereas the EITC 
expansions are spread out over the bottom and lower-middle sections of the income spectrum.  
Lowering the threshold from $12,050 to $3,000 as done in ARRA, meant that the benefits are 
focused on the newly eligible families and on increasing the credits of families who do not get 
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the full CTC.  The ARRA EITC expansion that lessened the marriage penalty, on the other hand, 
is spread out over all EITC eligible families, not just those in the bottom quintile, and can even 
raise the threshold of the phase-out of the credit.  Both are important in helping low-income 
families with children, but their distributional effects are not identical. 
 
As we move from the primary election to the general, the differences between the two parties on 
taxes is receiving a fair amount of attention.  One distinction is clear already:  The Republicans 
want to extend all of the Bush Tax Cuts, the Democrats want to extend them for people making 
less than $250,000.   
 
Yet another distinction on taxes exists between the parties.  Democrats want to extend tax cuts 
for working families, specifically the refundable CTC.  House Republicans, with their recent 
budget, are on record voting to let them expire, the equivalent of a tax increase on thirteen 
million families (Marr, 2012).  The likely GOP presidential nominee, Mitt Romney has said he 
supports the House GOP Budget and his plan, like the House budget, while extending the CTC 
refundability from the Bush tax cuts, allows the ARRA CTC expansion to expire.  Governor 
Romney may be putting himself in a difficult position.  No less a conservative voice than that of 
the National Review editorial board had called for Romney to quintuple the CTC to $5,000 and, 
echoing the contract with America, recommended it be made refundable to the extent of a 
family’s entire federal tax liability – including payroll taxes (National Review, February 20, 
2012). 
 
On March 21st, 2012, in the House Budget Committee, the lead Democrat Representative Chris 
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Van Hollen offered a non-binding “sense of the House” amendment to the Budget deal, saying 
that Congress should not lower income tax rates for the wealthy by scrapping tax benefits for the 
middle class and the poor.  The amendment failed 15 – 20 (Bloomberg Bureau of National 
Affairs Daily Tax RealTime, March 21, 2012).  Whether the issue rises in prominence in the 
coming election is yet to be known, but in the first blast email from the Obama campaign after 
Rick Santorum dropped out of the race – a time some may refer to as the unofficial beginning of 
the general election, campaign manager Jim Messina wrote in his list of things should give 
Americans “pause” about Governor Romney: 
 
Despite the lessons of recent history, Romney would double down on the disastrous tax 
policies that handed windfalls to the wealthy, but stacked the deck against the middle 
class.  Under Romney, millionaires and billionaires would get a $250,000 tax cut, while 
families with kids making less than $40,000 a year would, on average, actually see their 
taxes go up.  (Messina, April 11, 2012).17  (Emphasis mine). 
 
It was the first time the Obama campaign targeted the GOP for allowing taxes to go up by letting 
the ARRA CTC expansion expire. 
 
More recently, recent polling suggests that in the most competitive House districts, that a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Messina had watched U.S. Senate candidate for Montana Jon Tester’s numbers sink in the two 
weeks before his narrow victory over incumbent Senator Conrad Burns in 2006, while the 
Republican National Committee ran television advertisements suggesting Tester would raise 
taxes on Montana’s families by allowing the CTC to expire.  Tester narrowly eked out victory 
with just 623 votes over the ½ percentage point threshold that could have led to a recount.  In 
this election, the Democrats may be assuming a more offensive role in debating who is defending 
tax cuts for families.	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message based on a middle class tax hike - arguing that the incumbent “voted to raise taxes on 
middle class and working families in order to pay for tax cuts for CEOs, big corporations that 
outsource jobs, big oil companies that are more profitable than ever, and millionaires and 
billionaires, giving them a tax break of 265,000 dollars on top of the Bush tax cuts” - is the 
single strongest attack against the House budget among all likely voters and independents in 
particular (Greenberg, Carville, and Seifert, 2012).  With evidence of the potential of this issue, 
Romney may be forced to develop a more nuanced position than that which he has already taken. 
 
While some may criticize Democrats for raising the issue of tax increases since it could 
implicitly be embracing the right’s argument for tax cuts, it seems clear that the expiration of the 
ARRA expansion of the refundable CTC could provide a ripe opportunity for Democrats to 
contrast their agenda with that of the Republicans.  Only time will tell whether the parties choose 
to engage on this issue and whether it ultimately has any effect.  But whatever the politics are, 
what happens in November will affect the shape of the CTC moving forward, and that in turn, 





On October 22-24, 1967, the Citizens Committee for Children (CCC) hosted a conference in 
Warrenton, Virginia, to examine measures to enhance the “economic welfare of children.”  
Concerned with increasing evidence that family size may be an independent cause of child 
poverty, they turned their attention to a “social instrument [that] had not received the attention its 
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popularity in other countries deserved” (Burns, 1968).   
 
Conferees included experts in social welfare, sociology, demography, and economics; federal, 
state and local officials concerned with poverty, human resources, and welfare programs; 
representatives of social welfare beneficiaries; and persons experienced in the field of mass 
communication.  Presenters included Mollie Orshansky, the economist who had recently 
developed the U.S. federal poverty threshold, presenting on poverty and the economist Harvey 
Brazer presenting on tax policy and children’s allowances, arguing that a child allowance or even 
a “people’s allowance” with a phase out range at the top (a “vanishing tax credit”) could be a 
more progressive redistribution of income than a simple negative income tax (Brazer, 1968). 
 
The Children’s Allowance Conference, as it was called, was chaired, and the proceedings 
subsequently edited, by Emeritus Professer Eveline M. Burns of the Columbia University School 
of Social Work, a social economist and “leading thinker in the field of social security.” 
 
It was left to Lisle Carter, Jr., the Assistant Secretary for Individual and Family Services at the 
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, to provide the “Perspective from 
Washington.”  Carter posited that “before any new kind of income maintenance program is 
undertaken, the American people are going to have to understand the need for it and be willing to 
commit the resources for it.  They will not do that before they know a lot about both the need and 
the kinds of programs that can meet it” (Carter, 1968). 
 
Forty-five years ago academics and policy makers, drawing on comparative family policy, came 
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together to discuss the possibility of a child allowance to address child poverty in the United 
States.  They were onto something. 
 
Yet, it was not until thirty years later, in 1997 that the U.S.’s non-universal version of a child 
allowance, the child tax credit, was created, with conservatives leading the effort.  Refundability 
was expanded in subsequent negotiations in Congress with Democrats leading the effort, yet 
while the legislative record exists, it is not known to the public.   
 
It may be that in order for the U.S. to move to a comprehensive family policy – or even to move 
to full refundability - that a social movement needs to be built around parents - they vote 
(Skocpol and Dickert, 2001).  Yet for this one policy, the Child Tax Credit, much has happened 
under the radar. 
 
The United States is, after all, a representative democracy, not a direct democracy.  Every year 
Congress passes legislation – even the current Congress.  In the end, it is policy makers who 
make policy.  And if policy makers who understand the benefits of family policy are in a position 
to make change, particularly in the context of more costly bills, they just may do so.   
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Table 1:  CTC and EITC Eligibility Status by Age
All Children ages 0 - 16 % # in millions % # in millions
no credit, no earnings 8.38 5.85 8.38 5.85
no credit, poor w/ earnings 1.96 1.37
phasein 10.17 7.10 7.28 5.08
full credit 61.5 42.92 6.8 4.75
phaseout 7.81 5.45 20.96 14.63
no credit, high income 10.18 7.10 56.58 39.49
total 100 69.79 100 69.79
Children ages 0 - 2
no credit, no earnings 12.67 1.52 12.67 1.52
no credit, poor w/ earnings 3.16 0.38
phasein 13.25 1.59 11.15 1.34
full credit 57.76 6.94 8.49 1.02
phaseout 5.42 0.65 21.13 2.54
no credit, high income 7.73 0.93 46.56 6.00
total 100.00 12.02 100.00 12.02
Children ages 3-16
no credit, no earnings 7.98 4.61 7.98 4.61
no credit, poor w/ earnings 1.85 1.07
phasein 9.89 5.71 6.92 4.00
full credit 61.85 35.73 6.64 3.84
phaseout 8.03 4.64 20.94 12.10
no credit, high income 10.41 6.01 57.52 33.23
total 100.00 57.77 100.00 57.77
Too poor to get full CTC % # in millions
children 0 - 16 20.51 14.32
children 0 - 2 29.08 3.49
children 3 - 16 19.72 11.39
Receive at least partial EITC % # in millions
children 0 - 16 35.04 24.46
children 0 - 2 40.77 4.90




	   	  
Table&2:&&CTC&Eligibity&Status,&by&Race&and&Family&Structure,&in&% female&
All(Children CTC white black hispanic asian other married headed
no#credit,#no#earnings 8.38 5.27 18.15 10.77 4.5 12.66 2.53 25.27
no#credit,#poor#w/#earnings 1.96 1.42 3.77 2.36 0.75 3.06 0.71 5.63
phasein 10.17 6.52 16.13 16.7 5.44 12.2 6.49 20.7
full#credit 61.5 62.77 56.04 62.87 57.35 57.75 65.72 47.27
phaseout 7.81 10.25 2.73 4.06 11.86 5.35 10.65 0.52
no#credit,#high#income 10.18 13.77 3.18 3.24 20.11 8.97 13.91 0.6
Children(ages(0(&(2
no#credit,#no#earnings 12.67 6.45 26.63 17.58 6.21 16.75 2.35 37.26
no#credit,#poor#w/#earnings 3.16 2.42 4.37 3.55 2.84 5.65 0.69 8.99
phasein 13.25 8.24 20.47 19.46 7.33 17.06 8.72 23.27
full#credit 57.76 64.33 45.27 53.06 58.7 49.92 68.46 30.39
phaseout 5.42 7.78 1.36 2.97 9.47 1.7 8.22 0.01
no#credit,#high#income 7.73 10.78 1.91 3.38 15.45 8.91 11.56 0.08
Children(ages(3&16
no#credit,#no#earnings 7.98 5.17 17.28 10.02 4.34 12.09 2.54 23.93
no#credit,#poor#w/#earnings 1.85 1.34 3.71 2.23 0.55 2.7 0.71 5.26
phasein 9.89 6.38 15.68 16.39 5.27 11.53 6.29 20.41
full#credit 61.85 62.64 57.15 63.96 57.22 58.84 65.49 49.16
phaseout 8.03 10.45 2.87 4.18 12.08 5.86 10.86 0.58
no#credit,#high#income 10.41 14.02 3.32 3.23 20.55 8.97 14.11 0.66
Too(poor(to(get(full(CTC
children(0(&(16 20.51 13.21 38.05 29.83 10.69 27.92 9.73 51.60
children(0(&(2 29.08 17.11 51.47 40.59 16.38 39.46 11.76 69.52
children(3(&(16 19.72 12.89 36.67 28.64 10.16 26.32 9.54 49.60
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  3	  "hispanic"	  4	  "asian"	  5	  "other"	  
	   label	  val	  race	  race	  
	  
	  
/***********married	  only	  includes	  people	  with	  spouse	  present;	  separated	  and	  
	  spouse	  absent	  treated	  as	  unmarried***********/	  
	  
gen	  married=(marital==1	  |	  marital==2)	  
	  
gen	  familystatus	  =	  1	  if	  married	  ==1	  
replace	  familystatus	  =	  2	  if	  married	  !=1	  &	  familyrelationship==1	  &	  female==1	  
replace	  familystatus	  =	  3	  if	  married	  !=1	  &	  familyrelationship==1	  &	  female==0	  
	  
label	  def	  familystatus	  1	  "married"	  2	  "femaleheaded"	  3	  "maleheaded"	  
	   label	  val	  familystatus	  familystatus	  
	   	  
	  




order	  uid	  houseid	  familyid	  personid	  
	  
/**********************generate	  variables	  for	  all	  age	  groups*******/	  
	  




gen	  age45=(age>=4	  &	  age<=5)	  
gen	  age05=(age<=5)	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gen	  age611=(age>5	  &	  age<12)	  
gen	  age1216=(age>=12	  &	  age<=16)	  
gen	  age616=(age>=6	  &	  age<=16)	  
	  
	  
/*Next	  two	  lines	  create	  a	  variable	  that	  is	  the	  march	  supp	  weight	  of	  the	  	  
head	  of	  household	  and	  assign	  that	  value	  to	  everyone	  in	  the	  family*/	  
	  
gen	  headwgt=earningsweight	  if	  familyrelationship==1	  
	  
bysort	  uid:	  egen	  headmarchwgt=sum(headwgt)	  
bysort	  uid:	  egen	  totchild	  =	  count(child)	  
	  
bysort	  uid:	  egen	  nchild01	  =	  sum(age01)	  
bysort	  uid:	  egen	  nchild02	  =	  sum(age02)	  
bysort	  uid:	  egen	  nchild03	  =	  sum(age03)	  
bysort	  uid:	  egen	  nchild45	  =	  sum(age45)	  
bysort	  uid:	  egen	  nchild05	  =	  sum(age05)	  
bysort	  uid:	  egen	  nchild611	  =	  sum(age611)	  
bysort	  uid:	  egen	  nchild1216	  =	  sum(age1216)	  
bysort	  uid:	  egen	  nchild616	  =	  sum(age616)	  
	  
	  
bysort	  uid:	  egen	  householdsize	  =	  count(uid)	  
	  
/**********	  drop	  marital	  status	  for	  everybody	  except	  head	  of	  household*****/	  
replace	  marital	  =	  .	  if	  familyrelationship	  !=	  1	  
replace	  married	  =	  .	  if	  familyrelationship	  !=	  1	  
replace	  familystatus	  =	  .	  if	  familyrelationship	  !=	  1	  
	  
/*this	  loop	  assigns	  a	  number	  to	  each	  person	  in	  the	  family	  by	  ascending	  age	  
(youngest	  person=1,	  second	  youngest=2,	  etc)	  */	  
sort	  uid	  age	  
by	  uid:	  gen	  ageorder	  =	  1	  if	  _n	  ==	  1	  
forvalues	  sub	  =2/13	  {	  	  
by	  uid:	  replace	  ageorder	  =`sub'	  if	  _n	  ==	  `sub'	  
}	  
	  
/*this	  loop	  creates	  variables	  that	  have	  each	  person's	  age	  in	  the	  family	  by	  	  
ascending	  age	  (chage1=age	  of	  youngest	  child,	  etc)*/	  
	  
forvalues	  sub	  =1/13{	  
gen	  chage`sub'=age	  if	  ageorder==`sub'	  
gen	  chrace`sub'=race	  if	  ageorder==`sub'	  




/*add	  all	  variables	  to	  collapse	  statement-­‐-­‐note	  that	  collapse	  takes	  the	  	  
mean	  of	  the	  variable	  across	  families*/	  
collapse	  totchild	  nchild01	  nchild02	  nchild03	  nchild45	  nchild05	  nchild611	  ///	  
nchild1216	  nchild616	  ///	  
chage1	  chage2	  chage3	  chage4	  chage5	  chage6	  chage7	  chage8	  chage9	  chage10	  ///	  	  
chage11	  chage12	  chage13	  ///	  	  
chrace1	  chrace2	  chrace3	  chrace4	  chrace5	  chrace6	  chrace7	  chrace8	  chrace9	  ///	  	  
chrace10	  chrace11	  chrace12	  chrace13	  ///	  
chweight1	  chweight2	  chweight3	  chweight4	  chweight5	  chweight6	  chweight7	  chweight8	  
chweight9	  ///	  	  
chweight10	  chweight11	  chweight12	  chweight13	  ///	  
familystatus	  married	  marital	  householdsize	  ///	  
familyearnings	  headmarchwgt	  povertylevel	  poverty	  povertyratio	  familyincome,	  by(uid)	  	  
	  
order	  uid	  familystatus	  married	  maritalstatus	  householdsize	  ///	  
familyearnings	  headmarchwgt	  
	  
label	  val	  familystatus	  familystatus	  
label	  val	  chrace*	  race	  
	  
replace	  familyearnings	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  <	  0	  
	  
gen	  familyearnings2	  =	  familyearnings	  
replace	  familyearnings	  =	  .	  if	  chage1>16	  
	  
label	  var	  chage1	  "age	  of	  youngest	  child"	  
	  
gen	  familystatus2	  =	  familystatus	  
replace	  familystatus	  =	  .	  if	  chage1>16	  
replace	  familyearnings	  =	  .	  if	  familystatus	  ==	  .	  
	  
save	  "dissertationdatadistribution.dta",	  replace	  
	  
/*only	  keep	  families	  with	  a	  child	  less	  than	  17*/	  
drop	  if	  chage1>16	  
drop	  if	  familystatus==.	  
	  
/*****	  there	  were	  421	  children	  in	  families	  by	  themselves	  whom	  we	  dropped*****/	  
drop	  if	  familyearnings	  <	  0	  
	  
save	  "dissertationdata.dta",	  replace	  
	  
clear	  all	  
capture	  log	  close	  
cd	  "/Users/davidharris/Desktop/Dissertation/Dissertation	  Data/Dissertation	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Liana/Dissertation	  Data	  Files/"	  
	  
capture	  log	  close	  	  
	  
local	  mydate:	  di	  %tdCYND	  date(c(current_date),"DMY")	  
log	  using	  log`mydate'.log,	  replace	  
	  
use	  dissertationdata.dta,	  clear	  
	  
/*****	  generate	  agecategories*****/	  
gen	  agegrouping	  =	  1	  if	  chage1	  <	  3	  
replace	  agegrouping	  =	  2	  if	  chage1	  >	  2	  &	  chage1	  <	  6	  
replace	  agegrouping	  =	  3	  if	  chage1	  >	  5	  &	  chage1	  <	  14	  
replace	  agegrouping	  =	  4	  if	  chage1	  >	  13	  &	  chage1	  <	  17	  
	  
label	  def	  agegrouping	  1	  "age	  0-­‐2"	  2	  "age	  3-­‐5"	  ///	  
	   3	  "age	  6-­‐13"	  4	  "age	  14-­‐16"	  
	   label	  val	  agegrouping	  agegrouping	  
	  
/*****	  generate	  2	  	  agecategories*****/	  
gen	  agegrouping2	  =	  1	  if	  chage1	  <	  3	  
replace	  agegrouping2	  =	  2	  if	  chage1	  >	  2	  &	  chage1	  <	  17	  
	  
label	  def	  agegrouping2	  1	  "age	  0-­‐2"	  2	  "age	  3-­‐16"	  
	   label	  val	  agegrouping2	  agegrouping2	  
	   	  
/*****	  generate	  3	  	  agecategories*****/	  
gen	  agegrouping3	  =	  1	  if	  chage1	  <	  3	  
replace	  agegrouping3	  =	  2	  if	  chage1	  >	  2	  &	  chage1	  <	  14	  
replace	  agegrouping3	  =	  3	  if	  chage1	  >	  13	  &	  chage1	  <	  17	  
	  
label	  def	  agegrouping3	  1	  "age	  0-­‐2"	  2	  "age	  3-­‐13"	  ///	  
	   3	  "age	  14-­‐16"	  
	   label	  val	  agegrouping3	  agegrouping3	  
	   	   	  
/*****	  generate	  CTC	  variable*****/	  
gen	  maxctc	  =	  1000	  *	  totchild	  
	  
gen	  ctcphasein	  =	  (familyearnings	  -­‐	  3000)	  *	  (.15)	  
replace	  ctcphasein	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  3000	  
replace	  ctcphasein	  =	  0	  if	  ctcphasein	  >=	  maxctc	  
	  
gen	  ctcphaseout	  =	  (-­‐.05)	  *	  (familyearnings	  -­‐	  110000)	  +	  maxctc	  
replace	  ctcphaseout	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  110000	  
replace	  ctcphaseout	  =	  0	  if	  ctcphaseout	  <	  0	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gen	  noctcpoor	  =	  1	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  3000	  
gen	  noctcrich	  =	  1	  if	  familyearnings	  >	  110000	  &	  ctcphaseout	  ==	  0	  
	  
gen	  familyctc	  =	  maxctc	  
replace	  familyctc	  =	  ctcphasein	  if	  ctcphasein	  <	  maxctc	  &	  ctcphasein	  !=	  0	  
replace	  familyctc	  =	  ctcphaseout	  if	  ctcphaseout	  <	  maxctc	  &	  ctcphaseout	  !=	  0	  
replace	  familyctc	  =	  0	  if	  (noctcpoor	  ==	  1	  |	  noctcrich	  ==	  1)	  
	  
replace	  familyctc	  =	  .	  if	  familystatus	  ==	  .	  
	  
gen	  ctc	  =	  familyctc	  /	  totchild	  
	   	  
gen	  ctccat	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  ==	  0	  
	   replace	  ctccat	  =	  1	  if	  noctcpoor	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  
	   replace	  ctccat	  =	  2	  if	  ctcphasein	  !=	  0	  
	   replace	  ctccat	  =	  3	  if	  familyctc	  ==	  maxctc	  
	   replace	  ctccat	  =	  4	  if	  ctcphaseout	  !=	  0	  
	   replace	  ctccat	  =	  5	  if	  noctcrich	  ==	  1	  
	   replace	  ctccat	  =	  .	  if	  	  chage1	  >=	  17	  
	  
label	  def	  ctccat	  0	  "notworking"	  1	  "noctcpoorworking"	  ///	  
	   2	  "ctcphasein"	  3	  "fullctc"	  4	  "ctcphaseout"	  5	  "noctcrich"	  
	   label	  val	  ctccat	  ctccat	  
	  
/*****	  generate	  indexedCTC	  variable*****/	  
gen	  indexedmaxctc	  =	  1255	  *	  totchild	  
	  
gen	  indexedctcphasein	  =	  (familyearnings	  -­‐	  3000)	  *	  (.15)	  
replace	  indexedctcphasein	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  3000	  
replace	  indexedctcphasein	  =	  0	  if	  indexedctcphasein	  >=	  indexedmaxctc	  
	  
gen	  indexedctcphaseout	  =	  (-­‐.05)	  *	  (familyearnings	  -­‐	  110000)	  +	  indexedmaxctc	  
replace	  indexedctcphaseout	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  110000	  
replace	  indexedctcphaseout	  =	  0	  if	  indexedctcphaseout	  <	  0	  
	  
gen	  indexednoctcrich	  =	  1	  if	  familyearnings	  >	  110000	  &	  indexedctcphaseout	  ==	  0	  
	  
gen	  indexedfamilyctc	  =	  indexedmaxctc	  
replace	  indexedfamilyctc	  =	  indexedctcphasein	  if	  indexedctcphasein	  <	  indexedmaxctc	  &	  
indexedctcphasein	  !=	  0	  
replace	  indexedfamilyctc	  =	  indexedctcphaseout	  if	  indexedctcphaseout	  <	  indexedmaxctc	  &	  
indexedctcphaseout	  !=	  0	  
replace	  indexedfamilyctc	  =	  0	  if	  (noctcpoor	  ==	  1	  |	  indexednoctcrich	  ==	  1)	  
	  
replace	  indexedfamilyctc	  =	  .	  if	  familystatus	  ==	  .	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gen	  indexedctc	  =	  indexedfamilyctc	  /	  totchild	  
	   	  
gen	  indexedctccat	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  ==	  0	  
	   replace	  indexedctccat	  =	  1	  if	  noctcpoor	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  
	   replace	  indexedctccat	  =	  2	  if	  indexedctcphasein	  !=	  0	  
	   replace	  indexedctccat	  =	  3	  if	  indexedfamilyctc	  ==	  indexedmaxctc	  
	   replace	  indexedctccat	  =	  4	  if	  indexedctcphaseout	  !=	  0	  
	   replace	  indexedctccat	  =	  5	  if	  indexednoctcrich	  ==	  1	  
	   replace	  indexedctccat	  =	  .	  if	  	  chage1	  >=	  17	  
	  
label	  def	  indexedctccat	  0	  "notworking"	  1	  "noctcpoorworking"	  ///	  
	   2	  "ctcphasein"	  3	  "fullctc"	  4	  "ctcphaseout"	  5	  "noctcrich"	  
	   label	  val	  indexedctccat	  indexedctccat	  
	  
/*****	  generate	  CTCpreARRA	  variable*****/	  
	  
gen	  CTCphaseinpreARRA	  =	  (familyearnings	  -­‐	  12550)	  *	  (.15)	  
replace	  CTCphaseinpreARRA	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  12550	  
replace	  CTCphaseinpreARRA	  =	  0	  if	  CTCphaseinpreARRA	  >=	  maxctc	  
	  
gen	  noctcpoorpreARRA	  =	  1	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  12550	  
	  
gen	  preARRAfamilyctc	  =	  maxctc	  
replace	  preARRAfamilyctc	  =	  CTCphaseinpreARRA	  if	  CTCphaseinpreARRA	  <	  maxctc	  &	  
CTCphaseinpreARRA	  !=	  0	  
replace	  preARRAfamilyctc	  =	  ctcphaseout	  if	  ctcphaseout	  <	  maxctc	  &	  ctcphaseout	  !=	  0	  
replace	  preARRAfamilyctc	  =	  0	  if	  (noctcpoorpreARRA	  ==	  1	  |	  noctcrich	  ==	  1)	  
	  
replace	  preARRAfamilyctc	  =	  .	  if	  familystatus	  ==	  .	  
	  
gen	  preARRActc	  =	  preARRAfamilyctc	  /	  totchild	  	  
	   	  
gen	  preARRActccat	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  ==	  0	  
	   replace	  preARRActccat	  =	  1	  if	  noctcpoorpreARRA	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  
	   replace	  preARRActccat	  =	  2	  if	  CTCphaseinpreARRA	  !=	  0	  
	   replace	  preARRActccat	  =	  3	  if	  preARRAfamilyctc	  ==	  maxctc	  
	   replace	  preARRActccat	  =	  4	  if	  ctcphaseout	  !=	  0	  
	   replace	  preARRActccat	  =	  5	  if	  noctcrich	  ==	  1	  
	   replace	  preARRActccat	  =	  .	  if	  	  chage1	  >=	  17	  
	   	  
label	  def	  preARRActccat	  0	  "notworking"	  1	  "noctcpoorworking"	  ///	  
	   2	  "ctcphasein"	  3	  "fullctc"	  4	  "ctcphaseout"	  5	  "noctcrich"	  
	   label	  val	  preARRActccat	  preARRActccat	  
	   	  
gen	  increasedctc	  =	  ctc	  -­‐	  preARRActc	  
gen	  increasedfamilyctc	  =	  familyctc	  -­‐	  preARRAfamilyctc	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/*****	  generate	  EITC	  variable*****/	  
gen	  eitcfamily	  =	  1	  if	  totchild	  ==	  1	  &	  (familystatus	  ==2	  |	  familystatus	  ==	  3)	  
	   replace	  eitcfamily	  =	  2	  if	  totchild	  ==	  1	  &	  (familystatus	  ==1)	  
	   replace	  eitcfamily	  =	  3	  if	  totchild	  ==	  2	  &	  (familystatus	  ==2	  |	  familystatus	  ==	  3)	  
	   replace	  eitcfamily	  =	  4	  if	  totchild	  ==	  2	  &	  (familystatus	  ==1)	  
	   replace	  eitcfamily	  =	  5	  if	  totchild	  >=	  3	  &	  (familystatus	  ==2	  |	  familystatus	  ==	  3)	  
	   replace	  eitcfamily	  =	  6	  if	  totchild	  >=	  3	  &	  (familystatus	  ==1)	  
	  
label	  def	  eitcfamily	  1	  "one	  kid,	  single"	  2	  "one	  kid,	  married"	  ///	  	  
	   3	  "two	  kids,	  single"	  4	  "two	  kids,	  married"	  ///	  
	   5	  "3+	  kids,	  single"	  6	  "3+	  kids,	  married"	  
	   label	  val	  eitcfamily	  eitcfamily	  
	  
gen	  maxeitc	  =	  3050	  if	  eitcfamily	  ==	  1	  |	  eitcfamily	  ==	  2	  
	   replace	  maxeitc	  =	  5036	  if	  eitcfamily	  ==	  3	  |	  eitcfamily	  ==	  4	  
	   replace	  maxeitc	  =	  5666	  if	  eitcfamily	  ==	  5	  |	  eitcfamily	  ==	  6	  
	   	  
gen	  eitcphasein	  =	  0	  
	   replace	  eitcphasein	  =	  .34	  *	  familyearnings	  if	  ///	  
	   	   (eitcfamily	  ==	  1	  |	  eitcfamily	  ==	  2)	  &	  familyearnings	  <	  8970	  
	   replace	  eitcphasein	  =	  .40	  *	  familyearnings	  if	  ///	  
	   	   (eitcfamily	  ==	  3	  |	  eitcfamily	  ==	  4)	  &	  familyearnings	  <	  12590	  
	   replace	  eitcphasein	  =	  .45	  *	  familyearnings	  if	  ///	  
	   	   (eitcfamily	  ==	  5	  |	  eitcfamily	  ==	  6)	  &	  familyearnings	  <	  12590	  
	   	  
gen	  eitcphaseout	  =	  0	  
	   replace	  eitcphaseout	  =	  (-­‐.1598)	  *	  (familyearnings	  -­‐	  16450)	  +	  maxeitc	  if	  ///	  
	   	   eitcfamily	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >16450	  &	  familyearnings	  <	  35535	  
	   replace	  eitcphaseout	  =	  (-­‐.1598)	  *	  (familyearnings	  -­‐	  21460)	  +	  maxeitc	  if	  ///	  
	   	   eitcfamily	  ==	  2	  &	  familyearnings	  >21460	  &	  familyearnings	  <	  40545	  
	   replace	  eitcphaseout	  =	  (-­‐.2106)	  *	  (familyearnings	  -­‐	  16450)	  +	  maxeitc	  if	  ///	  
	   	   eitcfamily	  ==	  3	  &	  familyearnings	  >16450	  &	  familyearnings	  <	  40363	  
	   replace	  eitcphaseout	  =	  (-­‐.2106)	  *	  (familyearnings	  -­‐	  21460)	  +	  maxeitc	  if	  ///	  
	   	   eitcfamily	  ==	  4	  &	  familyearnings	  >21460	  &	  familyearnings	  <	  45373	  
	   replace	  eitcphaseout	  =	  (-­‐.2106)	  *	  (familyearnings	  -­‐	  16450)	  +	  maxeitc	  if	  ///	  
	   	   eitcfamily	  ==	  5	  &	  familyearnings	  >16450	  &	  familyearnings	  <	  43352	  
	   replace	  eitcphaseout	  =	  (-­‐.2106)	  *	  (familyearnings	  -­‐	  21460)	  +	  maxeitc	  if	  ///	  
	   	   eitcfamily	  ==	  6	  &	  familyearnings	  >21460	  &	  familyearnings	  <	  48362	  
	   replace	  eitcphaseout	  =	  0	  if	  eitcphaseout	  <	  0	  
	  
gen	  noeitcpoor	  =	  1	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  0	  
	  
gen	  noeitcrich	  =	  1	  if	  eitcfamily	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >=	  35535	  
	   replace	  	  noeitcrich	  =	  1	  if	  eitcfamily	  ==	  2	  &	  familyearnings	  >=	  40545	  
	   replace	  	  noeitcrich	  =	  1	  if	  eitcfamily	  ==	  3	  &	  familyearnings	  >=	  40363	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   replace	  	  noeitcrich	  =	  1	  if	  eitcfamily	  ==	  4	  &	  familyearnings	  >=	  45373	  
	   replace	  	  noeitcrich	  =	  1	  if	  eitcfamily	  ==	  5	  &	  familyearnings	  >=	  43352	  
	   replace	  	  noeitcrich	  =	  1	  if	  eitcfamily	  ==	  6	  &	  familyearnings	  >=	  48362	  
	  
gen	  familyeitc	  =	  maxeitc	  
	   replace	  familyeitc	  =	  eitcphasein	  if	  eitcphasein	  <	  maxeitc	  &	  eitcphasein	  !=	  0	  
	   replace	  familyeitc	  =	  eitcphaseout	  if	  eitcphaseout	  <	  maxeitc	  &	  eitcphaseout	  !=	  0	  
	   replace	  familyeitc	  =	  0	  if	  (noeitcpoor	  ==	  1	  |	  noeitcrich	  ==	  1)	  
	  
gen	  eitc	  =	  familyeitc	  /	  totchild	  
	   	  
gen	  eitccat	  =	  1	  if	  noeitcpoor	  ==	  1	  
	   replace	  eitccat	  =	  2	  if	  eitcphasein	  !=	  0	  
	   replace	  eitccat	  =	  3	  if	  familyeitc	  ==	  maxeitc	  
	   replace	  eitccat	  =	  4	  if	  eitcphaseout	  !=	  0	  
	   replace	  eitccat	  =	  5	  if	  noeitcrich	  ==	  1	  
	   replace	  eitccat	  =	  .	  if	  	  chage1	  >=	  17	  
	  
label	  def	  eitccat	  1	  "noeitcpoor"	  2	  "eitcphasein"	  3	  "fulleitc"	  ///	  
	   4	  "eitcphaseout"	  5	  "noeitcrich"	  
	   label	  val	  eitccat	  eitccat	  
	  
/*****	  generate	  kidcredits	  variable*****/	  
gen	  familycredits	  =	  familyctc	  +	  familyeitc	  
gen	  kidcredits	  =	  ctc	  +	  eitc	  
	  
/*****	  label	  poverty	  ratio*****/	  
label	  def	  povertyratio	  1	  "Under	  .50"	  2	  ".50	  to	  .74"	  ///	  	  
	   3	  ".75	  to	  .99"	  4	  "1.00	  to	  1.24"	  5	  "1.25	  to	  1.49"	  6	  "1.50	  to	  1.74"	  ///	  
	   7	  "1.75	  to	  1.99"	  8	  "2.00	  to	  2.49"	  9	  "2.50	  to	  2.99"	  10	  "	  3.00	  to	  3.49"	  ///	  
	   11	  "3.50	  to	  3.99"	  12	  "	  4.00	  to	  4.49"	  13	  "4.50	  to	  4.99"	  14	  "5.00	  and	  over"	  
	   label	  val	  povertyratio	  povertyratio	  
	   	  
gen	  poverty50pct	  =	  1	  if	  povertyratio	  ==	  1	  
gen	  poverty100pct	  =	  1	  if	  povertyratio	  <	  4	  
gen	  poverty150pct	  =	  1	  if	  povertyratio	  <	  6	  
gen	  poverty200pct	  =	  1	  if	  povertyratio	  <	  8	  
	  
/*****generate	  lifted	  above	  poverty	  variables*******************************/	  
gen	  liftedabovepoverty	  =	  1	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  (familyincome	  +	  familyctc)	  >=	  povertylevel	  
	   replace	  liftedabovepoverty	  =	  0	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  (familyincome	  +	  familyctc)	  <	  
povertylevel	  
gen	  liftedabovepovertypreARRA	  =	  1	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  (familyincome	  +	  preARRAfamilyctc)	  
>=	  povertylevel	  
	   replace	  liftedabovepovertypreARRA	  =	  0	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  (familyincome	  +	  
preARRAfamilyctc)	  <	  povertylevel	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gen	  liftedabovepovertybyARRA	  =	  1	  if	  liftedabovepoverty	  ==1	  &	  
liftedabovepovertypreARRA	  ==	  0	  
	   replace	  liftedabovepovertybyARRA	  =	  0	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  
liftedabovepovertybyARRA	  !=	  1	  
	  
/***************generate	  CTC	  variable**********************	  
	  
gen	  maxctc	  =	  1000	  *	  totchild	  
	  
gen	  ctcphasein	  =	  (familyearnings	  -­‐	  3000)	  *	  (.15)	  
replace	  ctcphasein	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  3000	  
replace	  ctcphasein	  =	  0	  if	  ctcphasein	  >=	  maxctc	  
	  
gen	  ctcphaseout	  =	  (-­‐.05)	  *	  (familyearnings	  -­‐	  110000)	  +	  maxctc	  
replace	  ctcphaseout	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  110000	  
replace	  ctcphaseout	  =	  0	  if	  ctcphaseout	  <	  0	  
	  
gen	  noctcpoor	  =	  1	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  3000	  
gen	  noctcrich	  =	  1	  if	  familyearnings	  >	  110000	  &	  ctcphaseout	  ==	  0	  
	  
gen	  familyctc	  =	  maxctc	  
replace	  familyctc	  =	  ctcphasein	  if	  ctcphasein	  <	  maxctc	  &	  ctcphasein	  !=	  0	  
replace	  familyctc	  =	  ctcphaseout	  if	  ctcphaseout	  <	  maxctc	  &	  ctcphaseout	  !=	  0	  
replace	  familyctc	  =	  0	  if	  (noctcpoor	  ==	  1	  |	  noctcrich	  ==	  1)	  
	  
replace	  familyctc	  =	  .	  if	  familystatus	  ==	  .	  
	  
gen	  ctc	  =	  familyctc	  /	  totchild	  	  
	   	  
gen	  ctccat	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  ==	  0	  
	   replace	  ctccat	  =	  1	  if	  noctcpoor	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  
	   replace	  ctccat	  =	  2	  if	  ctcphasein	  !=	  0	  
	   replace	  ctccat	  =	  3	  if	  familyctc	  ==	  maxctc	  
	   replace	  ctccat	  =	  4	  if	  ctcphaseout	  !=	  0	  
	   replace	  ctccat	  =	  5	  if	  noctcrich	  ==	  1	  
	   replace	  ctccat	  =	  .	  if	  	  chage1	  >=	  17	  
	  
label	  def	  ctccat	  0	  "notworking"	  1	  "noctcpoorworking"	  ///	  
	   2	  "ctcphasein"	  3	  "fullctc"	  4	  "ctcphaseout"	  5	  "noctcrich"	  




/***************generate	  ctc	  alternative	  policy	  variables*********************/	  
/***lower	  eligibility	  threshold	  to	  0	  -­‐	  House	  ARRA	  proposal*********************/	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gen	  zerothresholdphasein	  =	  (familyearnings)	  *	  (.15)	  
replace	  zerothresholdphasein	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  0	  
replace	  zerothresholdphasein	  =	  0	  if	  zerothresholdphasein	  >=	  maxctc	  
	  
gen	  zerothresholdnoctcpoor	  =	  1	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  0	  
	  
gen	  zerothresholdfamilyctc	  =	  maxctc	  
replace	  zerothresholdfamilyctc	  =	  zerothresholdphasein	  if	  zerothresholdphasein	  <	  maxctc	  &	  
zerothresholdphasein	  !=	  0	  
replace	  zerothresholdfamilyctc	  =	  ctcphaseout	  if	  ctcphaseout	  <	  maxctc	  &	  ctcphaseout	  !=	  0	  
replace	  zerothresholdfamilyctc	  =	  0	  if	  (zerothresholdnoctcpoor	  ==	  1	  |	  noctcrich	  ==	  1)	  
	  
replace	  zerothresholdfamilyctc	  =	  .	  if	  familystatus	  ==	  .	  
	  
gen	  zerothresholdctc	  =	  zerothresholdfamilyctc	  /	  totchild	  	  
	   	  
gen	  zerothresholdctccat	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  ==	  0	  
	   replace	  zerothresholdctccat	  =	  1	  if	  zerothresholdnoctcpoor	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  
	   replace	  zerothresholdctccat	  =	  2	  if	  zerothresholdphasein	  !=	  0	  
	   replace	  zerothresholdctccat	  =	  3	  if	  zerothresholdfamilyctc	  ==	  maxctc	  
	   replace	  zerothresholdctccat	  =	  4	  if	  ctcphaseout	  !=	  0	  
	   replace	  zerothresholdctccat	  =	  5	  if	  noctcrich	  ==	  1	  
	   replace	  zerothresholdctccat	  =	  .	  if	  	  chage1	  >=	  17	  
	  
label	  def	  zerothresholdctccat	  0	  "notworking"	  1	  "noctcpoorworking"	  ///	  
	   2	  "ctcphasein"	  3	  "fullctc"	  4	  "ctcphaseout"	  5	  "noctcrich"	  
	   label	  val	  zerothresholdctccat	  zerothresholdctccat	  
	   	  
gen	  zerothresholdincreasefamily	  =	  zerothresholdfamilyctc	  -­‐	  familyctc	  
gen	  zerothresholdincrease	  =	  zerothresholdctc	  -­‐	  ctc	  
	  
	  
/***full	  refundability	  for	  low-­‐income	  kids	  -­‐	  D.	  House	  budget	  2003	  proposal*****/	  
	  
gen	  fullrefundabilityfamily	  =	  maxctc	  
replace	  fullrefundabilityfamily	  =	  ctcphaseout	  if	  ctcphaseout	  <	  maxctc	  &	  ctcphaseout	  !=	  0	  
replace	  fullrefundabilityfamily	  =	  0	  if	  noctcrich	  ==	  1	  
	  
replace	  fullrefundabilityfamily	  =	  .	  if	  familystatus	  ==	  .	  
	  
gen	  fullrefundabilityctc	  =	  fullrefundabilityfamily	  /	  totchild	  	  
	  
gen	  fullrefundabilityctccat	  =	  3	  if	  fullrefundabilityfamily	  ==	  maxctc	  
	   replace	  fullrefundabilityctccat	  =	  4	  if	  ctcphaseout	  !=	  0	  
	   replace	  fullrefundabilityctccat	  =	  5	  if	  noctcrich	  ==	  1	  
	   replace	  fullrefundabilityctccat	  =	  .	  if	  	  chage1	  >=	  17	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label	  def	  fullrefundabilityctccat	  3	  "fullctc"	  ///	  
	   4	  "ctcphaseout"	  5	  "noctcrich"	  
	   label	  val	  fullrefundabilityctccat	  fullrefundabilityctccat	  
	   	  
gen	  fullrefundabilityincreasefamily	  =	  fullrefundabilityfamily	  -­‐	  familyctc	  
gen	  fullrefundabilityincrease	  =	  fullrefundabilityctc	  -­‐	  ctc	  
	   	  
/***double	  ctc	  for	  kids	  5	  and	  under	  (Schumer	  plus)**************************/	  
	  
gen	  schumermaxctc	  =	  (1000	  *	  nchild616)	  +	  (2000	  *	  nchild05)	  
	  
gen	  schumerctcphasein	  =	  (familyearnings	  -­‐	  3000)	  *	  (((.15	  *	  nchild616)	  +	  (.3	  *	  nchild05))	  /	  
totchild)	  
replace	  schumerctcphasein	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  3000	  
replace	  schumerctcphasein	  =	  0	  if	  schumerctcphasein	  >=	  schumermaxctc	  
	  
gen	  schumerctcphaseout	  =	  (((-­‐.05	  *	  nchild616)	  +	  (-­‐.025	  *	  nchild05))	  /	  totchild)	  *	  
(familyearnings	  -­‐	  110000)	  +	  schumermaxctc	  
replace	  schumerctcphaseout	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  110000	  
replace	  schumerctcphaseout	  =	  0	  if	  schumerctcphaseout	  <	  0	  
	  
gen	  schumernoctcrich	  =	  1	  if	  familyearnings	  >	  110000	  &	  schumerctcphaseout	  ==	  0	  
	  
gen	  schumerfamilyctc	  =	  schumermaxctc	  
replace	  schumerfamilyctc	  =	  schumerctcphasein	  if	  schumerctcphasein	  <	  schumermaxctc	  &	  
schumerctcphasein	  !=	  0	  
replace	  schumerfamilyctc	  =	  schumerctcphaseout	  if	  schumerctcphaseout	  <	  schumermaxctc	  
&	  schumerctcphaseout	  !=	  0	  
replace	  schumerfamilyctc	  =	  0	  if	  (noctcpoor	  ==	  1	  |	  schumernoctcrich	  ==	  1)	  
	  
gen	  schumerctc	  =	  schumerfamilyctc	  /	  totchild	  	  
	  
gen	  schumerctccat	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  ==	  0	  
	   replace	  schumerctccat	  =	  1	  if	  noctcpoor	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  
	   replace	  schumerctccat	  =	  2	  if	  schumerctcphasein	  !=	  0	  &	  schumerctc	  <	  1000	  
	   replace	  schumerctccat	  =	  3	  if	  schumerfamilyctc	  ==	  schumermaxctc	  ///	  
	   	   |	  (schumerctcphasein	  !=	  0	  &	  schumerctc	  >=	  1000)	  |	  (schumerctcphaseout	  !=	  
0	  &	  schumerctc	  >=	  1000)	  
	   replace	  schumerctccat	  =	  4	  if	  schumerctcphaseout	  !=	  0	  &	  schumerctc	  <	  1000	  
	   replace	  schumerctccat	  =	  5	  if	  schumernoctcrich	  ==	  1	  
	   replace	  schumerctccat	  =	  .	  if	  	  chage1	  >=	  17	  
	  
label	  def	  schumerctccat	  0	  "notworking"	  1	  "noctcpoorworking"	  ///	  
	   2	  "ctcphasein"	  3	  "fullctc"	  4	  "ctcphaseout"	  5	  "noctcrich"	  
	   label	  val	  schumerctccat	  schumerctccat	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gen	  schumerincreasefamily	  =	  schumerfamilyctc	  -­‐	  familyctc	  
gen	  schumerincreasectc	  =	  schumerctc	  -­‐	  ctc	  
	   	  
	   	  
/***triple	  ctc	  for	  all	  kids	  (Santorum	  plus)************************************/	  
	  
gen	  santorummaxctc	  =	  3000	  *	  totchild	  
	  
gen	  santorumctcphasein	  =	  (familyearnings	  -­‐	  3000)	  *	  (.15)	  
replace	  santorumctcphasein	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  3000	  
replace	  santorumctcphasein	  =	  0	  if	  santorumctcphasein	  >=	  santorummaxctc	  
	  
gen	  santorumctcphaseout	  =	  (-­‐.05)	  *	  (familyearnings	  -­‐	  110000)	  +	  santorummaxctc	  
replace	  santorumctcphaseout	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  110000	  
replace	  santorumctcphaseout	  =	  0	  if	  santorumctcphaseout	  <	  0	  
	  
gen	  santorumnoctcrich	  =	  1	  if	  familyearnings	  >	  110000	  &	  santorumctcphaseout	  ==	  0	  
	  
gen	  santorumfamilyctc	  =	  santorummaxctc	  
replace	  santorumfamilyctc	  =	  santorumctcphasein	  if	  santorumctcphasein	  <	  
santorummaxctc	  &	  santorumctcphasein	  !=	  0	  
replace	  santorumfamilyctc	  =	  santorumctcphaseout	  if	  santorumctcphaseout	  <	  
santorummaxctc	  &	  santorumctcphaseout	  !=	  0	  
replace	  santorumfamilyctc	  =	  0	  if	  (noctcpoor	  ==	  1	  |	  santorumnoctcrich	  ==	  1)	  
	  
replace	  santorumfamilyctc	  =	  .	  if	  familystatus	  ==	  .	  
	  
gen	  santorumctc	  =	  santorumfamilyctc	  /	  totchild	  	  
	   	  
gen	  santorumctccat	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  ==	  0	  
	   replace	  santorumctccat	  =	  1	  if	  noctcpoor	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  
	   replace	  santorumctccat	  =	  2	  if	  santorumctcphasein	  !=	  0	  &	  santorumctc	  <	  1000	  
	   replace	  santorumctccat	  =	  3	  if	  santorumfamilyctc	  ==	  santorummaxctc	  ///	  
	   	   |	  (santorumctcphasein	  !=	  0	  &	  santorumctc	  >=	  1000)	  |	  
(santorumctcphaseout	  !=	  0	  &	  santorumctc	  >=	  1000)	  
	   replace	  santorumctccat	  =	  4	  if	  santorumctcphaseout	  !=	  0	  &	  santorumctc	  <	  1000	  
	   replace	  santorumctccat	  =	  5	  if	  santorumnoctcrich	  ==	  1	  
	   replace	  santorumctccat	  =	  .	  if	  	  chage1	  >=	  17	  
	  
label	  def	  santorumctccat	  0	  "notworking"	  1	  "noctcpoorworking"	  ///	  
	   2	  "ctcphasein"	  3	  "fullctc"	  4	  "ctcphaseout"	  5	  "noctcrich"	  
	   label	  val	  santorumctccat	  santorumctccat	  
	  
gen	  santorumincreasefamily	  =	  santorumfamilyctc	  -­‐	  familyctc	  
gen	  santorumincreasectc	  =	  santorumctc	  -­‐	  ctc	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/***increase	  ctc	  to	  1255	  and	  index***************************************/	  
	  
gen	  max1255ctc	  =	  1255	  *	  totchild	  
	  
gen	  ctc1255phasein	  =	  (familyearnings	  -­‐	  3000)	  *	  (.15)	  
replace	  ctc1255phasein	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  3000	  
replace	  ctc1255phasein	  =	  0	  if	  ctc1255phasein	  >=	  max1255ctc	  
	  
gen	  ctc1255phaseout	  =	  (-­‐.05)	  *	  (familyearnings	  -­‐	  110000)	  +	  max1255ctc	  
replace	  ctc1255phaseout	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  110000	  
replace	  ctc1255phaseout	  =	  0	  if	  ctc1255phaseout	  <	  0	  
	  
gen	  noctc1255rich	  =	  1	  if	  familyearnings	  >	  110000	  &	  ctc1255phaseout	  ==	  0	  
	  
gen	  family1255ctc	  =	  max1255ctc	  
replace	  family1255ctc	  =	  ctc1255phasein	  if	  ctc1255phasein	  <	  max1255ctc	  &	  
ctc1255phasein	  !=	  0	  
replace	  family1255ctc	  =	  ctc1255phaseout	  if	  ctc1255phaseout	  <	  max1255ctc	  &	  
ctc1255phaseout	  !=	  0	  
replace	  family1255ctc	  =	  0	  if	  (noctcpoor	  ==	  1	  |	  noctc1255rich	  ==	  1)	  
	  
gen	  ctc1255	  =	  family1255ctc	  /	  totchild	  
	   	  
gen	  ctc1255cat	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  ==	  0	  
	   replace	  ctc1255cat	  =	  1	  if	  noctcpoor	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  
	   replace	  ctc1255cat	  =	  2	  if	  ctc1255phasein	  !=	  0	  &	  ctc1255	  <	  1000	  
	   replace	  ctc1255cat	  =	  3	  if	  family1255ctc	  ==	  max1255ctc	  ///	  
	   	   |	  (ctc1255phasein	  !=	  0	  &	  ctc1255	  >=	  1000)	  |	  (ctc1255phaseout	  !=	  0	  &	  
ctc1255	  >=	  1000)	  	  
	   replace	  ctc1255cat	  =	  4	  if	  ctc1255phaseout	  !=	  0	  &	  ctc1255	  <	  1000	  
	   replace	  ctc1255cat	  =	  5	  if	  noctc1255rich	  ==	  1	  
	  
label	  def	  ctc1255cat	  0	  "notworking"	  1	  "noctcpoorworking"	  ///	  
	   2	  "ctcphasein"	  3	  "fullctc"	  4	  "ctcphaseout"	  5	  "noctcrich"	  
	   label	  val	  ctc1255cat	  ctc1255cat	  
	  
gen	  ctc1255increasefamily	  =	  family1255ctc	  -­‐	  familyctc	  
gen	  ctc1255increasectc	  =	  ctc1255	  -­‐	  ctc	  
	  
/***change	  phasein	  to	  15%	  per	  child***************************************/	  
	  
gen	  ctc15perchildphasein	  =	  (familyearnings	  -­‐	  3000)	  *	  (.15	  *	  totchild)	  
replace	  ctc15perchildphasein	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  3000	  
replace	  ctc15perchildphasein	  =	  0	  if	  ctc15perchildphasein	  >=	  maxctc	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gen	  family15perchildctc	  =	  maxctc	  
replace	  family15perchildctc	  =	  ctc15perchildphasein	  if	  ctc15perchildphasein	  <	  maxctc	  &	  
ctc15perchildphasein	  !=	  0	  
replace	  family15perchildctc	  =	  ctcphaseout	  if	  ctcphaseout	  <	  maxctc	  &	  ctcphaseout	  !=	  0	  
replace	  family15perchildctc	  =	  0	  if	  (noctcpoor	  ==	  1	  |	  noctcrich	  ==	  1)	  
	  
replace	  family15perchildctc	  =	  .	  if	  familystatus	  ==	  .	  
	  
gen	  ctc15perchild	  =	  family15perchildctc	  /	  totchild	  
	   	  
gen	  ctc15perchildcat	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  ==	  0	  
	   replace	  ctc15perchildcat	  =	  1	  if	  noctcpoor	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  
	   replace	  ctc15perchildcat	  =	  2	  if	  ctc15perchildphasein	  !=	  0	  
	   replace	  ctc15perchildcat	  =	  3	  if	  family15perchildctc	  ==	  maxctc	  
	   replace	  ctc15perchildcat	  =	  4	  if	  ctcphaseout	  !=	  0	  
	   replace	  ctc15perchildcat	  =	  5	  if	  noctcrich	  ==	  1	  
	   replace	  ctc15perchildcat	  =	  .	  if	  	  chage1	  >=	  17	  
	  
label	  def	  ctc15perchildcat	  0	  "notworking"	  1	  "noctcpoorworking"	  ///	  
	   2	  "ctcphasein"	  3	  "fullctc"	  4	  "ctcphaseout"	  5	  "noctcrich"	  
	   label	  val	  ctc15perchildcat	  ctc15perchildcat	  
	  
gen	  ctc15perchildincreasefamily	  =	  family15perchildctc	  -­‐	  familyctc	  
gen	  ctc15perchildincreasectc	  =	  ctc15perchild	  -­‐	  ctc	  
	  
/**change	  phasein	  to	  10%	  of	  maxctc	  for	  each	  $1,000	  of	  earnings	  @	  first	  $	  of	  earnings**/	  
	  
gen	  ctctiedphasein	  =	  (familyearnings/1000)	  *	  (maxctc)	  *	  (.10)	  
replace	  ctctiedphasein	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  0	  
replace	  ctctiedphasein	  =	  0	  if	  ctctiedphasein	  >=	  maxctc	  
	  
gen	  noctctiedphaseinpoor	  =	  1	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  0	  
	  
gen	  familytiedphaseinctc	  =	  maxctc	  
replace	  familytiedphaseinctc	  =	  ctctiedphasein	  if	  ctctiedphasein	  <	  maxctc	  &	  
ctctiedphasein	  !=	  0	  
replace	  familytiedphaseinctc	  =	  ctcphaseout	  if	  ctcphaseout	  <	  maxctc	  &	  ctcphaseout	  !=	  0	  
replace	  familytiedphaseinctc	  =	  0	  if	  (noctctiedphaseinpoor	  ==	  1	  |	  noctcrich	  ==	  1)	  
	  
replace	  familytiedphaseinctc	  =	  .	  if	  familystatus	  ==	  .	  
	  
gen	  tiedphaseinctc	  =	  familytiedphaseinctc	  /	  totchild	  	  
	  
gen	  tiedphaseinctccat	  =	  1	  if	  familyearnings	  ==	  0	  
	   replace	  tiedphaseinctccat	  =	  2	  if	  ctctiedphasein	  !=	  0	  
	   replace	  tiedphaseinctccat	  =	  3	  if	  familytiedphaseinctc	  ==	  maxctc	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   replace	  tiedphaseinctccat	  =	  4	  if	  ctcphaseout	  !=	  0	  
	   replace	  tiedphaseinctccat	  =	  5	  if	  noctcrich	  ==	  1	  
	   replace	  tiedphaseinctccat	  =	  .	  if	  	  chage1	  >=	  17	  
	  
label	  def	  tiedphaseinctccat	  1	  "notworking"	  ///	  
	   2	  "ctcphasein"	  3	  "fullctc"	  4	  "ctcphaseout"	  5	  "noctcrich"	  
	   label	  val	  tiedphaseinctccat	  tiedphaseinctccat	  
	   	  
gen	  tiedphaseinincreasefamily	  =	  familytiedphaseinctc	  -­‐	  familyctc	  
gen	  tiedphaseinincreasectc	  =	  tiedphaseinctc	  -­‐	  ctc	  
	  
/**change	  phasein	  to	  15%	  of	  maxctc	  for	  each	  $1,000	  of	  earnings	  @	  first	  $	  of	  earnings**/	  
	  
gen	  ctctiedphaseinb	  =	  (familyearnings/1000)	  *	  (maxctc)	  *	  (.15)	  
replace	  ctctiedphaseinb	  =	  0	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  0	  
replace	  ctctiedphaseinb	  =	  0	  if	  ctctiedphaseinb	  >=	  maxctc	  
	  
gen	  noctctiedphaseinpoorb	  =	  1	  if	  familyearnings	  <=	  0	  
	  
gen	  familytiedphaseinctcb	  =	  maxctc	  
replace	  familytiedphaseinctcb	  =	  ctctiedphaseinb	  if	  ctctiedphaseinb	  <	  maxctc	  &	  
ctctiedphaseinb	  !=	  0	  
replace	  familytiedphaseinctcb	  =	  ctcphaseout	  if	  ctcphaseout	  <	  maxctc	  &	  ctcphaseout	  !=	  0	  
replace	  familytiedphaseinctcb	  =	  0	  if	  (noctctiedphaseinpoorb	  ==	  1	  |	  noctcrich	  ==	  1)	  
	  
replace	  familytiedphaseinctcb	  =	  .	  if	  familystatus	  ==	  .	  
	  
gen	  tiedphaseinctcb	  =	  familytiedphaseinctcb	  /	  totchild	  	  
	  
gen	  tiedphaseinctccatb	  =	  1	  if	  familyearnings	  ==	  0	  
	   replace	  tiedphaseinctccatb	  =	  2	  if	  ctctiedphaseinb	  !=	  0	  
	   replace	  tiedphaseinctccatb	  =	  3	  if	  familytiedphaseinctcb	  ==	  maxctc	  
	   replace	  tiedphaseinctccatb	  =	  4	  if	  ctcphaseout	  !=	  0	  
	   replace	  tiedphaseinctccatb	  =	  5	  if	  noctcrich	  ==	  1	  
	   replace	  tiedphaseinctccatb	  =	  .	  if	  	  chage1	  >=	  17	  
	  
label	  def	  tiedphaseinctccatb	  1	  "notworking"	  ///	  
	   2	  "ctcphasein"	  3	  "fullctc"	  4	  "ctcphaseout"	  5	  "noctcrich"	  
	   label	  val	  tiedphaseinctccatb	  tiedphaseinctccatb	  
	  
gen	  tiedphaseinbincreasefamily	  =	  familytiedphaseinctcb	  -­‐	  familyctc	  
gen	  tiedphaseinbincreasectc	  =	  tiedphaseinctcb	  -­‐	  ctc	   	  
	  
/*******estimate	  those	  lifted	  above	  poverty********/	  
gen	  liftedabovepovertyzerothreshold	  =	  1	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  (familyincome	  +	  
zerothresholdfamilyctc)	  >=	  povertylevel	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   replace	  liftedabovepovertyzerothreshold	  =	  0	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  (familyincome	  +	  
zerothresholdfamilyctc)	  <	  povertylevel	  
	   	  
gen	  liftedabovepovertyfullrefund	  =	  1	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  (familyincome	  +	  
fullrefundabilityfamily)	  >=	  povertylevel	  
	   replace	  liftedabovepovertyfullrefund	  =	  0	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  (familyincome	  +	  
fullrefundabilityfamily)	  <	  povertylevel	  
	  
gen	  liftedabovepovertyschumer	  =	  1	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  (familyincome	  +	  schumerfamilyctc)	  
>=	  povertylevel	  
	   replace	  liftedabovepovertyschumer	  =	  0	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  (familyincome	  +	  
schumerfamilyctc)	  <	  povertylevel	  
	  
gen	  liftedabovepovertysantorum	  =	  1	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  (familyincome	  +	  santorumfamilyctc)	  
>=	  povertylevel	  
	   replace	  liftedabovepovertysantorum	  =	  0	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  (familyincome	  +	  
santorumfamilyctc)	  <	  povertylevel	  
	   	  
gen	  liftedabovepovertyctc1255	  =	  1	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  (familyincome	  +	  family1255ctc)	  >=	  
povertylevel	  
	   replace	  liftedabovepovertyctc1255	  =	  0	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  (familyincome	  +	  
family1255ctc)	  <	  povertylevel	  
	   	  
gen	  liftedabovepovertyctc15perchild	  =	  1	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  (familyincome	  +	  
family15perchildctc)	  >=	  povertylevel	  
	   replace	  liftedabovepovertyctc15perchild	  =	  0	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  (familyincome	  +	  
family15perchildctc)	  <	  povertylevel	  
	   	  
gen	  liftedabovepovertytiedphasein	  =	  1	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  (familyincome	  +	  
familytiedphaseinctc)	  >=	  povertylevel	  
	   replace	  liftedabovepovertytiedphasein	  =	  0	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  (familyincome	  +	  
familytiedphaseinctc)	  <	  povertylevel	  
	  
gen	  liftedabovepovertytiedphaseinb	  =	  1	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  (familyincome	  +	  
familytiedphaseinctcb)	  >=	  povertylevel	  
	   replace	  liftedabovepovertytiedphaseinb	  =	  0	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  (familyincome	  +	  
familytiedphaseinctcb)	  <	  povertylevel	  
	  
/*******generate	  earnings	  quintile********/	  
xtile	  earningsquintile	  =	  familyearnings	  [aw=headmarchwgt],	  nq	  (5)	  
xtile	  earningsquintile2	  =	  familyearnings2	  [aw=headmarchwgt],	  nq	  (5)	  
	  
save	  "generatevariablesdata.dta",	  replace	  
	  
clear	  all	  
capture	  log	  close	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cd	  "/Users/davidharris/Desktop/Dissertation/Dissertation	  Data/Dissertation	  
Liana/Dissertation	  Data	  Files/"	  
	  
capture	  log	  close	  	  
	  
local	  mydate:	  di	  %tdCYND	  date(c(current_date),"DMY")	  
log	  using	  log`mydate'.log,	  replace	  
	  
use	  generatevariablesdata.dta,	  clear	  
	  
reshape	  long	  chage	  chrace	  chweight,	  i(uid)	  j(rank)	  
drop	  if	  chage	  ==	  .	  	  
	  
/*****	  generate	  reshaped	  agecategories*****/	  
gen	  rsagegrouping	  =	  1	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  
replace	  rsagegrouping	  =	  2	  if	  chage	  >	  2	  &	  chage	  <	  6	  
replace	  rsagegrouping	  =	  3	  if	  chage	  >	  5	  &	  chage	  <	  14	  
replace	  rsagegrouping	  =	  4	  if	  chage	  >	  13	  &	  chage	  <	  17	  
	  
label	  def	  rsagegrouping	  1	  "age	  0-­‐2"	  2	  "age	  3-­‐5"	  ///	  
	   3	  "age	  6-­‐13"	  4	  "age	  14-­‐16"	  
	   label	  val	  rsagegrouping	  rsagegrouping	  
	  
save	  "reshapevariablesdata.dta",	  replace	  
	  
clear	  all	  
capture	  log	  close	  
cd	  "/Users/davidharris/Desktop/Dissertation/Dissertation	  Data/Dissertation	  
Liana/Dissertation	  Data	  Files/"	  
	  
capture	  log	  close	  	  
	  
local	  mydate:	  di	  %tdCYND	  date(c(current_date),"DMY")	  
log	  using	  log`mydate'.log,	  replace	  
	  
use	  reshapevariablesdata.dta,	  clear	  
	  
/*****Use	  chweight	  instead	  of	  headmarchwgt**********************************/	  
/*****Use	  rsagegrouping	  instead	  of	  agegrouping	  *****************************/	  
	  
/*****TABLE	  1**************************************************/	  
	   	  
/********Look	  at	  %	  ineligible	  for	  CTC/EITC**************/	  
tab	  ctccat	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  ctccat	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  ctccat	  if	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	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tab	  eitccat	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  eitccat	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  




/*******distribution	  of	  kidcredits	  by	  race********/	  
tab	  ctccat	  chrace	  [aw=	  chweight],	  column	  nofreq	  
tab	  ctccat	  chrace	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  column	  nofreq	  
tab	  ctccat	  chrace	  if	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  column	  nofreq	  
	  
/*******check	  n	  of	  distribution	  of	  kidcredits	  by	  race********/	  
tab	  ctccat	  chrace	  
	  
/*******ctc	  cat	  by	  familystatus	  for	  under	  3s	  and	  overs********/	  
tab	  ctccat	  familystatus	  [aw=	  chweight],	  column	  nofreq	  
tab	  ctccat	  familystatus	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  column	  nofreq	  





tab	  ctccat	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  ctccat	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  ctccat	  if	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	  
tab	  preARRActccat	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  preARRActccat	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  preARRActccat	  if	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	  
tab	  zerothresholdctc	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  zerothresholdctc	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  zerothresholdctc	  if	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	  
tab	  ctc1255	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  ctc1255	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  ctc1255	  if	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	  
tab	  santorumctc	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  santorumctc	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  santorumctc	  if	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	  
tab	  schumerctc	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  schumerctc	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  schumerctc	  if	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	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tab	  ctc15perchild	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  ctc15perchild	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  ctc15perchild	  if	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	  
tab	  tiedphaseinctc	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  tiedphaseinctc	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  tiedphaseinctc	  if	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	  
tab	  tiedphaseinctcb	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  tiedphaseinctcb	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  tiedphaseinctcb	  if	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	  
tab	  fullrefundabilityctc	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  fullrefundabilityctc	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  





/**************get	  means	  of	  policies	  for	  grossing	  up	  costs**************/	  
tabstat	  preARRActc	  [aw=	  chweight],	  by	  (rsagegrouping)	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  ctc	  [aw=	  chweight],	  by	  (rsagegrouping)	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  zerothresholdctc	  [aw=	  chweight],	  by	  (rsagegrouping)	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  ctc1255	  [aw=	  chweight],	  by	  (rsagegrouping)	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  santorumctc	  [aw=	  chweight],	  by	  (rsagegrouping)	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  schumerctc	  [aw=	  chweight],	  by	  (rsagegrouping)	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  ctc15perchild	  [aw=	  chweight],	  by	  (rsagegrouping)	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  tiedphaseinctc	  [aw=	  chweight],	  by	  (rsagegrouping)	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  tiedphaseinctcb	  [aw=	  chweight],	  by	  (rsagegrouping)	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  fullrefundabilityctc	  [aw=	  chweight],	  by	  (rsagegrouping)	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  eitc	  [aw=	  chweight],	  by	  (rsagegrouping)	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  kidcredits	  [aw=	  chweight],	  by	  (rsagegrouping)	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
	  
/**********FAMILY	  means	  for	  average	  increase	  in	  ctc	  by	  policy*************************/	   	  
	   /**********ALL	  FAMILIES*************************/	  
tabstat	  familyctc	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  preARRAfamilyctc	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  zerothresholdfamilyctc	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  fullrefundabilityfamily	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  schumerfamilyctc	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  santorumfamilyctc	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  family1255ctc	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  family15perchildctc	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  familytiedphaseinctc	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  familytiedphaseinctcb	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	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tabstat	  familyctc	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  preARRAfamilyctc	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  zerothresholdfamilyctc	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  fullrefundabilityfamily	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  schumerfamilyctc	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  santorumfamilyctc	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  family1255ctc	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  family15perchildctc	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  familytiedphaseinctc	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  familytiedphaseinctcb	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
	  
tabstat	  familyctc	  if	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  preARRAfamilyctc	  if	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  zerothresholdfamilyctc	  if	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  fullrefundabilityfamily	  if	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  schumerfamilyctc	  if	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  santorumfamilyctc	  if	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  family1255ctc	  if	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  family15perchildctc	  if	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  familytiedphaseinctc	  if	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  familytiedphaseinctcb	  if	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
	   	  
	   /**********FAMILIES	  in	  POVERTY************************/	  
tabstat	  familyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  preARRAfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  zerothresholdfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  fullrefundabilityfamily	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  schumerfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  santorumfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  family1255ctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  family15perchildctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  familytiedphaseinctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  familytiedphaseinctcb	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
	  
tabstat	  familyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  preARRAfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  
n)	  
tabstat	  zerothresholdfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  
median	  n)	  
tabstat	  fullrefundabilityfamily	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  
median	  n)	  
tabstat	  schumerfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  
n)	  
tabstat	  santorumfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  
n)	  
tabstat	  family1255ctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	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tabstat	  family15perchildctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  
median	  n)	  
tabstat	  familytiedphaseinctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  
median	  n)	  
tabstat	  familytiedphaseinctcb	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  
median	  n)	  
	  
tabstat	  familyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  preARRAfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  
n)	  
tabstat	  zerothresholdfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  
median	  n)	  
tabstat	  fullrefundabilityfamily	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  
median	  n)	  
tabstat	  schumerfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  
n)	  
tabstat	  santorumfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  
median	  n)	  
tabstat	  family1255ctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  family15perchildctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  
median	  n)	  
tabstat	  familytiedphaseinctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  
median	  n)	  
tabstat	  familytiedphaseinctcb	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  
median	  n)	   	  
	   	  
	   /**********FAMILIES	  in	  POVERTY	  w/	  EARNINGS******************/	  
tabstat	  familyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  
n)	  
tabstat	  preARRAfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  
median	  n)	  
tabstat	  zerothresholdfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  
(mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  fullrefundabilityfamily	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  
(mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  schumerfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  
median	  n)	  
tabstat	  santorumfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  
(mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  family1255ctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  
median	  n)	  
tabstat	  family15perchildctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  
(mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  familytiedphaseinctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  
(mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  familytiedphaseinctcb	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	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(mean	  median	  n)	  
	  
tabstat	  familyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  &	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  
(mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  preARRAfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  &	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  
stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  zerothresholdfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  &	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  
chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  fullrefundabilityfamily	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  &	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  
chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  schumerfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  &	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  
stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  santorumfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  &	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  
stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  family1255ctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  &	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  
stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  family15perchildctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  &	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  
chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  familytiedphaseinctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  &	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  
chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  familytiedphaseinctcb	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  &	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  
chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
	  
tabstat	  familyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  &	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  stats	  
(mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  preARRAfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  &	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  
chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  zerothresholdfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  &	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  
chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  fullrefundabilityfamily	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  &	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  
chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  schumerfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  &	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  
stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  santorumfamilyctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  &	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  
chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  family1255ctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  &	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  
stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  family15perchildctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  &	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  
chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  familytiedphaseinctc	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  &	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  
chweight],	  stats	  (mean	  median	  n)	  
tabstat	  familytiedphaseinctcb	  if	  poverty	  ==	  1	  &	  familyearnings	  >	  0	  &	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  






/*******estimate	  %	  of	  kids	  in	  poverty*********/	  
tab	  poverty	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  poverty	  if	  chage	  <=	  16	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  poverty	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
tab	  poverty	  if	  chage	  >=	  3	  &	  chage	  <=	  16	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	  
	  
/*****Look	  at	  how	  many	  kids	  and	  how	  many	  families,**************************/	  
/******and	  how	  many	  infants,	  are	  lifted	  above	  poverty	  line	  by	  CTC	  **********/	  
/******at	  3k	  threshold,	  12550	  threshold,	  and	  other	  iterations***************/	  
	  
tab	  liftedabovepoverty	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	   tab	  liftedabovepoverty	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	   tab	  liftedabovepoverty	  if	  chage	  >=3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	  	  
tab	  liftedabovepovertypreARRA	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	   tab	  liftedabovepovertypreARRA	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	   tab	  liftedabovepovertypreARRA	  if	  chage	  >=3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	  
tab	  liftedabovepovertybyARRA	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	   tab	  liftedabovepovertybyARRA	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	   tab	  liftedabovepovertybyARRA	  if	  chage	  >=3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	  
/*******estimate	  lifted	  above	  poverty	  by	  policy	  fix*********/	  
	  
tab	  liftedabovepovertyzerothreshold	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	   tab	  liftedabovepovertyzerothreshold	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	   tab	  liftedabovepovertyzerothreshold	  if	  chage	  >=3	  [aw=	  chweight]	   	  
	   	  
tab	  liftedabovepovertyfullrefund	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	   tab	  liftedabovepovertyfullrefund	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	   tab	  liftedabovepovertyfullrefund	  if	  chage	  >=3	  [aw=	  chweight]	   	  
	   	  
tab	  liftedabovepovertyschumer	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	   tab	  liftedabovepovertyschumer	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	   tab	  liftedabovepovertyschumer	  if	  chage	  >=3	  [aw=	  chweight]	   	  
	   	  
tab	  liftedabovepovertysantorum	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	   tab	  liftedabovepovertysantorum	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	   tab	  liftedabovepovertysantorum	  if	  chage	  >=3	  [aw=	  chweight]	   	  
	   	  
tab	  liftedabovepovertyctc1255	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	   tab	  liftedabovepovertyctc1255	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	   tab	  liftedabovepovertyctc1255	  if	  chage	  >=3	  [aw=	  chweight]	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tab	  liftedabovepovertyctc15perchild	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	   tab	  liftedabovepovertyctc15perchild	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	   tab	  liftedabovepovertyctc15perchild	  if	  chage	  >=3	  [aw=	  chweight]	   	  
	  
tab	  liftedabovepovertytiedphasein	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	   tab	  liftedabovepovertytiedphasein	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	   tab	  liftedabovepovertytiedphasein	  if	  chage	  >=3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  	  
	  
tab	  liftedabovepovertytiedphaseinb	  [aw=	  chweight]	  
	   tab	  liftedabovepovertytiedphaseinb	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight]	  





/*******#	  of	  families	  who	  benefited	  by	  ARRA********/	  
tab	  ctccat	  preARRActccat	  [aw=	  chweight],	  nofreq	  cell	  
tab	  ctccat	  preARRActccat	  if	  chage	  <	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  nofreq	  cell	  
tab	  ctccat	  preARRActccat	  if	  chage	  >=	  3	  [aw=	  chweight],	  nofreq	  cell	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